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This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the
understanding of the research and development process at the level
of the firm. The existing economic evidence on research and
development lacks thorough understanding of the nature of the
inventive process, even though the volume sponsored by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, "The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity", points to the strikingly micro-character of R and D
activity.
The thesis has several major objectives:- First, to
review the existing economic evidence on research and development
and to point to any firm conclusions from the evidence. Second, to
describe the nature of research and development in the firm, the
characteristics of the inventive process and the decision process
in R and D and the nature of uncertainty inherent in R and D
activity. Third, to accumulate retrospective evidence on the
efficiency of research and development in the firm. Fourth, to
try and build operationally useful models to help R and D management
cope with the sequential,groping and uncertain nature of R and D
activity. These models stress the use of concepts from statistical
decision theory and capital budgeting and are based on the decision
process analysis work carried out in the firms. Fifth, to evaluate
the usefulness and relevance of the rational theories of statistical
decision theory in aiding the solution of the R and D decision
under uncertainty.
The thesis is divided into five parts which present
results under each of the five above headings. Throughout the emphasis
is on econometric and decision analysis work and parts (ii) to (v)
are based on empirical evidence obtained from a case study sample of
firms in the electronics industry in Scoreland.
The final section discusses the usefulness of the
research work and suggests further model-building approaches. Decision
theory is found to be more useful on a conceptual- rather than on
a practical level because of the uncertain character of R and D
activity.
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ECONOMETRIC AND DECISION ANALYSIS STUDIES IN
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ELECTRONICS
INDUSTRY.
INTRODUCTION
The economics of research and development is an area
which is attracting increasing interest from economists and
operational research workers. One of the main reasons for this
interest is the extent of government sponsorship of research in
both Britain and the United States. The reasons for this sponsor¬
ship derive from such policy needs as the drive for technological
change in British industry and the huge efforts expended through
NASA space programs and the Vietnam war effort in the United
States.
A large number of articles has appeared in the management
journals explaining to businessmen how they should manage and
plan their research activities. Almost without exception these
articles show scant awareness of the structure and economic
characteristics of the research and development process at the
firm level. Mansfield ^ goes further and states that the scien¬
tific content of such articles tends to be very low. He makes out
(1) E. Mansfield, "Economics of R and D:- A Survey of Issues,
Findings and Needed Future Research", In V. Terpstra ed. Patents
and Progress; New York: J. Wiley, 1965.
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a case for the study of research and development at the firm
level pointing out the paucity of knowledge with regard to such
things as the nature of research and development, the composi¬
tion of a firm's R and D portfolio and the determinants of the
size of the R and D budget.
This thesis is concerned with the decision processes in
research and development and builds very much upon the work
of Mansfield^ and the RAND Corporation economists, ^ ^ who
pioneered the detailed study of R and D at the firm level. It
tries to outline and make clear the nature of the research and
development decision under uncertainty. As such it draws
heavily upon both the decision theory (where we define decision
theory in the narrow statistical and the broader normative eco¬
nomic context) and the capital budgeting literature. Some of the
problems considered are the resource allocation decisions of
what projects to support and how much to spend on them given
an objective of maximising the return from a given budget.
However, in order to suggest "normative" models to aid
R and D decision-makers in making decisions under uncertainty
our first aim must be to describe the decision process and spell
out the nature of the uncertainties and how they vary through time.
(2) E. Mansfield, Econometric Studies of Industrial Research
and Technological Innovation, New York: W. W. Norton, 1968.
(3) Some of this work is summarised in Rate and Direction
of Inventive Activity - R. R. Nelson (ed.), Princeton: 1962.
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A major objective in this study is thus to describe in great detail
how firms actually make decisions in R and D. For example, we
consider what information decision-makers draw upon and how
far they are constrained by the structure of the organisation with¬
in which they operate. It is considered vital that the processes are
sufficiently well documented and understood before any attempt is
made to construct operationally realistic models of the R and D
process. The second aim of the study is then to suggest model-
building approaches in R and D and, particularly, to discuss the
usefulness and relevance of the rational theories of statistical
(4)decision put forward by the Harvard decision School.
The reasons for studying the research and development
decision rather than other decision problems at the firm level
are an amalgam of several different motives. First, a study of
the economics of science in general was commissioned under
Professor J. N. Wolfe of Edinburgh University and fortunately
the author was asked to contribute to the work because of his
interest in decision theory. This interest had previously led him
to do some pilot work on the marketing decision problems of a
firm in the Edinburgh area which he had decided to abandon be¬
cause of the lack of data and implementation of marketing con¬
cepts in the firm concerned. As this firm was suggested by many
colleagues to be typical of most of those in South East Scotland
(4) See, for example, R. Schlaifer, Probability and Statistics
for Business Decisions, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
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with marketing interests a decision to abandon the marketing
area was thus taken. Second, the research and development
decision, like the new product decision problem in marketing,
is a good example of a decision problem under uncertainty. Third,
the expansion of the electronics industry in Scotland has been a
rapid post-war phenomenon and the captive audience and co¬
operation of some of these firms was essential to the conduct
of the study. Fourth, to try and compare the predictions of eco¬
nomic theory about the firm's motives for undertaking R and D
with those of alternative theories of the firm.
There were several subsidiary reasons for undertaking
this study which derive from the author's careful introduction
to, and growing interest in, Bayesian and subjective probability
methods as a result of a year's fellowship in the School of Business
in Chicago in 1965-66. ^
Once the decision to work in R and D was made much thought
was directed towards how the study should be conducted. As a result
of the author's literature search and discussion with a few self-
selected research engineers, it became clear that the only way
to understand the dynamics of a complex mechanism such as R
and D was to carry out depth or case studies of the decision pro¬
cess at the firm level. Such a method by its very nature has faults.
For example, the firms who co-operated were simply those who
were sufficiently interested in the work to undertake a fairly
severe commitment of time - as such the sample has no general
validity whatsoever. The trade-off for such an approach is clearly
the ability to concentrate on depth rather than breadth of coverage,
i.e., to sacrifice generality for insight.
Within the firms who co-operated, the work was carried
out in three broad stages
(i) An attempt to understand the meaning of R and D
to the firm. The work here sought to find out about the
organisation, finance and management of R and D and to
try and isolate the interactions and feedback mechanisms
linking R and D activity to the firm as a whole and to
other sub-functions within the firm.
(ii) An attempt to carry out a thorough and detailed
analysis of previous historical projects carried out by
the R and D activity. This retrospective analysis helps
to throw light upon the research areas and interests of
the firm, the factors taken into account in deciding
upon particular projects and the degree to which firms
are effective in the research area.
(iii) An attempt to construct and evaluate models for
helping the decision-maker to analyse prospective pro¬
jects for inclusion in the R and D program.
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Of these three stages (i) and (ii) are the descriptive,
analytical material on the decision process and (iii) is the
normative material. The first two stages rely heavily on
the research method and this point will be taken up in detail
in the relevant sections. The third stage is the really diffi¬
cult one in which trade-offs of realism against computational
convenience inevitably have to be made.
The way in which this thesis is organised closely follows
the logic of the organisation of the study. The aim has been to
provide a logical flow in the argument section by section. To
achieve this the material is organised in five parts as follows:
a) Part I:- THE CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM
The evaluation of the economic evidence on R and D
at the firm level and a questioning of the predictions of
the classical economic theory of the firm.
b) Part II:- THE QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY
The first stage in the R and D decision analysis,
i. e. , how decisions are made within the firms analysed.
c) Part III:- THE RETROSPECTIVE STUDY
The second stage in the decision analysis, i. e.
the effectiveness of the firms In their past completed R
and D work.
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d) Part IV:- THE MODEL-BUILDING PHASE
The third stage in the decision analysis, i. e. , the
attempt to formalise quantitatively how decisions are made
and to use rational models to put forward "normative'1 aims.
e) Part V:- SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK AND
CONCLUSIONS
Areas not touched upon by the existing work - direc¬
tions in which further research should be concentrated.
It is traditional in theses to include literature surveys early
on in the thesis. Here, because we have decided to divide the text
into five parts following the distinct phases of the work, we shall
prefer to present literature surveys for each of the parts in turn
whenever they are applicable. In this way the reader should be able
to appreciate the logic of the work much more clearly and thus be
kept in touch with the argument step by step. The only exception to
this is at the beginning where we analyse a fair proportion of
studies in order to provide a realistic justification for studies of
R and D at the micro level.
Finally, it is customary to complete the introductory state¬
ment of intent by summarising the planned aims of the work. First,
to understand the nature of R and D. Second, to present a detailed
analysis of the decision process in R and D. Third, to build models
of an operationally useful nature (if possible) given a thorough
knowledge of the decision process. Fourth, to speculate on the
usefulness of "normative" theories of statistical decision.
It will be clear at the end whether we have succeeded in
fulfilling the task. The only judge in this oontext must be the
reader, if he is satisfied and has gained insight then the task
will have been worthwhile.
<7
Chapter /
THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
1.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the
published literature on the economics of science. The range of
contributions is so wide and diverse that it is necessary to have
a framework within which to survey the published work. The sug¬
gested framework has three broad divisions and sub-topics within
these as follows:- * ^)» (c)
1. THEORY OF INVENTION AND INNOVATION
including problems of the definition and measurement of
inventive activity.
2. MACRO-ANALYSES
1. The effect of research and development on the country's
rate of economic growth.
2. The impact of non market factors such as government
science policy measures on R 8c D activity.
3. International comparative studies on R 8c D activity at
the national and industry levels.
3. MICRO-ANALYSES
1. The analysis of the sources of inventions.
2. The diffusion of innovations.
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3. The effects of market structure on It & D activity at
the firm and industry level.
4. The effect of P. & D activity upon the productivity and
profits of the firm and industry i. e. the payoff aspects of
research and development.
5. The definition and measurement of the output of re¬
search and development.
6. Case studies of particular development projects and
innovations.
7. The management of research and development within
the firm.
It must be noted that the subject categories are not mutually
exclusive and that the references cited are not intended to be a
comprehensive list but to indicate the directions in which research
has progressed. In this section economic theory and its applications
are emphasised whilst other references remain for more detailed
consideration in succeeding parts.
1. 1. THE THEORY OF INVENTION AND INNOVATION
The main motivation for the development of the theory of
innovation has been the impact of technological change.
2 3 4
Studies ' ' ' carried out in relation to the American economy
have shown that only a small fraction of increased output/worker in
n
America over the last 300 years or so can be explained by
increased capital per worker. The remainder can be attributed
to increased efficiency - a component of which must be the pro¬
cess of technical change which produces new techniques for
manufacturing existing products and evolves totally new pro¬
ducts. The existence of this phenomenon of technicalchange
has made economists aware of the need to examine the basic
relations between invention and economic activity.
A subsidiary reason for the renewed interest of economists
in the links between research and economic activity has been the
increasing awareness* that many corporations involved in the
competitive process may concentrate their competitive effort on
the development of new products and processes rather than on
price manipulation. Firms are seeking long-term growth as a
major objective and foregoing short-term optimality. In a sense
pareto-optimality is being sacrificed for a longer-term optimality
based on the addition of new products.
Whatever the reason for the interest in technical change in
order to build a theory economists need to understand the processes
involved in inventive activity. It is widely accepted that it is useful
to distinguish between INVENTION AND INNOVATION 5. An inven¬
tion can be thought of as the output of the process of inventive acti¬
vity. The output may be a new production process, product or some¬
thing more fundamental. The process of innovation is concerned
* See, for example, Baumol, W. J. Economic Theory and Operations
Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, 1963.
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with the commercial exploitation of the results of the inventive
process.
There is disagreement about the determinants of invention
6
and the speed of response of innovation to invention. Schumpeter ,
who perhaps first formulated the distinction between invention and
innovation, suggests that inventions are an exogenous stimulus to
the economic system and regards the decision to innovate as the
province of the entrepreneur. If such a view is accepted then it
implies that inventions occur randomly and are not an outcome
of increased economic activity. This tradition of the exogeneity
of technical change is a basic reason why the relations between
invention and economic activity are relatively unexplored.
7
Schmookler in some very important work is largely res¬
ponsible for calling into question the Schumpeterian treatment
of invention as an exogenous variable. He addresses himself to
the problem of whether inventive activity influences economic
activity or is influenced by it. There are, of course, valid in¬
stances of the exogeneity of invention such as the constant drive
of the pure researcher acting to improve the stock of technical
knowledge. Such instances are not at issue. The main issue is
whether technical change is mainly endogenous or exogenous.
From a detailed analysis of patent data and of significant
historical innovations Schmookler concludes that in general in¬
ventive activity in a field tends very much to fluctuate with economic
13
activity in that field. In particular, he finds that investment leads
inventive activity. This result is against the Schumpeterian view
g
and also the well-known work of Salter .
As a result of Schmookler's lead most economists working
in the area of invention have tried to integrate inventive activity
into the framework of conventional economic analysis. Schmookler's
9
own later work is an example of this type of development.
Nordhausattempts to develop an economic theory of
technological change. He contends that an adequate micro-theory
of the generation and transmission of new knowledge is necessary
in order that a reasonable model of the inventive process can be
developed and tested. He builds on the work of Schmookler, Arrow*
12
and Jewkes who have stressed that inventive activity is always an
uncertain undertaking and that inventive inputs (R & D) and outputs
(inventions) are qualitatively different from productive inputs and
outputs in the classical economic analysis of production.
The distinctive character of research activity unearthed by
the previous authors leads Nordhaus to suggest that a sophisticated
model of the research process is necessary. The work of Solow
mentioned previously, which was a great advance in the field of
productivity measurement, would suggest that inventive activity
should be treated as a productive input in the production function
in the same way as capital. Nordhaus rejects this approach and
regards the capital theoretic productivity work of Grilliches and
Jorgenson and Lucas as being too crude because of the treatment
of inventions as a capital good without regard to the distinctive charac-
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ter of the inventive input. In this rejection he is supported by Arrow
who suggests that production function models may be useful descrip¬
tively but they do not capture the essential features of the creation
and transmission of knowledge.
The novelty of Nordhaus's approach is his treatment of inven¬
tion. He assumes that inventions are produced within the system
and are defined as either new processes of production or new vectors
of input-output coefficients. He regards any invention as being
potentially a public good either because it is indivisible or can
be used universally at zero marginal cost. However, he recognises
the intervention of safeguards, legal or otherwise, to provide a
temporary monopoly on the results of the invention. The inventor
is granted a temporary monopoly over his work during which time
he can produce output or license his work. After the safeguarded
period the research work is open to exploitation by any one. This
approach differs from Schumpeter's conception of the entrepreneurs
reaping the benefit from the exploitation of a given invention. Nord-
haus assigns the innovation decision to the inventor who thus obtains
the profits or surplus of entrepreneurial activity.
Having otherwise made neo classical assumptions about the
economy (other than in the sphere of knowledge production) Nordhaus
goes on to devise tests of the relation first between inventive activity
l€
and the growth of productivity and second between inventive
activity and economic activity based on a production function
type analysis. The first test is unsuccessful and the problem
16
of isolating this relation remains to be solved. Sanders in
an earlier study was equally unsuccessful. The second test
gives a positive result and is consistent with Schmookler's
earlier findings on the endogeneity of technical change.
Much remains to be done in the area. The problem of
measuring inventive activity is a difficult one. Nordhaus in his
study follows Schmookler by using numbers of patents as his
indicator of inventive activity. This indicator is deficient because
there may be differences in the behaviour of industries and firms
within industries in their desire to pate nt. In using patent data
there is also the bias arising from quality differentials between
patents. Some weighting scheme to measure patent worth is
clearly necessary to overcome the biases involved in assigning
equal weighting to both trivial and complex patents.
Arrow and Nordhaus both make a case for the distinctive
character of research. Arrow regards research and development
as being connected with the problems of uncertainty reduction.
Each step in the progress of technological change adds knowledge
and tends to reduce the residual uncertainty. Each step in pro¬
ducing knowledge is qualitatively different from each other step.
Logically, therefore, knowledge production is different from each
I b
production of physicai goods where successive items can be
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qualitatively identical. It is clear that Domar agrees with both
of them in their desire to move towards models for the analysis
of technical change in which proper allowance is made for the
micro-character of the inventive process. The whole literature
18
evidence on the subject (see the NBER volume for the broad
coverage of the area) brings out the micro nature of the processes
of technical change- and the need to bring in concepts from other
disciplines to understand them and point to directions for further
research.
The theory of innovation is thus developing slowly. Most
economists believe that economic activity provides the main but
not the sole stimulus for the development of inventive activity.
Schumpeter's position is not now held by many. Given the link
between invention and economic activity work is now being directed
towards a more sophistivated view of the processes of invention
in the hope of providing more fruitful models of the economic
and productive value of invention. This point will be further
developed as one of the main themes of Chapter 3.
1. 2 MACRO-ANALYSES
1.2.1 R&D AND THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
The economic history evidence of Abramovitz and Schmookler
showed the inability of the increase in the capital/labour ratio to ex-
plain the major part of the increase in per capita income in the
U.S. The rate of technical change was thus suggested as being
one of the elements that would account for most of residual un-
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explained variation. Similar conclusions were derived by Denison ,
Fabricant20 and Massell21 in their corresponding econometric
history studies.
22
Schmookler's later work points to a demand-induced or
market theory of inventive activity in which the two most impor¬
tant determinants of the supply curve of inventions in a given area
are taken to be the number of suitably qualified people and the
present state of knowledge in that area.
23
Some more recent work has been carried out by Minasian
24
and Mansfield to try and measure the effect of R & D expendi¬
ture on a firm or industry's rate of technical change. The measure-
25
ment of technical change is derived from Solow's work (which in¬
volves the addition of an extra trend term to reflect technical
change in a production function analysis) and both authors provide
some results on the magnitude of the rate of technical change.
Much remains to be done if the exact nature of the relations
between R&D and economic growth is to be determined. The
studies reported offer little information on the amount a country
should spend on R & D and virtually none on how the overall global
R&D budget should be distributed amongst the industrial sector
of the economy. For a policy-maker four questions need detailed
1$
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answers : first, what is the relative productivity of the various
types of unit in which R & D is carried out? What appears to be
the most efficient R&D unit in terms of size and organisation
structure? Second, given the optimum allocation of R & D to the
most efficient R&D sub-units, what is the nature of the relation
between total R&D expenditure and the rate of technical change?
Third, given that the links between R&D and rate of technical
change are know, what is the broader effect of R & D on economic
growth? Fourth, how do we decide upon the optimum combinations
of input factors such as investment, R&D expenditure etc. in order
to achieve the objective of a given rate of economic growth?
To achieve the answers to these questions it is clear that
we need to know much more about the research and development
process at the micro level. Little is known about the nature of
R&D work in various industries and the extent to which the com¬
position of a firm's R&D portfolio affects its rate of technical
change. Once more is known about research and development
within the typical industrial firm more information will be available
on the extent to which technical change in a firm requires invest¬
ment in new capital equipment and its effect on the firm in terms
of saving amounts of alternative productive factors, capital and
labour.
Most growth models assume that the effect of technical change
27
is neutral. Fellner suggests that there is some evidence to show
11
that the effects of technical change are not neutrai and feels that
rough estimates of the extent of capital or labour saving should
always be calculated. It can be seen, therefore, that more de¬
tailed micro-information about the nature of R & D will improve
the treatment of R & D input in growth models and help to esta¬
blish empirically the relation between R&D and growth on a
sounder theoretical basis.
1.2.2. THE IMPACT OF NON-MARKET FACTORS ON
R&D ACTIVITY
28
Nelson makes the point that in the United States a fairly
large proportion of research is government controlled. He notes
that on the demand side over half the demand is federal govern¬
ment investment and on the supply side the universities and
29
government laboratories figure prominently. Shanks brings
this statistical picture up to date and states that three-fifths of
all R & D in the U.S. is government financed. The greater pro¬
portion of U.S. government finance is spent on defence and aero¬
space programmes. Because the financial support is directed
largely towards a few key programmes the U.S. government
has been eager to make sure that there is a spin-off from these
programmes to the civilian sector of the economy. Programmes
30
such as Polaris have aided the development of PERT techniques
in research planning and such techniques have since been widely
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adopted. Shanks outlines the mechanisms by which the U.S.
government tries to help "spin-off". He concludes that there is
2*
still very little evidence that the massive investment in space
technology by the United States will produce an adquate commercial
pay-off. This technology transfer from key programmes to indus¬
trial K & D is limited to some extent by the mutual distrust be¬
tween Federal Government and Industry.
In Britain on the other hand government and industry co¬
operate more readily. There are a number of government
sponsored institutes and research associations and a considerable
involvement by the Ministry of Technology and the National Re¬
search Development Corporation in the sponsorship of research.
In Britain as in the United States the greater proportion of research
and development work is government financed or sponsored. The
greatest support areas are those related to defence and weapons
systems. Very little work has, however, been done on the effec¬
tiveness of such expenditures and on determining at what level
government sponsorship should stabilise. Such benefit/cost analyses
of government expenditures are clearly necessary.
A valuable adjunct to cost/benefit studies of government
R&D expenditures are case studies of the effectiveness of parti-
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cular research programmes. Iviarschak presents evidence
of the effectiveness of certain defence projects and his work
clearly shows the groping and uncertain nature of research
activity.
Perhaps the most useful example of a case study in the British
2i
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context is the work of Grossfieid and Heath . Grossfiela and
Heath looked at the case of the potato harvester, the development
of which was aided by financial support from the National Research
Development Corporation and the National Institute of Agricultural
Engineering. A related study in the American literature is the
35
analysis by Grilliches of the research costs and social returns
of hybrid corn and other related innovations. The important feature
of both studies is their attempt at measurement of the social returns
of the innovation.
Cost benefit analysis is in its infancy and requires much research
on the measurement of costs and benefits. Its development is important
in the government context as a check on the effectiveness of sponsor¬
ship.
1.2.3. INTERNATIONAL. COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF
R&D AT NATIONAL AND INDUSTRY LEVELS.
Perhaps the most thorough and detailed work in this area has
, v „ „ 36, 37, 38, 39,+® , .been pioneered by C. Freeman ^and his associates at
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Such work
is of value to national policy makers because it provides guidelines
with which to judge the relative effectiveness of national R&D
efforts and the strength of several key industries, for example,
plastics, electronics and chemical process plant, in international
competition.
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As of 1962 Freeman finds that expenditure on R & D as
%
a proportion of national income is running at 3. 1% in the U.S. ,
2. 5 - 3% in the U.S.S. R. and 1.6^. in Western Europe. The
corresponding proportions of the labour force employed on R &
D work are found to be 6. 2%, 4.4% and 2. 9% respectively. At
official exchange rates the U.S. spends four times as much as
Western Europe and about 3-4 times as much as the U. S.S. R.
on research and development. When these figures are calculated
in real terms allowing for factor cost differences U.S. invest¬
ment in R & D is 2. 5 times that of Western Europe and 1. 2
times that of the U. S. S. R.
These figures help to place the R&D effort of the various
countries in context but on their own they do not explain the large
gap between the United States and Europe in terms of R & D
effectiveness. Many hypotheses for the greater effectiveness
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of U.S. R&D can be offered. Shanks ', for example, suggests
that the more hard-headed commercial attitude of American firms
and the size and scale of the large American corporations may be
responsible for U.S. leadership.
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Freeman's industry studies are part of a programme of
studies designed to discover the relationships between research,
innovation and market performance of the principal firms in
various industries namely plastics, electronics and chemical
process plant. One of the uses Freeman makes of patent statistics
is to analyse the performance of the technical leaders in these
Industries and he finds, for example, that leaders were ahead in
numbers of innovations, patents taken out and volume of R & D
inputs. In plastics the dominance of Germany in technical leader¬
ship and production over both Britain and the U.S. is attributed
to the initial leadership achieved by I. G. Farben Ltd. between
1931-45 when Farben spent a great deal more than any other firm
on R & D and produced twice as many patents. Despite a resur¬
gence of U. S. and British research (mainly I. C. I.) in the early
fifties, the leadership of German R&D was reasserted largely
because of the German tradition and history of excellence in
plastics research giving Germany something that could loosely
be described as "research economics of scale in plastics. "
Chemical process plant work is found to be dominated by
the U.S. firms. Not only do U.S. firms win the greater propor¬
tion of large contracts but their design and development work is
regarded as superior to the competition. Freeman attributes this
to the close interaction in the U.S. between the plant construction
companies and their clients - the oil and chemical companies. In
America companies release a constant flow of process innovations
to contractors and work closely with them in design and develop¬
ment work. In this way the lead time between process invention
and innovation and adoption is considerably minimised.
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Some work by Brechling and Surrey and Dhrymes on
the electricity utility industry has shown the different approaches
adopted in the U.S. and U.K. on the design of electricity generation
equipment. The CEGB in the U.K. has an avuncular attitude to the
construction companies and as a virtual monopsonist handles the
design work itself on the principle that it is more aware of the
characteristics and performance required from new equipment.
This divorce of design from production is not present in the U. S.
where electric utility companies are privately owned. Westinghouse
and General Electric, for example, have design teams integrated,
coordinated and controlled by the producer and the production team.
Whether or not design control from outside affects the creativity and
output of the British producer is a testable hypothesis as the perfor¬
mance results of the industries in both countries are readily available.
It is clear that the studies pioneered systematically by Freeman
analyse closely the structure of individual indistries and analyse the
reasons for success and failure in the context of that industrial en¬
vironment. If the lessons of failure are learnt and acted upon, then
the government support of newer industries should incorporate the
lessons from previous experience. The value of such studies is two¬
fold:- first, to emphasise the need for the constant revision and re¬
valuation of industrial strength. Second, to make the administrator
aware of the process of learning from experience in doing research
work. Some of the guidelines from the chemical process plant study
should have helped firms in that industry in the U.K. to encourage
their clients to work with them and feed them research results
quickly so as to maintain their competitive position.
lb
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Freeman's work has been widely used by Martin J. Peck
in a detailed study of the economics of science and technology in
Britain. The study is an applied macro economic analysis draw¬
ing upon Freeman's work, national statistics on science and tech-
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nology and various government reports on scientific activity
Peck makes two hypotheses which he tries to verify. First, that
Britain is trying to do more with its science and technology than
manpower resources permit. He illustrates the truth of this
hypothesis by comparing the ratio of total R&D expenditures to
GNP with the ratio of scientists and engineers as a percentage of
employment for the major industrial countries. These figures show
that Britain is spending half as much again as the U.S. on R & D,
relative to GNP, but with a much smaller proportion of technically
qualified personnel. As Peck points out this may simply say that
Britain is very efficient in the use of scientific manpower or that
other countries are under-committed in R & D. The figures quoted
show that Britain suffers from a relative shortage of engineers and
has, therefore, to incur costs of substitution by employing trained
scientists or technicians (HNC level) in place of engineers. Further¬
more, Britain overall has a far smaller relative percentage of
qualified scientists and engineers working in industry. This short¬
age of scientists and engineers in industry coupled with an industrial
structure in which research intensive industries are relatively more
important than elsewhere lends further weight to the overcommittment
2<*
hypothesis since this cohort of scientists and engineers has also
to service a large defence and basic research effort.
The hypothesis is not fully proven. Proper allowance has not
been made for the influence of the technical college trained engineer
and his relatively greater importance to the British firm. Peck is
not able to offer evidence on how many of the qualified technicians
would have a similar level of competence to some American en¬
gineers. A study of the comparability of qualifications between
countries would point to a more useful definition of the term engineer.
It is clear that the outcome of such a study would be to include at
least a part of the qualified technicians under the category engineer.
If the effect of the technician were large then relative dis¬
parities between countries in the proportion of technically qualified
personnel would narrow and reduce the substitution effect predomi¬
nantly to the scientist/engineer substitution.
The relatively greater proportion of scientists employed in
industry in R & D in Britain together with the relatively smaller
proportion of engineers employed in industry compared with other
OECD countries can be considered to be evidence of a substitution
of engineer by scientist. On the other hand the relative difference
could equally well be caused by either or both of:
(i) a preference by firms in their employment policies for scientists
over engineers because of the greater technical flexibility of the
former (and thus their ability to learn an engineering role on the job)
(ii) an awareness by firms that engineering training is not a
homogenous commodity. Some schools keep abreast of industrial
needs and technical developments in their course planning but
others have a very limited and narrow training. Of an entrant
has been to a poor department, the firm has to incur a cost of
training in making the new entrant aware of the techniques and
methods most useful to the firm. The firm might consider that it
would be preferable to incur the same level of training cost on a
more technically flexible scientist than a less flexible, narrowly
trained engineer.
Second, Peck establishes the second hypothesis in his study
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without questioning its validity. He comments that it is said that
British managers of R & D decide on projects without adequate
allowance for marketability cost and production considerations
and that execution of projects lacks the sense of urgency necessary
for timely completion, ie. that economic management of R & D
lacks understanding of economic factors and their relation to time.
Without pointing to the source of these remarks he comments that they
are consistent with the overcommittment hypothesis as the available
engineers have not sufficient free time given the relatively greater
pressure of work to analyse the economic characteristics of a project.
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Shanks notices a distinct difference in the attitude towards R&D
by British and American firms. The Americans he feels are aware
of their objectives for doing R&D and are aware of the effect of
I'i
R & D on profitability and growth. He develops this point further
by noting the control and evaluation procedures that exist for R&D
in American industry which are not paralleled in British industry.
Shanks' observations lend support to the second hypothesis but the
published research evidence to date doesn't, h we consider the evidence
50
it is clear from the RAND studies in the U.S. that although allowance
is made in military R&D for cost, production and marketing factors
the ability of the estimators to make accurate initial estimates is
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poor. In Britain the work of Allen shows that for the seven projects
he analysed allowance is made for economic factors but the initial
estimates of these factors are also very inaccurate. In both cases the
time slippage between estimated and actual time for completion is of
the same order of magnitude.
Much more evidence needs to be gathered about the effectiveness
of R & D management. A limited amount of case study evidence is
given in later chapters but this alone is not sufficient to confirm or
deny that effective economic management of R & D is purely the pre¬
serve of American industry.
Peck in his analysis concludes that he has established beyond
resonable doubt the validity of his hypotheses about British over-
committment to R & D. He may be right but there are points that
need to be considered before accepting the analysis. His conclusions
are based on an analysis of aggregate statistics which require careful
interpretation. Peck's analysis is sound in so far as it goes but it
suffers from the one major deficiency, namely, that Peck was not
able to draw on depth analysis at the micro levfel to validate some of
his statements. It certainly raises the question of how much Britain
can afford to spend on R & D? It cannot answer this question without
more detailed micro-work to enrich the aggregate analysis.
In the next major section we turn our attention to some repre¬
sentative examples of research work published about the economics
of R & D at the firm (or industry) level.
1- 3. MICRO-ANALYSES
1. 3. 1. The Analysis of the sources of inventions
No question is more interesting in this area than the nature of
the inventor. Who is he and under what conditions does he achieve
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maximum inventive output? Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman in
the most comprehensive work on major twentieth century inventions
find that less than half the inventions are the direct result of company
or firm research. Their evidence points to the strong influence of
the individual inventor but in recent years patent analyses have
shown the increasing influence of firms in applications for patentable
inventions.
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Schmookler's evidence of a random sample of patents taken out
in the U.S. in 1953 shows that about 1/3 of them are the result of the
activities of the individual independent inventor, the remaining 2/3
receiving either part or full company or government sponsorship.
3°
An invention may turn out to be economically viable at a given
point of time. Why do successful inventions occur more at certain
points in time than others? We know that inventions respond to
economic activity so it is not surprising to find from the work of
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Grilliches and Schmookler that the investment rate in an industry
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tends to lead the patent rate. Schmookler has also found that patent
activity in an industry has a positive high correlation with the output
and investment in that industry. This suggests that patent activity
will tend to be related to the business cycle, a suggestion that is
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supported by the work of Graue
In summary, invention is a response in the main to economic
factors. Although the "pioneer myth" of the amateur inventor still
exists the greater proportion of inventive output results from the
full-time employed inventor.
1. 3. 2. The Diffusion of Innovations
Innovation is considered to be the process by which inventive
output i. e. knowledge or information is commercially exploited.
Given that an invention is commercially adopted, what is the process
by which the knowledge about this innovation, be it a new product or
process, is transmitted through the economic system? This process
of knowledge transmission has attracted the attention of both eco¬
nomists and sociologists. The economist stresses the nature of the
demand for innovation whereas the sociologist looks at the channels
or processes by which information is transmitted from the inventor
3/
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to the person interested in adopting the innovation. Arrow
summarises the approaches and indicates that the economic studies of
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Grilliches and Mansfield tend to emphasise the profitability of
the investment and the risks involved. For example, Mansfield's
interests in his diffusion studies are to determine the speed of
adoption of the innovation and the most innovative type of firm.
In his work he finds that if the profitability of the innovation and the
size of investment required are held constant, the rate of imitation
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tends to be greater in less concentrated industries. Later research
carried out in the tool and die industry has tended to support Mans-
fields findings on imitation.
Sociologists, such as Coleman61 and Rogers62 have found
out that personal contact is the most useful channel between adopters
of an innovation and potential followers. Though mass media tend to
have some usefulness they have greater cost elements and do not
produce as many contacts. Arrow likens the sociologist's interest
in the process of diffusion to studying the supply of different commu¬
nication channels which have different cost elements attached to them.
Coleman points out, for example, that personal contacts are not
randomly distributed in the population and thus the manner in which
an item is diffused throughout the system is correspondingly altered.
Arrow cites one example, namely, the diffusion of use of new drugs
was higher among physicians practising in pairs than among those
practising singly.
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It can be seen that hypotheses have been generated from
existing research about reasons for the adoption of innovations
and the processes by which knowledge about innovations diffuses
through the economic system. More research is needed as the
available economic evidence suggests that international inequa¬
lities in productivity and income have their origin in the relative
efficiencies of the systems of information communication within
those countries; i.e. some countries are apparently much better
both at reducing the time lag between invention and innovation and
at rapidly adopting a given innovation.
1. 3. 3. Effects of Market Structure on R Si D Activity at
the Firm and Industry Level
Technical change increases the set of factor possibilities
open to the firm in its production operations. It also increases the
range of choice open to consumers in their purchasing decisions.
Unfortunately, technical change costs money and economic re¬
sources must be allocated to R & D. As the firm is now the major
unit from which inventive output is developed it is important to
understand the relationship between an industry's market structure
and its rate of technical progress. For example, do certain types
of market structures encourage technical change and other inhibit
technical change? There is no definite agreement amongst economists
on the ways in which firm size and market structure affect the rate
of technical change. In order to evaluate the literature on the subject
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it is instructive to consider what the theory of the firm has to say
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about the incentives to innovate under different market structures
The key issue is clearly how much market organisation affects the
rate of inventive activity.
Under both monopoly and perfect competition there is an
incentive to reduce costs throughinnovation given an objective of
profit maximisation. The distinction between the two cases lies in
the long run incentive. A monopolist can always increase his pro¬
fits through cost reduction and since by definition entry into the
industry is barred these profits are maintained in the long run.
The firm in a perfectly competitive industry has the same incentive
as the monopolist in the short run but not in the long run. If the fi rm
concerned is earning short-run profits it will attract entry of other
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firms by virtue of making greater than "normal" profit . Clearly,
therefore, the short run profits will be eroded through entry of new
firms in the long run. Therefore, whether or not the incentive to
innovate is sufficiently attractive to the firm in perfect competition
depends upon the length of the short run period and the amount of
supernormal" profit. Obviously, the shorter the period the less
willing will the firm in a competitive industry be to incur the costs
of developing the new innovation.
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Schumpeter is the economist around whom the counter arguments
to perfect competition centre. He feels it is unjustified to act "on the
principle that big business should be made to work as the respective
industry would work in perfect competition . He argues that profit
incentives lead entrepreneurs to innovate and that monopoly power
is an important instrument in providing the climate for the innova-
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tion process. Galbraith supports Schumpeter's position and
argues that an industry comprising a few large firms will do more
R&D than one with a large number of small firms because larger
firms have more financial resources available to them and can
trade off research expenses against tax laws.
There are an equally large number of economists who take the
opposite view that although the incentive to innovate is greater in
monopolistic conditions there may be less pressure to do research
because of the absence of competition. The argument can be deve¬
loped to show that the more competitive the conditions the stronger
the incentive to innovate in order to maintain one's market position.
A strong competitive position now may result in bankruptcy later
unless research results are constantly used to produce new products
or processes.
The evidence available does not conclusively point to an optimum
type of industrial structure for industrial innovation. The evidence on
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the monopoly side comes from Maclaurin , Villard and Nelson .
Maclaurin adopts a subjective approach in which he assesses the degree
of monopoly and rate of technological progress in thirteen selected
American industries. The tables he presents, based on subjective
judgment and not objective definitions, show that there is a strong
3^
association between monopolistic conditions and the rate of
technical change in industrial situations. In discussing his
results he states that although some degree of monopoly is
necessary for technical progress it must be associated with
elements of competitive conditions which themselves stimulate
progress. Villard has collected data on research and development
expenditures as a proportion of sales for various sizes of firms
in six different American industries. His evidence shows that
in three of the six industries there is an increasing percentage
spent on R & D as we progress from smaller to larger firms.
This is not conclusive and his only useful result is the fact that
in five of the six industries the largest firm spent the highest
percentages on research and development. This rather weak
relationship suggests that oligopolies promote greater research
and development expenditures. Nelson's case is a more theore¬
tical one and is essentially that the larger size of an oligopolistic
firm allows it to use research results, wait longer for the payoff
because of its corporate security and recapture a larger portion
of the aggregate social gains from the research.
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Schmookler takes issue with Villard's interpretation of
his data and suggests that above some minimum firm size there is
no evidence of a relationship between R & D as a proportion of
sales and firm size across the industries quoted. In this statement
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he is supported by evidence from the work of Jewkes and Nutter
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Indeed Mansfield in some more recent work has shown that
for the industries for which he had data, the largest firms spent
a somewhat smaller proportion of their sales on R & D than did
smaller rivals.
75
Hamberg in a review article sums up the position on
market structure very well. He states that though a positive
association between R&D intensity (i. e. percentage of sales
devoted to research and development expenditure) and industrial
concentration apparently exists, it must be described as weak,
as must also be the case for industrial concentration as a sti-
76
mulus to R & D, both in absolute and relative terms. Scherer
in a later article concludes that little support can be mustered
for the hypothesis that corporate bigness, conglomerateness, and
market power are especially favourable to technological progress.
It could well be that different market structures suit different
77
industries for their R&D needs. Fuchs's work on the economics
of the fur industry tends to support the hypothesis that oligopoly
conditions are conducive to the promotion of technological change.
He finds that the major technological changes in the industry have
been initiated by the breeders and tanners which are sectors of the
78
fur market with a fairly oligopolistic structure. Comanor on the
other hand finds that for the pharmaceutical industry there is a
significant interaction between research and firm size, and increasing
firm size tends to be associated with a decline in the productivity of
the research. He suggests that at least for the pharmaceutical industry
37-
doubt must be cast on the view that extensive research establish¬
ments within large firms are necessarily an efficient means of
fostering an accelerated rate of technical advance.
It can be seen that the evidence on R & D by industry is such
that we have no method of predicting the type of competitive struc¬
ture most conducive for effective research and development activity
in a given industry. More work is needed at the individual industry
level before any general analysis can be made. Comanor's article
does raise one interesting related question. Is there any evidence
of economies of scale in R & D ? His conclusions for the pharma¬
ceutical industry indicate that within relatively small firms there
are substantial economies of scale in R & D but that when firm size
becomes even moderately large decreasing returns to scale become
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evident. Mansfield provides some very tentative evidence regar¬
ding the extent of economies of scale in the chemical, petroleum
refining, and steel industries. He confirms Comanor's result that
the productivity of a firm's R&D declines as the size of firm
increases, holding the size of R & D expenditures constant. As
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Mansfield states elsewhere most economists would agree that there
are economies of scale in R & D up to some point. There would,
however, be disagreement about the extent of such economies and
the critical size of research establishment. Both examples given
above indicate that the critical size will vary from industry to industry
depending on the amount of capital equipment necessary to operate an
an effective research laboratory.
Another question that is of interest is whether certain large
firms, small firms or government establishments produce a more
significant flow of inventions than dhers? The answer to this ques¬
tion depends on how we define an invention. If we are strict and say
that it is unique in character or of strategic importance to the nation
then the available evidence indicates that the market place is not the
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environment in which the major inventions are produced. Hamberg
finds that, with few exceptions, the large industrial research labora¬
tories are .minor sources of major inventions. In fact, industrial
laboratories are likely to be major sources of essentially improve¬
ment inventions. Although his findings are based on only 7 studies,
Hamberg suggests that for economic and organisational reasons they
are likely to be generally true.
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McConnell and Peterson present evidence on R & D activity
in small firms (defined to be firms which employ less than 500 people).
In this category all research work is found to be of an applied improve¬
ment or new product type and it can safely be concluded that small
firms do not produce significant inventions.
It seems clear that if the firms adhere to their own objectives
they will do R & D for profitability considerations and thus carry out
product improvement research. Pure Invention research seems to be
the preserve of universities and government financed contract research.
The influence of the space programme and various defence programmes
31
in the U.S. upon the creation of a flow of significant inventions
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has been enormous. Risk capital for such programmes provides
"spin-off to civilian R & D, a process which Professor E. Roberts
has described in a recent seminar. ^
Given that the major inventions tend to be produced outside
the market place it is interesting to discover whether certain
market structures are more conducive to the speedy commercial
introduction of new products and processes derived from the output
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of the inventive process. Mansfields study is perhaps the most
authoritative in this area. He finds that in some industries the
largest firms account for a disproportionately large share of the
innovations but in others they do not. He suggests that the effect
of market structures on the speedy commercial generation of new
innovations is dependent upon the size of investment required to
innovate and other related economic factors. His evidence suggests
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that the positions of Bain and Brozen , who extol the Virtues of
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competitive conditions in generating innovations and Villard who
favours oligopoly as a stimulant to speedy innovations, are like
those of extreme right or left wing politicians viz. their arguments
hold in some cases but not in others. Much research needs to be
done in this area but it will not be surprising if Manefield's results
are confirmed.
A related topic of interest is the influence of market structure
on the process of diffusion of an innovation through an industry given
4°
that the innovation is adopted by some unit within the industry.
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Mansfield's work is again the most authoritative .
The main findings are as follows. Fir6t, the greater the number
of firms in an industry using a new technique the more likely is
it that the remainder will follow. Second, the rate of diffusion
in an industry tends to be higher for more profitable innovations,
for those requiring smaller levels of investment, and for those
utilising existing capital equipment. The rate of diffusion is not
constant across industry, there being no definite tendency for
degree of concentration to affect rate of diffusion. The diffusion
rate in an industry tends to be higher when its output is growing
rapidly. Third, there is no consistent pattern to suggest that
certain firms are innovation leaders in given industies. Fourth,
the speed of adoption of a new innovation by a particular firm is a
function of its size and the expected profitability resulting from
adoption of an innovation. Fifth, small firms seem to be quicker
in adapting themselves to new techniques and processes than older
ones do.
Further research in this area needs to follow the leads
suggested by Arrow in a previous section. More fruitful models
of the diffusion process need to be constructed using the basic
work of Mansfield and others in sociology. In this way we will
understand better how to promote conditions which favour the
rapid and efficient adoption of the available technology.
f'
It can be seen from this review of evidence on the effect
of market structure on R & D that it is not yet clear if particular
market structures encourage R&D activity. As such it is too
early to say whether market structure is an external economy
to the individual firm in its quest for R&D profitability.
1.3.4. The Effect of R & D Activity on the Productivity
and Profits of the Firm and Industry
The final aim of R & D activity is the production of a flow
of innovations. The value of this flow must be measured in rela¬
tion to the extent to which each element of the flow achieves
particular stated objectives. It is clear that R & D at the firm
level has commercial objectives which in the end can be summa¬
rised by the desire to increase profitability. The aim of developing
new or improved production processes is to reduce the costs side
of the profit equation whereas the aim from new product growth
is to increase sales and market share and hence the revenue side
of the equation. A subsidiary objective of new product introduction
is the desire- to maintain long term growth.
It is necessary to differentiate between the firm and the
industry in measuring the effect of new innovations because benefits
accruing to the individual firm and industry may be different. At the
firm level there is in theory a great amount of accounting and other
information available for ex post evaluation of the benefits accruing
from a new innovation. Ex ante there may be information available
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from historical projects on costs/benefits etc., but if Peck's
point is true, in Britain R&D personnel are not aware of cost/
benefit considerations in commissioning and undertaking innova¬
tive research. In theory, of course, ex ante evaluation could be
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carried out. There are according to Nelson many problems
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in such work. The case study evidence in the N. B. E. R. volume
suggests that quite a detailed and sophisticated analysis is required
to understand where profit opportunities lie - if we assume that
inventive effort is motivated by profit maximisation considerations.
Two sets of factors are regarded as being important in the percep¬
tion of profit opportunities in invention viz. organisational and
economic factors. Rubenstein^' ^ emphasises the importance
of such organisational factors as the distribution of power and in¬
fluence in the company; the relations between functional areas in
the firm (e.g. marketing and research); The communication
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channels available to the researcher in his search for ideas
and information and the composition and research specialities of
the research team. The economic factors are outlined by Nelson.
We must be able to determine which factor costs are important
to the profits from innovation. We must also be able to assess whether
firms try to estimate the demand for innovation and the supply curve
for innovation of that type in their innovation decisions. Further,
we must have information on whether new innovations require new
investment in capital equipment i. e. are innovation and investment
in plant and equipment complementary goods?
43
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Schnee is at present working on the determinants of
development costs in the drug industry and his preliminary
findings quoted by Mansfieldindicate the significant variables.
If studies such as these highlight the most significant cost
influences, information will be available from which we can
proceed via sensitivity analysis or a similar approach to
isolate the relative influence of the significant cost variables
on the expected profit criterion. This type of approach is known
in chemical engineering as risk or venture analysis and will be
discussed in detail in Part IV of this thesis.
Ex ante evaluation can in principle, therefore, be carried
out. As this thesis proceeds some of the available methods will
be outlined and compared. Even though such cost benefit analyses
can be attempted, very few studies of innovations at either the firm
or industry level have been published. The approaches of Grilliches
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and Grossfield and Heath were attempts to assess the benefit
to the community, farmers and manufacturers of new innovations
viz hybrid corn and the potato harvester. In both cases great
difficulty was encountered in trying to measure social benefits.
At the industry level the effect of a new innovation requires
a different type of analysis from a detailed within firm evaluation
of profit opportunities.
At this level attempts must be made to assess the possible
external benefits and costs that might accrue from widespread
•f-4
adoption of the innovation throughout the industry. Again, a great
research effort is needed here because of the existing state of
knowledge.
The main reasons for the absence of cost benefit studies from
the literature can be attributed to any or all of the following reasons:
(i) the difficulty of selecting, isolating and measuring the
appropriate "costs" and "benefits". This is clear from Gril-
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liches, Grossfield and Mansfield's work.
(ii) the unwillingness of firms to allow researchers to
scrutinise pajt records.
(iii) the desire to maintain company security in a competi¬
tive research environment.
If the measurement of the effect of R & D on profitability is
beset with measurement problems so also is the effect of R & D
on productivity. One of the main complications is the uncertainty
about the relation between R&D and capital investment. If R & D
and capital investment are complements in the inventive process
it becomes impossible to distinguish between the effects of each
in a Cobb-Douglas production function type analysis. Most of the
work in this area has been contributed by Minassian*^' and
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Mansfield . Minassian views R&D activity as representing
efforts to increase efficiency. In his early work he considers
the relationship between the rate of growth of productivity and
research and development expenditures and finds a positive
correlation. His later work is an analysis of the rate of return
to R & D expenditures measured by a production function type
analysis. Although he doubts the value of Cobb-Douglas produc¬
tion functions he uses the Cobb-Douglas framework and a covariance
analysis to measure rate of return. For a sample of seventeen
firms in the chemical industry he calculates estimates from log re¬
gression results of the elasticity of capital and research and develop¬
ment expenditures and uses these with estimates of the average real
value added (the Cobb-Douglas output variable) per firm per year,
average real gross capital per firm per year and average real
accumulated R&D expenditures to estimate the marginal products
for capital and R&D expenditures. From these he estimates that
the gross return on investment in R & D is 54% compared with 9%
for capital. Despite his lack of faith in the production function type
analysis he is fairly confident about the accuracy of his estimates
even though they depend upon the form of production function assumed.
Mansfield attempts to construct a simple econometric model
to estimate the marginal rate of return from R&D expenditures
in various firms and industries. Provided we assume a production
function of Cobb-Douglas form with capital, labour and total past
R&D expenditures as inputs simple expressions can be obtained
for the marginal rate of return from R&D given the further neces¬
sary assumption that R&D expenditures have grown at an exponen¬
tial rate. These expressions remain simple no matter whether
technical change is capital-embodied or organisational. "If technical
change is capital embodied, the marginal rate of return is directly-
related to the elasticity of output with respect to total past R&D
expenditures and the rate of investment but inversely related to the
ratio of total past R&D expenditures to present output".
On the basis of the theoretical results he attempts to estimate
the marginal rates of return in I960 for ten major chemical and
petroleum firms and lower bounds for the marginal rate of return
for ten manufacturing industries. For individual industries the rate
of return was very high in petroleum ; in chemicals it was high for
capital embodied technical change and low for organisational tech¬
nical change. The rate of return was directly related to a firm's
size in chemicals and inversely related to it in petroleum. For the
industry data the rate of return on R & D is highest in the food, apparel
and furniture industries.
T
It is fair to say that Mansfield and Minassian's work is by no
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means definitive. The defects of Cobb-Douglas work are well known
and the simplifying assumptions particularly the neutrality of techni¬
cal change are unrealistic. The major defect of the work is the attempt
to fit the unique character of R & D process into the classical economic
input/output mould without sufficient justification.
It is very clear that major research effort needs to be directed
towards the pay off aspects of R & D and later in this thesis some ex
post and ex ante evaluation of R & D profitability is presented.
1*3.5. Definition and Measurement of the Output of R & D Activity
One problem remains in any analysis of the payoff from research
and development and that is how we define the output from R&D
activity. We have seen earlier that the intermediate output of the
R&D process is a flow of knowledge or inventions which become
a flow of innovations provided in each case an entrepreneur commer¬
cialises the results of the inventive process.
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Freeman has recently written a review paper on the measure¬
ment of the output of research and development activity. In his dis¬
cussion he disposes of those people who argue that it is impossible
to measure the output of R & D activityHe emphasises that the
task is difficult but if we consider a model of the inventive process in
which inventions and innovations are the flow of output certain features
of the output flow are well known. Parts of research activity are
channeled into patent applications and the learned journals and,
provided certain difficulties in interpretation, such as differences
in the quality of this output, are allowed for, we can in principle
measure the output of this portion of research activity. Yet the
most interesting portion of research and development activity is
the output of enterprise-level R&D which is rarely the subject of
patent application or learned paper submission. In these cases
measurement has to be indirect and heavily dependent upon the
cooperation of individual firms. Methods such as cost-benefit
analysis, both ex ante and ex post, of innovations can prove to be
4g
relevant measurement tools. The rationale of cost/benefit analysis
is, given the cost of innovation, what is the estimated or actual
benefit that will occur to the firm. The principles underlying this
method have been outlined in the pay off section and some results
are presented later in the thesis for a small sample of commercial
R&D projects.
There is no doubt that detailed case study research, industry
by industry and project by project, will enable the output of micro
level commercial research to be better understood. Only in this
way can the relation of firm to industry and generalisations about
output at the industry level be attempted.
1. 3. 6. Case Studies of Particular Development Projects
and Innovations
In the previous section it is suggested that a case study
approach is valuable in providing guide lines by which micro level R
& D can be better understood and measured. The drawbacks of the
case study approach are primarily that the firms or cases studied
may be a biased sample. Firms who co-operate tend to be atypical
and not representative of the cross section. As such generalising
from case studies to conclusions about industry wide behaviour is
often pointless. The researcher is definitely faced with a considerable
dilemma in this area but it is sensible to do research with the coop¬
erative firms and not wait for an Utopian environment where company
security is not endangered.
There are many examples in the literature of case study
approaches. Four important pieces of work are singled out here;
first, the NBER work of Mueller ^ \ Enos^^, Peck**^, Marschak**^
and Nelson ^; second the work of Jewkes^^, Sawers and Stillerman;
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third the work of Mansfield and fourth, the work of J. A. Allen
Mueller, Enos and Peck's work can be considered together as an
attempt to describe the history of technological change and invention
in various industries. Enos, for example, gives some interesting
information on the innovating firms in the petroleum industry.
Marschak and Nelson describe in great detail the development of a
new communications system for Bell Telephone Laboratories and the
basis transistor. Their interest was more in finding out the reasons
for development and the time path of the innovation process. Marschak
for example, finds that the communications system development was
rational and had as its main objective cost reduction.
Jewkes et al have performed perhaps the basic work in analysing
the sources of major twentieth century inventions. Their findings
summarised earlier stressed the importance of the individual in¬
ventor in stimulating the inventive process.
Mansfield's case study is an attempt to describe first of all the
mechanisms by which a given laboratory appraised potential research
and development projects. Having understood the mechanisms he
sought to build and test descriptive models of the project selection
process. From a case study point of view the presentation of the
formal system for project appraisal used in the firm gives useful
guide lines for further work in this area without laying any claims
to generality.
Allen is a professor of Chemistry who has adopted the daunting
course of following a series of major innovations through from the
pre-invention stage right to the point of full scale production. He
tries to dwell at length on the total situation of these innovations
both in depth and breadth and consider both economic aspects and
scientific and technological issues. He adopts the viewpoint of the
historian and attempts to incorporate in the analysis any relevant
factors connected with the industrial and scientific pre-history of
the innovation. The innovations he studied were polythene, tery-
lene and oxygen steelmaking. Some further work on the history of
innovations is currently in progress at the Science Policy Research
Unit in Sussex University.
Case study work must figure more prominently in future
research output. The value of such concentrated depth research
is in the insight given into the relevant economic and scientific
factors in particular innovations. From the model building point
of view case studies can help to unearth some of the key economic
and technical factors in commercial research and development
activity.
6'i
1. 3. 7. The Management of Research and Development within
The Firm
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One of the favourite topics of the popular management journals
has been how to manage scientific research effort within the firm. The
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literature is almost 100% normative and as Mansfield says is almost
completely devoid of scientific content.
From the management point of view the work of Klein and
Meckling121 is extremely important. They suggest that inventive
activity is a form of problem solving and as such is characterised
by a considerable degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. This
evidence on the groping, sequential nature of the R&D process
and its unpredictability does not favour a predictive theory of in¬
ventive activity. However, subsequent evidence suggests that un¬
certainty in R & D is very great initially but diminishes greatly through
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time and this provides a rationale for the development of useful
predictive theories.
The most important economic problems facing an R & D manager
are first, how to appraise ex ante the worth of a given flow of potential
areas of R & D activity or projects. Second, given a worth assessment
how to determine the optimal distribution of resources amongst the set
of projects which possess probabilistic outcomes. Third, given an
optimal allocation at some point in time how to review and control
the performance of the selected portfolio of projects.
The literature on these problems will be evaluated in detail later.
it
For now, a brief summary of approaches will be given. The measures
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of worth suggested for R&D projects vary from numerical indices
124.
to capital budgeting criteria such as the DCF rate of return
Many possible strategies for managing R&D efforts have
been presented. One of the most plausible is the concept of parallel
125
inventive efforts. Klein argues that the type of uncertainty in¬
herent in R & D implies that decision makers might be wise to run
several R&D efforts for a particular project in parallel. The
rationale for this approach is that, since uncertainty about the out¬
come of a given configuration of R & D effort is highest initially, if
a number of possible effort configurations (or approaches) are
carried on in parallel, the passage of time will allow us to decide
upon the optimal approach. Other approaches to project selection
are based upon models borrowed from the mathematical programming
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literature and are summarised by Baker and Pound . However, it
must be said that there is sparse published evidence on the application
of these approaches and this tends to imply that they have not yet
gained wide acceptance.
One of the favourite tools suggested in the literature for the
control of R & D programmes is PERT. This was initially developed
as an offshoot of the POLARIS programme in the United States and
has since gained rapid adoption. Evidence presented by De Paula
in a recent publication suggests that PERT is not widely used for
project control in the United Kingdom.
S3
1.4. Summary
In this chapter much evidence has been evaluated and the field
as a whole reviewed. The economic literature has been emphasised
and topics taken up and referred to later in the thesis are mentioned
only in broad outline.
In the review of the literature it can be said that the area is
one in which it is difficult to see the wood for the trees. In places,
evidence conflicts sometimes because of poor data and at other times
because of definitional difficulties. It is clear that much more re¬
search is needed and indications of the most important areas are
given. Also, the areas in which this thesis will present evidence
are outlined.
One point that emerges forcefully from the literature is the
strikingly micro-character of R & D activity. Arrow is right when
he says that we have to move towards more fruitful theories of the
inventive process. To this end the next chapter investigates the
usefulness of the micro economic theory of the firm in providing
a base for a theory of the inventive process and evaluates the
extent to which organisational concepts and other theories such
as learning theory and statistical decision theory help towards the
construction of a more operationally useful theory of the firm.
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TOWARDS A MODEL OF THE INVENTIVE PROCESS WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DECISION MAKING
2. 0. Introduction
In this chapter we will try to analyse the usefulness of classical
economic theory as a model for the inventive process. The discussion
will use existing evidence and will seek to incorporate the known
characteristics of technologically progressive firms and of the
inventive processes within firms into a more realistic model of
the inventive process. In the discussion a recent article by W. Z.
Hirsch* will be used as the framework for our analysis.
We shall consider first what we know about technologically pro¬
gressive firms and the process of invention. We shall therefore,
outline the distinctive features of the inventive process and the
economic problems faced by the decision maker in promoting R&D
activity. Once the problems faced by the R&D decision maker are
clear we shall then try to assess the value of economic theory. Finally,
we shall review other models which have been suggested for the
analysis of decision processes.
2.1. The Characteristics of Technically Progressive Firms
It is clear that there are many characteristics of technologically
progressive firms, which require theoretical insight and explanation.
1. W. Z. Hirsch, "Technological Progress and Microeconomic
Theory", AER, Papers and Proceedings, May 1969.
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First, by what procedures do these firms determine their research
policy? Have they a series of objectives which they seek to satisfy
or is the assumption of research for reasons of profit maximisation
a reasonable simplification? Second, why do certain industries have
a monopoly of the technically innovative firms? Third, do large firms
have economies of scale in R & D ? Fourth, does advertising have
an effect on technical progress?
The answers to these questions and others are not yet available.
However, we can at least point out some of the distinctive features
of technically progressive firms.
One of the most important issues in the development of models
to explain the economics of R & D is the identification of the indivi¬
duals in the firm who make policy decisions about R&D. Such major
policy decisions include the determination of a total budget for R&D
work and the allocation of this budget amongst different projects. The
neoclassical theory of the firm assumes that there is a single deci¬
sion maker in the firm, the entrepreneur, who both owns and manages
the firm's resources. The entrepreneur is assumed to be motivated by
profitability considerations in his decision making process and the
costs of his decision making are only material if the direct conse¬
quences of decisions turn out to be unprofitable.
Is it realistic, therefore, to suggest that a single decision maker
assumption is sufficient for the description of economic decision
making in R & D? There is an abundance of information in the
0+
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management journals suggesting how R&D activities ought to be
3
organised in order to maximise research output. Burns and Stalker
find that various types of organisation structure have been adopted
for innovation management but a feature of most of them, apart from
the pyramidal type structure, is the decentralization of decision
making for R&D from the entrepreneur-owner level to a technical
manager whose function is to coordinate research activity in his
area. Further, the entrepreneur-owner level rarely consists of
a single decision maker except in the very small firms. E. B.
4
Roberts in his studies of research offshoots from the Lincoln
Laboratory and the MIT research park area has found that small
contract research firms tend to have a single entrepreneur owner
in whom complete authority for management and decision making
is vested. In small firms, therefore, the assumptions of neo¬
classical theory are approximately satisfied but in large firms
there is considerable decentralisation of authority and more evi¬
dence of group decision making. Hirsch finds two variants of the
neo classical assumptions in the literature. First, Henderson and
5
Quandt view the entrepreneur as an engineer manager who chooses
the optimal production function and manipulates output and price
6
in order to maximise profits. Second, Friedman treats the entre¬
preneur as the resource owner who does not sell the rights to use
his resources in production to someone else. The reward for entre-
2. See for example, the Harvard Business Review, R&D Management
Series
3. T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation. London:
Tavistock
4. E. B. Roberts, "Paper on MIT Science Project", Faculty of Social
Sciences, Edinburgh, 1967.
5. J. M. Henderson & R. M. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-
Hill, 1958.
6. M. Friedman, Price Theory, Aldine, 1962.
preneurship is the residual between revenue for the product and
the cost of producing the product (which includes opportunity cost ele¬
ments on behalf of the owner).
7
Hirsch suggests that a more useful concept of the entre¬
preneurial function is to divide the role of the entrepreneur into
two parts which correspond to the practice of decentralised deci¬
sion making. The entrepreneur-owner maintains the risk bearing
function but delegates a lesser entrepreneurial role of routine
decision making to a tachnical manager. The reward of the entre¬
preneur-owner for risk bearing is profit defined as capital gains
or losses in the value of ownership rights plus the differences
between dividend receipts and the riskless opportunity rate of
return on the owner's investment. The reward to the technical
manager consists of his sanctioned income which is a function of
the profit to the entrepreneur and unsanctioned income derived
from discretionary use of the firm's resources as a result of
authority delegation. Such discretionary use may reduce entre¬
preneur profit and hence sanctioned income. It is worthwhile to
replace a manager if and only if the loss resulting from his dis¬
cretionary use is greater than the costs of the owner "policing"
the manager.
For all these reasons Hirsch suggests that the reward
structure within firms sometimes leads to technical decisions
which do not maximize profit to the owner because of a manager's
7. This is based on R. Teeples, "A Working Paper on the Theory
of the Firm" UCLA, 1968.
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concern for his own job. He further suggests that differences
between R&D expenditures in large and small firms can be
accounted for by the differences in managerial complexity be¬
tween these types of organisation.
Even if a model in the R&D area makes satisfactory
allowance for decentralised and group decision making, several
other issues must be resolved. How do firms gain access to
sources of finance for promoting R&D activity? How do they
decide upon suitable production meftiods and determine the ex¬
pected demand for a new product? Are any cost/benefit assess¬
ments made ex ante?
Q
Hirsch points out that a primary difference between firms
in their capability to undertake R&D lies in their relative
ability to finance R&D. The literature survey in Chapter
concluded that the case for bigness and scale in R & D activity
has not yet been settled but that there was evidence of scale effects
in a number of industries depending upon the nature of the product
offered. Hirsch has been more selective in his literature review
and asserts that significant scale economies exist for R&D acti¬
vity especially for the kinds of product and production technique
associated with technically progressive firms. He quotes an article
9
by Baldwin which supports his assertion that large firms appear to
have an advantage in securing economies of large-scale R&D
activities.
8. W. Z. Hirsch, op cit. , p. 41
9. W. L. Baldwin, "Contracted Research and The Case for Big
Business" JPE, June 1962.
Having demonstrated the truth of his assertion in this way he
points out the advantages that large firms have for exploiting large
scale R&D. Some of the advantages are the low cost of capital of
R&D activity to the entrepreneur and low transactions and commu¬
nications costs between technical personnel and management at least
up to a given firm size. Though these advantages do exist Hirsch is
too eager to generalise about bigness.
The neoclassical theory of the firm disregards scale effects
in R & D activity. Both the size of firm and its scale of activity in
R&D are considered to be irrelevant and unimportant. It is clear
that the positions of Hirsch and the neoclassival theorists are both
extreme and the truth lies somewhere between them. Studies must
be undertaken in the area of financing in R & D to determine the
constraints on the level of budgets for R & D in industry, the ex¬
tent of internal financing of R&D, the relative importance of extra-
form risk bearing agencies, and the financial characteristics of
projects that receive allocations from the R&D budgets. Such
considerations must be included in any realistic model of the finan¬
cing element of the inventive process.
When resources have been allocated to projects a proportion of
them eventually lead to research output. A question that Hirsch
poses is with whom are the property rights to the invention vested.
If the output is specific to the firm then the increased knowledge is
transmitted within the firm. However, inventive knowledge most often
?/
has value to competing firms and an inventor within the firm can
seek job offers at a higher salary and in a sense the profit from the
inventive knowledge is gained by the research worker. A further
problem that faces the firm is that technical knowledge is implanted
in the intellect of its research staff which is the possession of those
staff. In order to increase the stock of technical knowledge embodied
in the collective intellect of its staff the firm can choose between
policies designed on the one hand to retain the experienced research
man or on the other hand to have thorough training programmes
to train relatively less experienced people. Both alternatives incur
costs and the firm must make a choice between them and a range of
other possible alternatives.
Of course, if the research output is the subject for a patent
then the property rights are vested in the patentee for a specific term.
During this period he may hinder the adoption of new techniques if he
decides to carry out the process of production himself without selling
his patent rights through licences or royalty agreements. In practice,
patent rights are often bartered on the open market and infringed in
large firms in the knowledge that patent lawyers will be able to work
some sort of trade off between patents vested in each firm or make a
financial settlement, Thus, neoclassical theory^ is upheld at least
for largish firms when it maintains that the principal obstructions to
the employment of new techniques are the costs of obtaining informa¬
tion, switchover costs, and a reluctance to take risks.
10. W. Z. Hirsch, op cit. p. 41.
Given that the firm is in possession of research results it
has to decide on the choice of production technique to exploit
such results. The nature of technical progress is such that
production techniques change with the passing of time in a dyna¬
mic manner and often the firm is not fully aware of the range of
production possibilities open to it. Neoclassical theory assumes
that the decision maker is fully aware of the set of possibilities
and that there is contemporaneous transformation of inputs into
outputs. Neither of these assumptions is fully realistic and such
effects as learning** from experience in the production process
and intertemporal trade-offs in production are neglected.
A most important issue in a model of the inventive process is
how firms decide ex ante on the likely benefit to be gained from
commercial adoption of a proposed new product. Often the market
for the product is not known exactly and the firm is keen to find
out the expected demand for the product under various marketing
mix combinations i. e. at given levels of advertising expenditure
and price. It is clear from case study evidence, for example in
Part III of this thesis, that there is a relationship between the
expected demand and the expected cost of a new product. If a firm
is unable to complete the development work on a project in a given
time, for whatever reason, it usually has to inject extra cost
resources into the project in order to complete it within a reasonable
time. The slippage of time and the extra resources involved in
11. See for example K. J. Arrow, "The Economic Implications of
Learning by Doing", Review of Economic Studies, 1962.
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ensuring as early a completion time as possible is costly.
The delay in completion of the work means that at the point of
commercial introduction the product may have to face increased
competition. In some situations, therefore, there may be a
relationship between a firm's demand curves and supply curves
which should be analysed clearly.
The analysis has so far centred on the decision maker in R
& D, the decisions he has to make, and the assumptions made by
neoclassical theory. We have not discussed either the nature of
the decision to undertake research and development work or the
processes by which ideas for possible research projects are
generated within the firm.
It has been fashionable to treat all business decisions as
investment decisions under uncertainty. It is said that almost
every major decision involves a cost element and is undertaken
in order to provide some required pay off or return to the firm.
Marketing decisions involve an investment in some firm of ad¬
vertising medium in the hope of providing some extra increment
of sales. Capital investment decisions likewise involve an invest¬
ment in plant or equipment in the hope of an extra increment
of productivity and thus extra return. Research and development
is regarded by the theorist as being similar in nature to capital
investment except that the investment is in new technical know¬
ledge rather than new machinery. Therefore, in the search for
useful models for assessing the worth of research and development
projects a thorough consideration of the various approaches in the
literature on capital budgeting can prove to be very worthwhile.
This point is taken up in greater detail in Part IV.
The processes of idea generation in R & D within the firm are
by no means widely understood. Studies that have been undertaken
have not documented the process of idea generation and diffusion
within the firm in anything like sufficient detail for model building
purposes. The attention of sociologists12 has been drawn towards
the process of idea generation and their interest can only lead to a
greater understanding of the mechanisms involved.
We have now discussed in broad outline some of the charac¬
teristics of research and development and the implications of these
characteristics for the development of useful models of the decision
mechanisms in the R&D process and thus for the process itself.
The most quoted single theory of firm behaviour is the neoclassical
theory of the firm. The next section considers its value as a
building block for a model of the R&D process based on an analysis
of decision making processes.
2. 2. The Relevance of Neoclassical Theory to Model Building
In the consideration of any theory we must immediately draw
13
the distinction between a descriptive and a normative theory. A
descriptive theory of the firm seeks to describe how the individual
firm behaves, and given the observations of behaviour, predictions
12. See for example J. S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical
Sociology, Free Press (1964)
13. See for example R. G. D. Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive
Economics. London: Weidenfeld and" Nichols on, 1967.
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can be made about future behaviour. The normative theory-
suggests how firms "should" behave and is an attempt to
provide the decision maker with methods to aid him in his
decisions.
Criticising the economic theory of the firm has in recent
years been one of the favourite topics of economists. This
criticism is healthy but to be effective must be shown thfet
some aspect of the theory is disputed by carefully observed
facts. We can never have an infinite amount of knowledge about
hypotheses and we must adopt a statistical view in which we say
that refutation or confirmation of hypotheses can never be final
but that we must decide on the basis of the available evidence
at a particular point in time.
The orientation of classical work in microeconomics has
14
largely been normative. Economists have been relatively
uninterested in the behaviour of individual economic agents and have
taken the view that they want to know how people ought to hehave,
not how they do behave.
The Marshallian Concept of the theory of firm describes the
allocation of resources amongst firms in an industry, the long run
development of that industry and its price structure. The theory
is based on the concept of a competitive market, with atomistic
decision making units, the firms, in which all transactions are
accomplished by means of a smoothly functioning price mechanism.
14. See H. A Simon , "Theories of Decision Making in Economics
and Behavioural Science", AER, 49, pp. 235-83
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In so far as any attention is paid to the internal structure of the
firm, it is assumed to be centred around a rational decision
maker - economic man - who possesses all relevant knowledge
and who acts in a calculated manner so as to achieve an objective
of profit maximisation. As can be seen there are many simpli¬
fications inherent in the theory which suggests that it will be of
limited use to the study of decision making at the level of the
firm given the known complexities of firms e.g. the organisation
structure and the multiproduct nature of its operations. Classical
theory has been extended to explain multiproduct firms and market
situations where conditions of perfect competition do not exist. Its
objective in these extensions is the same as in perfect competition,
namely, to specify the mechanisms by which resources are allo-
15
cated in the market place . It is thus a theory constructed to
explain in general terms the behaviour of firms in a given market
and not the internal workings of a firm within that market. Any
extension of the theory must, therefore, relate to its purpose and
not some other imagined set of objectives.
Criticisms of the theory of the firm seem to follow the pattern
pointed out by Bodenhorn^. First, that traditional theory makes
incorrect assumptions; second, that it does not properly describe
decision-making procedures within modern industrial firms and
therefore, third, that it makes incorrect predictions about market
behaviour of firms in the world.
15. G.P. E. Clarkson, Managerial Economics, Penguin, 1969. p. 53




Bodenhorn largely takes up Friedman's position about the role
of assumptions in the formulation and testing of theories. Friedman
feels that a theory is developed to explain certain phenomena and
that only the implications for these phenomena should be tested
against reality. In particular, testing assumptions against reality
is futile because they must be false. Freidman's test is, therefore,
to accept a theory if its predictions conform with reality in the
majority of cases. He concedes that the assumptions are an indirect
test of the theory and this is interpreted by Bodenhorn to mean that
we should consider the reasonableness of the assumptions as well
as the accuracy of the predictions. If we adopt this view then
18
Koopman's position that both predictions and assumtions should
be compared with reality to test a theory is partially taken into
account.
19
Bodenhorn goes further and states that on Friedman's
definitions a theory is true with respect to the phenomena it
correctly predicts. Classical economic theory may not be able
to explain decision making theories within the firm but it is able
to predict market behaviour. It is thus true with regard to its
basic objective but its falsity in the explanation of the operation
of decision making procedures within the firm means only that we
need a new theory with a new set of assumptions to explain such
procedures. It is a mistake also to view classical theory as a
single theory; rather it is a set of theories which are able to explain
17. M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago, 1943.
18. T. C. Koopmans, Three Essays on the State of Economic Science,
McGraw-Hill, 1957.
19- D. Bodenhorn, op cit. p. 166.
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some facets of market behaviour. The criticism that classical
theory is of no use for explaining the decision process mechanisms
within the "black box" - the firm - is true but not relevant because
the objective of classical theory is the description of market beha¬
viour.
It would obviously be useful to construct a decision process
theory within the firm both from the point of view of understanding
e/o.
the system and constructing its interr^/ltionships. As Bodenhorn
20
poxnts out it does not follow that such a theory will necessarily
help us in predicting market behaviour. It may simply be that we
do not need to know how firms make decisions if we assume that
they are all in the game to make money and will organise their
internal procedures to achieve that objective.
The sum total of the argument is that even though economic
theory is of no use in explaining decision process phenomena it
must be judged by its ability to explain the classes of phenomena
that it purports to explain. The justification for the development
21
of theories of the decision process must come from Cohen
"To achieve satisfactory answers to such questions as how
are resources allocated within firms, what are the effects of
organisation structure on entrepreneurial behaviour etc. we need
to develop theories of the firm which incorporate a much greater
degree of realism than does traditional neoclassical theory".
20. D. Bodenhorn, op cit. p. 168.
21. K. J. Cohen, "Simulation of the Firm ' AER, May I960.
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The implied justification is thus that economic theory has left
a number of largely unanswered questions which we must attempt
to answer. To do so we must build on the very useful framework
that the classical theory provides. It does not matter, therefore,
that classical theory does not explain the distinctive character
of the inventive process. We must use it as a major building
block in the development of a more relevant theory of decision
making in the inventive process.
Many economists have suggested revisions. In this next section
we summarise some of the more important ones and review their
value for our subsequent model building exercise.
2.3. Suggested Revisions to the Theory of the Firm
We will not consider in this discussion the extent to which
revisions to the theory provide a more useful theory of market
behaviour. Our objective here is to move towards greater realism
in theories of the inventive process.
Many researchers have pointed out the multiplicity o f objectives
22, 23
which firms seem to have. Drucker suggests that firms seek
to survive and to achieve this they require satisfactory performance
in each of five areas. From Drucker's exhortations it is not possible
to construct any theory with which we can try to predict the action a
manager will take under a given set of circumstances. This is because
Drucker always writes to provide a framework for good management
22. P. F. Drucker, The Practice of Management, New York: Harper
and Row.
23. P. F. Drucker, "Business Objectives and Survival Needs: Notes
on a Discipline of Business Enterprise", Journal of Business,
1958
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but his writings are based both on inadequate preparation and
understanding of the nature of a theory. In fact nowhere in Drucker's
theory is there anything really new. We could take the position that
the satisfactory attainment of five objectives could be achieved by
maximising profits and in so doing performing satisfactorily
according to four other criteria or objectives.
A much more weighty revision than Drucker's has been the
work of the Carnegie School on the Behavioural Theory of the Firm.
This theory specifically disaggregates the unit of interest in micro-
economic theory from the market to the individual firm. Its objec¬
tive is an analysis and prediction of a firm's decision making he-
haviour. In this theory of decision making behaviour the classical
principle of maximisation is replaced by the notion of achieving a
satisfactory level of performance. This satisficing objective is
24 25
behind much of Drucker's work but the work of Margolis , Simon
26
and Cyert and March provides attempts to lead towards an opera¬
tional definition of file satisficing concept. Margolis tells us that a
level of profits will be satisfactory if it earns the firm a return at
least equal to its aspiration level. Nowhere in his analysis of
decision making procedures is this aspiration level defined indeed
the argument becomes almost circular when he asserts that the aspira¬
tion level equals or exceeds the satisfactory level. Thus, Margolis
does not provide us with an operational definition of satisfactory profits.
Simon suggests that the satisfactory profit level is a subjective concept
24. J. Margolis, "The Analysis of the Firm: Rationalism, Convention¬
alism and Behaviourism ', Journal of Business, 1958.
25. H. A. Simon, Models of Man, Social and Rational, Wiley, 1957.
See paper on "A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice"
26. R. M. Cyert and J. G. March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm,
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
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for the manager concerned and varies in a dynamic manner
with experience and time. The concept of satisficing adopted
in the behaviourai theory is defined in terms of levels of as¬
piration for performance on particular objectives and these
levels vary through time. The theory allows for as many
objectives as are highlighted by observations of firm behaviour.
Each objective is regarded as a constraint on performance and
satisfactory performance is evaluated with respect to the set of
possible objectives. It can be seen , therefore, that the satis¬
ficing definition is somewhat woolly with subjective concepts
such as aspiration levels to be measured. A relevant question to pose
at this stage is "do the alternative theories based on assumptions
of multiple objectives appear to be more useful than theories of
decision making based on a single objective of profit maximisation?"
The assumption of profit maximisation has intuitive appeal and
though simplified can be justified as an approximation to the moti¬
vation of the individual firm. If it is the prediction of the behaviour
of a single firm then a process involving the observation of firm
behaviour, analysing the major objectives and providing operational
measurement of these objectives is likely to be much more fruitful
than an approach based on a simplistic assumption of profit maxi¬
misation. From a model building viewpoint the assumption of
objectives should be left open and each case should be treated
on its own observations of behaviour. It may well be that the
multiplicity of goals thesis is merely a smoke screen to hide the
real aim of the firm, namely, long run profit maximisation. If
this is true, there is no virtue in complexity because we can treat
27
attainment of sub-objectives as boundary conditions to the overall
aim of profit maximisation.
If we accept that it is more reasonable for a theory at the level
of the individual firm to postulate multiple objectives we must ask
whether the knowledge of those objectives is sufficient to enable us
to predict behaviour. Cyert and March certainly believe that a
knowledge of objectives together with the satisficing concept is
sufficient to explain decisions within organisations. This view
assumes that the employee accepts and acts towards the attainment
of the stated objectives of the firms. There is evidence that mana¬
gers adopt a strategy to further their own objectives first and those
of a larger group be it the department or the firm as a whole to a
much smaller extent: The onus is then on the firm to set up an
organisation structure and control systems which bring the objec¬
tives of the manager and the firm into close proximity. An example
28
of this type of approach is that of management by objectives
Cyert and March's optimism about knowledge of objectives being
sufficient to explain decisions within organisations is incorrest except
under special conditions namely explaining repetitive decisions within
29
a stable organisation. The fact that managers in the firm have wide
27. See M. Shubik, "Approaches to the Study of the Decision Making
Relevant to the Firm", Journal of Business, 1964, p. 110.
28. See for example J. D. Wickens, "Management by Objectives: An
appraisal", Journal of Management Studies, October, 1965.
29. See Cyert and March, op. cit.
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discretionary powers and freedom of choice raises several issues
which face not only the behavioural theorists but also the decision
theorists. Intuitively appealing though the satisficing concept may
be it merely suggests a range of possible satisfactory solutions to
the decision problem. It does not provide a decision rule for
choosing within the range of possible solutions. Further, satis¬
ficing is a particularly difficult criterion to define operationally
even if we accept its merit as the relevant objective for the firm.
How can a thorough consideration of individual preferences and
objectives be eliminated from the analysis? Yet Cyert and March
feel that once the relevant satisficing set of objectives are known
we are in a position to predict decision making behaviour. This
assumes that an effective coalition exists between employee and
employer in their joint perception of the value of the objectives
of the firm and that procedures for efficient control and admini¬
stration within the firm are implemented. This latter assumption
is not materially different from the assumption that economists make
to justify the fact that they can successfully predict market actions
of firms without needing to know how the firms make decisions.
Economists would say that firms are in business to make money and
that they will, in general, set up administrative and other procedures
30 3}
to accomplish this objective. Alchian puts this in another way by
saying that only those firms that set up efficient administrative pro¬
cedures will survive.
30. D. Bodenhorn, op git, p. 168
31. A. A. Alchian, ' Uncertainty Evolution and Economic Theory".
JPE, 1950
Cyert and March's theory really takes us a step further than
Drucker's exhortations on how to organise the firm to achieve
optimum performance. It provides an attempt to formalise and
measure a behavioural theory and is a significant addition to the
literature. Yet the number of applications of this formulation
has been limited largely because of the necessity of undertaking
a thorough and detailed analysis of a decision problem which is
both time consuming and out of the mainstream of economic re-
32
search at the moment. Clarkson's doctoral thesis is an example
of how a detailed study of the decision processes of a particular
trust investment manager can help us to move towards a general
theory of decision processes in trust investment. From his work,
which involved building a simulation model of the trust investment
process, Clarkson found that the portfolios selected were very
similar to those of the manager and that a significant proportion
of the manager's recorded behaviour was replicated by the model.
If successful models of individual behaviour in various processes
(like Clarkson's) can be built by a series of researchers then we
will be able to translate theories of individual behaviour into theories
of market and organisational behaviour. It is surely right that we
should now work from the smallest unit - the individual firm and
its complexity - and try and develop aggregate theories from sub-
unit theories.
32. G.P. E. Clarkson, Portfolio Selection: A simulation of trust
investment, Prentice-Hall, 1962.
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The subject of interest in this thesis is the R&D process and
bow to build operationally useful models of such processes. Some
concepts from theories developed so far may be valuable in model
building but in addition a detailed study of the firm, its employees,
its environment, its decision processes and the relation of research
and development to the objectives of the firm are extremely relevant.
This observation of firm behaviour both past and present is under¬
taken in Parts II and III of this thesis before the model building
analysis. For the moment we will try to consider which theories,
a priori, seem valuable to our study. In particular we will look at
the range of alternative decision theories put forward in the literature.
2. 4. Concepts from the Theory of the Firm, Behavioural
Theories and decision Theories Relevant to the R&D Process
33
Arrow in his paper on the production and transmission of
technical knowledge focuses his attention on the uncertainty inherent
in research activity, particularly in the prediction of the outcome.
In the studies described in this thesis we shall be concentrating
primarily on the uncertainty aspects of research and neglect the
other distinctive feature of research activity, its public goods pro¬
perty, with all the consequent ramifications for patent policy.
We start with a conception of economic man, a decision maker,
who is confronted with choices resulting in known certain outcomes.
In this highly unrealistic situation the decision maker has no decision
33. K. J. Arrow, "Classificatory Notes on the Production and Trans¬
mission of Technological Knowledge" AER, May 1969.
problem he merely chooses that act which confers the most
desirable outcome in terms of the firm's maximisation ob¬
jectives. This assumes a one to one correspondence between
the decision maker and the firm. Suppose we are now to com¬
plicate this simplified model by introducing statistical un¬
certainty into the outcome space. There are methods available
to help the decision maker in the face of uncertainty, for
34
example, linear programming under uncertainty or statis-
35
tical decision theory. Statistical decision theory specifically
involves the use of probability in decision making situations and
its development has given rise to a vast literature on subjective
probability and the theory of preferences or utility theory. There
is a good deal of controversy amongst statisticians about the use
of subjective probability distributions and the suggestion has been
made that decision makers do not maximise expected monetary value but
expected utility. There are, therefore, problems concerned with
the definition and measurement of subjective probability and utility
which require testing and solution. Further, decision theories
imply that the decision maker in the organisation is a single entity
whose objectives correspond exactly with the objectives of the firm
and who acts in accordance with a single maximisation objective.
36
This is in conflict with the findings of the organisational theorists
who suggest a multiplicity of objectives and a satisficing criterion.
In our previous discussion of the behavioural theory it became
34. See G. B. Dantzig, "Linear Programming Under Uncertainty",
Management Science, 1955, pp. 197-206
35. See R. Schlaifer, Probability and Statistics for Business Decisions
McGraw-Hill, 1959.
36. J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organisations, Wiley, 1958.
apparent that problems of the identity of the decision maker and the
relevant criterion for decision making are not understood sufficiently
to make the behavioural theory effectively operational. Yet this does
not mean that studies of individual microeconomic behaviour should
be abandoned. In order both to understand microeconomic changes
in productivity and to develop more useful micro-theories we must
study behaviour of decision makers in the R&D area.
The viewpoint adopted later in this thesis is that statistical
decision theory provides the most useful framework with which to
analyse the inventive process. There are problems involved in the
application of such methods some of which are outlined above but
none of them are so destructive that allowance cannot be made for
them if it proves to be necessary. However, a more thorough and
detailed study of the type documented in later chapters, is neces¬
sary to solve some of the economic problems connected with the
research activity. For example, the problem of allocating re¬
sources to research needs to be solved. We need to search for
analytic solutions but advances in the first instance may only come
through the numerical solution of particular problems, employing
the techniques of the Bayesian variant of statistical decision theory.
Whatever conclusion we reach it is possible that in the process some
light will be thrown upon unresolved conceptual problems in statis¬
tical decision theory. In any case we will have a case study to help
us evaluate the relevance of the Bayesian approach.
2.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we took as our starting point the need to in¬
vestigate more thoroughly the micro-character of research activity
uncovered by previous research investigators. Having outlined the
distinctive micro features of research activity we evaluated the
usefulness of the microeconomic theory of the firm as an analytical
framework for the R&D process. It was seen that economic theory
does not treat individual firm behaviour as its purpose is to predict
the market behaviour of firms.
The behavioural theory was considered because it has been one
of the few attempts to construct a decision making theory at the
firm level. Its value is not yet clear because some conceptual prob¬
lems concerning the multiplicity of objectives and the nature of the
satisficing concept have not been fully resolved.
Certain concepts from economic theory and the behavioural
theories will be useful for developing models to explain elements
of decision making in R & D. In addition, studies of the R&D
process from a decision making point of view need to be carried
out at the level of the firm. These studies should be carried out
in two stages:- first, the description of decision processes in R & D;
second, the development of methods for the analysis of decision prob¬
lems. In Parts II and III the essential first stage work in the detailed
analysis of micro decision process in R & D is carried out. This is
to piece together from discussion and historical evidence the formal
$1
and informal operation of the firm's decision making procedures
and gather retrospective evidence on the effectiveness of R & D
decisions. This is an essential prerequisite for the second stage
of building models which are appropriate to the operations of the
firms under study. At this second stage we consider that the
Bayesian approach to decision making is the most relevant
analytical method.
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Part II THE QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY
Introduction
The aim of this part of the study is to provide an information
base for the succeeding research on R & D. Specifically, we gain
information about the processes of decision making (Chapter )
and evaluate the effectiveness of past R&D decisions with infor¬
mation gained from the questionnaire enquiry in Part III. In Part
IV we use this information as a basis for structuring models of
decision problems in R & D.
The existing information base in the literature deals mainly
12 3
with military R & D in the United States ' ' . Since military
R&D tends to be more technically advanced than industrial R&D,
there is a clear need for some additional case study evidence on
the problems of industrial R&D.
1. See M. Peck, R. R. Nelson, T. Marschak, Enos, Marshall and
Meckling in Nelson, R. R. (ed), The Rate and Direction of Inven¬
tive Activity, Princeton, 1962.
2. T. Marschak, T. K. Glennan Jr. and R. Summers, Strategy for
R&D, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1968.
3. M. J. Peck and F. M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process
Harvard: Harvard Business School, 1962.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY OF QUESTIONNAIRE ENQUIRY
3. 0. Introduction
In essence, the approach adopted in this work is the case
study method. The rationale for the use of this method is the
wealth of detailed information which can be obtained about a
firm's research activity. Because the case method is used
we have no statistical sampling problems since we consciously
sacrifice information about a representative sample of firms
in the electronics industry for more detailed knowledge of the
operations of a few firms.
3. 1 Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire presented in the Appendix to this chapter
was designed with two requirements in mind. First, as the
firms who agreed to cooperate in the study differed in their
organisation structures, types of research carried out and a
number of other dimensions the organisation of the questionnaire
had to be sufficiently flexible to allow for such differences. Second,
to provide detailed and thorough information on the development
process. This second requirement includes the more difficult
task of assessing the information needs and problems of the develop¬
ment process. We used the previous case studies and research
fjl
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enquiries ' ' about R & D to provide the basis for the material
covered in the final questionnaire.
In the final questionnaire the topics considered most relevant
were general firm data, management and organisation of research
and development, finance of research and development, manpower
aspects of research and development and data and information on
the general results of research and development.
The research method adopted, was to complement the question¬
naire method with participant observation in the actual R&D opera¬
tions of the firm. This researcher spent a considerable amount of
time in both firms and worked there on a regular basis in order to
be regarded by the employees of the firm as having the same status
as them. Detailed and careful discussions were undertaken with
all relevant employees in the firms studied to assure them that
the research was an academic project and that any results of the
work relating to specific individuals, projects etc. would not be¬
come either the property of the firm or be presented to the firm.
Inevitably, discussions of this type do not really break down the
barriers between the researcher and employee and the success of
the observer role depends on the observer's personality and ability
to fit into the organisational environment. With the two firms
studied here the author spent one day a week in each over two years
working the same hours as the firm's employees, occupying a desk
at the factory and making sufficient personal contacts to allow the
1. Industrial Research in Manufacturing Industry, 1959-60, Federation
of British Industries, London, 1961.
2. E. Mansfield and R. G. Brandenberg, "Allocation, Characteristics
and outcome of the Firm's Research and Development Portfolio",
^ournal of Business, October 1966.
3. See also the military R. & D. references given in the introduction
to Part II.
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the work to proceed reasonably successfully. Each evening on
reaching home from the firm the author tried to document in note
form the facts and impressions about the workings of the R&D
organisation and any comments made by employees which would
tend to explain features of the organisation's environment left
vague or ambiguous by answers to the questionnaire study. The
participant observation process was carried on throughout the
subsequent stages of the project analysis outlined in Part III and
IV.
This complementary process of participant observation is
similar to the social anthropologist's field study method. Since
we are interested in the decision processes in R & D we must
not merely accept the formal statements of objectives and mecha¬
nisms for decision making, we must also try and document the
informal operation of these processes. This follows the thinking
4
of Brown in "Exploration in Management" where he postulates four
organisational structure models: the theoretical, the modified
theoretical, the assumed and the manifest. Brown says that we
can never know the manifest organisation i. e. the one actually in
operation yet it is clear that if we try to describe the informal
operations of the processes under study we must approximate to
the actual organisational environment.
Having outlined the research method adopted we must discuss
the construction and details of the questionnaire.
4. W.B.D. Brown, Exploration in Management, London: Penguin
Books Ltd. 1965.
The first section on general firm data is included to provide
broad information on the nature of the firm's business, its methods
of organisation and its financial accounts.
Section II is perhaps the most important section in the
questionnaire as it covers the management and organisational
aspects of research and development. Section I helps us to estab¬
lish the general environment of the organisation and particularly
its financial position and overall structure. In the second section
the information required from the firm is made much more
specific in that we concentrate upon the management of the
research and development function. In order to understand
the process of innovation within the firm we must first estab¬
lish the type and nature of research and development work under¬
taken and the organisation and function of research and develop-
5
ment within the firm. Previous research evidence suggests
that firms undertake different types of research work and do not
always try to satisfy the same objectives by doing R&D. Further,
Burns and other authorities have suggested that the organisation
structures adopted for innovation management in the firm vary
along a continuum ranging from no decentralisation of authority
and functions within the firm to complete decentralisation. The
structures adopted will in turn influence the lines of communication
between the various functional areas within the firm and have
associated implications for the processes of decision making
within the firm.
5. See for example T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management
of Innovation. London: Tavistock Press, 1961.
The organisation structure and the objectives for undertaking
R&D, be they financial or merely prestige objectives, allow us
to understand the processes and mechanisms by which ideas for
potential project innovations are generated. In some organisations
the R&D work acceptable to the firm might be conditioned by
constraints that it must fall within a given marketing policy for
the firm and be capable of being undertaken by the physical re¬
sources and production facilities within the firm. In these cases
ideas for projects may be generated to a large extent by customer
needs as perceived by the marketing function. This in turn requires
that we must find out the sources of ideas for projects and relate
idea source to the subsequent effectiveness of the research project
when completed.
Once we have found out the processes of project generation
we must find out about the ways in which the firm and, in particular,
the research and development function review the feasibility of
potential projects before deciding whether or not to adopt any of
them. Therefore, we must have information on the lines of com¬
munication and responsibility within the R&D department and the
formal and informal procedures used in reviewing potential research
projects. The information on review procedures naturally leads us
to enquire about the information required by the firm and its deci¬
sion makers when they have to select projects and allocate resources
between them. Do the firm's management have a budget for research
%
and development work? What factors are considered important
in resource allocation decisions in research and development?
These are some of the points which a questionnaire must cover
in the area of the management of research and development. Yet,
there is much information that can only be obtained by observation
and participation in the work of the research and development
function particularly the distinction between formal and informal
procedures of organising jobs and making decisions. The question¬
naire is thus a check list of factors which seem relevant, a priori,
in highlighting the microeconomic and organisational problems in
the day to day management selection and control of research pro¬
jects. However, our knowledge of the microeconomic processes
of innovation is deepened by the subjective observation of the
researcher and this should be borne in mind in evaluating the rele¬
vance of questions in the questionnaire.
Whilst the second section is intended to be the core section of
the questionnaire as it tries to bring out the nature of the innovation
process the remaining three sections are designed to cover three
highly important areas of the innovative process. Thus, the third
section builds up our knowledge of the financial aspects of research
and development and tries to gain information on the profitability of
research and development work and its relation to the efficiency of
the R&D department and the firm as a whole.
The manpower aspects (Section IV) of research and development
are important because the availability and existence of skilled man¬
power resources are essential elements in the resource-mix of the
individual firm. A knowledge of the type of research unit in which
engineers work, the skills and publications of members of the re¬
search staff and the existence of incentive and training schemes help
us to compare and contrast the efficiency of different research and
development organisations.
Manpower, financial, organisational and technical aspects of
the innovative process are considered to be aspects of the innovative
process which require study and attention. In addition, if we wish to
piece together the interactions of these factors we must try also to
evaluate past research and development project results (Section V).
We question whether the rate of progress was satisfactory, whether
the technical problems could have been treated more efficiently,
whether the control of the progress and of the effort expended on the
project could have been improved and whether the organisational
structure hindered the efficient operation of the project. Thus, by
concentrating on some specific historical projects we hope to piece
together some of the problems of the inventive process, the inter¬
actions of economic and technical factors etc. , in order to understand
more fully the microeconomic character of the inventive process.
However, discussion of this retrospective analysis is postponed
until Part III of the thesis.
3. 2. Summary
The Rationale for the questionnaire approach and the research
methodology adopted in this phase of the work have been discussed.
In the next chapter the depth of information obtained and the pro¬
cesses of descision in the firms under study are described. It is
important to remember that the distinctive feature of the research
method is the combination of the dual advantages of questionnaire
methods and participant observation.
Despite concentrating our attention on two firms in the
electronics industry we believe that our case study findings in f irms
A and B will be reasonably representative of electronics firms. An
unpublished paper by Clark^, in which the characteristics of 30
electronics firms were studied, provides a justification for our
belief in the wider applicability of the case study findings.
6. N. Clark, "Science and Regional Economic Development",
unpublished Working Paper, University of Edinburgh, Department
of Economics, 1968.
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3- 3- APPENDIX TO Chapter 3
QUESTIONNAIRE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE
FIRM LEVEL
The Questionnaire given below has been constructed to give
depth knowledge about R & D in the individual firm. As such it
draws upon the FBI survey and a number of other government
enquiries previously mentioned for detailed definitions of R & D
activity.
/oo
QUESTIONNAIRE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Notes and Definitions on the Questionnaire
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH is defined as original investigation towards the discovery
of new scientific knowledge, either without short term objectives and/or
specific products in view in which case it is termed basic research, or
with particular commercial objectives where it is called applied research.
DEVELOPMENT is technical activity concerned with non-routine problems
encountered in translating research findings into products and processes.
This includes construction of pilot plants and design and development of
prototypes.
Research and development excludes -
(a) routine analyses, routine inspection, routine production
testing and routine quality control.
(b) design of manufacturing units
(c) tooling up for full-scale production after development
of new plant
(d) production for sale
(e) market research
(f) pre-production of aircraft
(g) selling of an established product
(h) legal work in connection with patent applications
except where these activities are undertaken by R. & D. department for
other departments and itself, in which case they should be included under
technical services.
Research and Development is expressed into the seven following categories
1./
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1. Basic Scientific Research
2. Applied Research directed towards specific new products or
processes
3. Applied Research on improvements to existing products and
processes
4. Development of new or existing products and processes
*5. Technical Services
*6. Informational Services
7. Any other activities. Please specify
^'Technical Services include design of special equipment for a
process.
£These include the preparation of reports, drawings, formulae,
specifications^ standard practice instruction, operating manuals, etc.
for transmitting to production units, information obtained from other
R. and D. activities.
ANNUAL DATA
Period covered by data should be kept comparable either on a fiscal,
calendar, or accounting year basis. If this is not possible, this
should be indicated where a change occurs.
Note. Firm should include information on its annual period ending


























LIST OF PRODUCT GROUPS
Description of Product Group
MINING AND QUARRYING PRODUCTS
Mining and quarrying products




CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
i
Petroleum products (including lubricating oils prepared
at refineries)
Paint and printing ink
Pharmaceutical and toilet preparations
Synthetic resins and plastics materials
Other chemicals and allied products
METAL MANUFACTURE
Iron and steel
Light metals, copper, brass and other base metals
ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL GOODS
Agricultural machinery (except tractors)
Metal-working machine tools and engineers' small
tools and gauges
Textile machinery and accessories
Mining machinery
Boilers and boilerhouse plant
Industrial and marine engines
Mechanical handling equipment





No. Description of Product Group
21 Pumps, valves, compressors, hydraulic and pneumatic
power equipment
22 Industrial plant and fabricated steel work
23 Other non- electrical machinery and equipment
24 Scientific, surgical and photographic instruments, watches
and clocks
25 Electrical machinery
26 Insulated wires and cables
27 Telegraph, telephone, radio and other electronic apparatus
28 Domestic electrical appliances
29 Miscellaneous electrical goods
SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING
30 Shipbuilding and ship repairing
31 Marine engineering
VEHICLES
32 Motor vehicles (including tractors) including parts and
accessories except electrical equipment
33 Motor cycles, three-wheel vehicles and pedal cycles
34 Aero engines (manufacture and repair)
35 Airframes (manufacture and repair)
36 Aircraft parts and accessories (except electrical
equipment)
37 Locomotives, railway carriages, and wagons and other
vehicles
METAL GOODS NOT ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED
38 Tools and implements; cutlery; wire and wire manufactures;
cases and metal boxes; jewellery; plant and precious metals;
bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, etc; and other metal products
not elsewhere specified
TEXTILES
Man-made fibres (staple fibre and continuous filament yarn)
Yarn thread, cloth and piece goods of cotton, flax, silk,




No. Description of Product Group
41 Woollen and worsted products
42 Textile finishing
43 Other textile manufactures, including asbestos products
(except asbestos cement)
LEATHER, LEATHER GOODS AND FUR







47 Bricks, cement and miscellaneous building materials
and abrasives
48 Pottery, china and glass
49 Timber and furniture etc.
50 Paper and board
51 Paper products, printing and publishing
52 Rubber and rubber products
53 Other manufacturing industries
CONSTRUCTION
54 Building and civil engineering work of all kinds
OTHER NON-MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES
55 Water companies
56 Wholesale and retail distribution
57 Other and general (e. g. research and development





List of qualifications in engineering, science and technology
For the purpose of this inquiry a "first degree or equivalent qualification
in engineering, science or technology" means one of the following:-
University degree
Diploma in technology
Chartered engineer (C. Eng.)
Associateships or diplomas awarded by the following colleges
or former colleges. (Some are now universities. ):-
Abbreviations of awards
The Camborne School of Mines A.C. S.M. or Dip. C. S.M.
The City and Guilds of London Institute A. C. G.I.
The Cranfield College of Aeronautics (Diploma)Dip. of
The Heriot Watt College A.K.W. C.
The Manchester College of Science and A. M. C. S. T.
Technology
The Robert Gordon's Technical College,
Aberdeen
The Royal College of Science (London) A.R. C. S .
The Royal College of Science (Ireland)
The School of Mines A. R. S. M.
The Royal College of Science and
Technology, Glasgow
The Imperial College of Science and A. R. C. S., A. R. S. M.,
Technology A. C. G. I.
Graduate or corporate membership of:-
The Royal Aeronautical Society
The Institute of Biology
The Institution of Chemical Engineers
The Royal Institute of Chemistry
The Institution of Civil Engineers
The Institution of Electrical Engineers
The Institution of Electronic and Radio Engineers
The Institution of Gas Engineers
The Institute of Marine Engineers
The Institution of Mechanical Engineers
The Institution of Metallurgists
The Institution of Mining Engineers
The Institution of Mining and Metallurgy
The Institution of Municipal Engineers
The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
The Institute of Physics and Physical Society
The Plastics Institute
The Institution of Production .Engineers
The Institution of the Rubber Industry





Technicians and other technical supporting staff
These occupy a position between that of the Q. S. E. on the one hand
and the skilled foreman or craftsman on the other. Their education
and specialised skills enable them to exercise technical judgment. By
this is meant an understanding by reference to general principles, of
the reasons for and the purposes of their work, rather than a reliance
solely on established practices or accumulated skills. They may
possess qualifications such as Higher or Ordinary National Diploma or
certificate, or the City and Guilds or similar nationally recognised
awards. Some may possess a degree in science, engineering or
technology. If a person does not possess a formal qualification this
does not mean he is not a technician. In identifying technicians and
other technical supporting staff it is essential to consider the job being
done rather than the qualifications held. Persons under training as
technicians or other technical supporting staff should be included.
Range of functions of technicians and other technical supporting staff
They are normally encountered among workers in the following fields:
(a) The detailed design and development, or the manufacture,
erection or commissioning of equipment and structures; drawing
estimating, inspecting and testing equipment: use of measuring
instruments: operating, maintaining and repairing machinery:
activities connected with R. & D. , testing of materials and com¬
ponents; technical advice to customers; servicing equipment;
data processing; work study.
(b) assisting qualified scientists in physical measurements;
collection and evaluation of experimental observations;
devising and setting up of experimental apparatus; preparation
of chemicals or biological cultures or similar preparations in
other fields; photographic work; taking and routine testing of
product samples, chemical analysis, etc.
Main Job Titles
Computer operators and programmers, designs assistants,
draughtsmen, other design and drawing office staff, laboratory
technicians, plant and site supervisors, installers, etc., and service
engineers, production planners, research assistants, technical sales


































(Note: There are obviously many more job titles describing the
function of technicians and other T.S. S. than given here. The lists
are not to be taken as exhaustive and are merely illustrative.)
%
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DART I - GENERAL DATA ON FIRM
■\. Status of Firm
1. Are you owned or controlled
by another company?
2. If owned by another company, when
were you acquired?
3. (a) If you are a subsidiary or affiliate
of a company overseas, please
name company, and country.
(b) If a subsidiary or affiliate of a
company whose headquarters are
in the U. K. , please name company,
and country.
4. Do you have your own board of
directors?
5. How much control does your
management have over decisions




6. If the answer to Question 1 is
Yes, what is the composition of
your board of directors between
your own and that of the controlling
firm?
7., Does your board of directors have
complete control over financial,
employment, investment and
management decisions in the firm?
Please expand.
8. Do you publish your own accounts
separately? We should like a





Have there been any changes in
your method of accounts over past




10. What is your financial year? See





1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
1. Pre-tax profits £
2. Net Sales £
3. Total employment
in all activities











b) Plant, equip- ^
ment, vehicles £
6. Value of Stocks:
a) Raw Materials
b) Finished products
c) Work in progress
Note: Please explain firm's
method of deprecia¬
tion and any changes
in past five years.
?•/
4.
7. a) Into which Product Group
or Groups do your products
fall? (See key to Product
Groups in Definitions.)
b)
Give prices and physical
output in most recent
year of the 10 principal
products into which the
output falls.
Firm Operations









PART__rL MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION OF R. & D.
1. (a) Do you accept the following seven categories of research and
development as being sensible for your organisation?
(1) Basic scientific research.
(2) Applied research directed towards specific new
products and processes.
(3) Applied research on improvements to existing
products and processes.




(7) Any other activities: please specify.
(b) Could you talk about the work undertaken in your organisation
in these categories?
(c) Could you make an estimate of the number of current projects
in each category?
(d) Could you yvill in the following table which seeks to gain informa¬
tion about the percentage distribution of research projects by category
of research for the period 1964-1968?
Percentage of Research Projects by Category of Research, 1964-1968
(Here 1968 - means year ending 1968)-
1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
Basic Scientific Research








(i) To what extent do other departments in the firm undertake their
own R. & D. activities? (Answer with reference to your current
year.)
(ii) Has the position been changing over the last five years?
(b)
(i) Can you estimate the percentage of R. & D. activity in the firm
in the current year that is undertaken by the R. & D. department?
(ii) Is it possible to make estimates of this percentage for the last
five years?
The following table may make it easier to answer this question:
Percentage of R. &_D. Activity undertaken
by the" IirXl3ri5epaxTt1ment In~the""following years
&





Do other departments put up ideas to the R. & D„ Department
scientific evaluation?
What are the main function(s) of the R. & D. department in your
organisation?
e. g. (i) as a service department
(ii) as a major source of new ideas and research
What do you think that the R. & D. organisation can most usefully
do in order to maintain the profitability of the firm?
Is the R. & D. department on a different site from other departments
in the firm?
To what extent does the R. & D. department have autonomy in its
operation?
e.g. (i) in FINANCIAL matters: can you spend money
allocated to your department in whatever way
you think fit?
(ii) in ORGANISATIONAL matters: can you hire
employees freely?
(a) To whom are you responsible in the firm and to whom do you
report on the performance of your various activities?
(b) Are there any other poeple to whom you must answer?
What are the lines of responsibility within the R. & D. department?
e. g. do you employ project leaders superintending project
teams or is your organisation different from this pattern?
4.
9. (a) What is the relation between your department and other
departments in the firm, e. g. finance, production, marketing,
sales, the central board?
(b) With which departments do you communicate most?
(c) What proportion of specific requests are made of the R. & D.
department by these other departments?
From which departments do these requests come?
(d) Do ideas for future research topics, other than these specific
requests, come much from outside the R. & D. function?
If YES: What proportion come from outg^de and from which
departments?
10. (a) If requests are made by other departments, who from the other
department contacts the R. & D. organisation? (For example, does
the person who thinks up the idea contact the R. & D. department
directly or does he communicate with his own functional management
first?)





(c) Is it possible for the team to look at certain current requests
from other departments and see both how they are treated and what
happens to them eventually?
(d) Are there-records available of requests made by other depart¬
ments to the R. & D. department over the last five years?
If YES, would you fill in following table.
Percentage of Requests from Other Departments
b^TyplfoFXctivity












11. (a) Is each idea that is received by the R. & D. department from
other departments scrutinised by the R. & D. manager first?
If YES: After the manager has looked at it does he then pass it on
to one of his staff for evaluation before a preliminary decision on
its viability is made? If not, what is the procedure that is then
followed?
If NO: If there any procedure in practice by which these ideas are
reviewed?
(b) Is it possible for the team to look at some ideas that have
recently been put forward to the R. & D. department by other
departments to see how they are treated initially and also what the
subsequent stages in the evaluation procedure are?
(c) If records of ideas put to the R. & D. department by other
departments (over the past five years) are available, would you
please complete the following table?












1968 1967 - 1966 1965 1964
7.
i z-r
12. (a) Ideas are generated also within the R. & D. department? Can
these ideas be categorised by the seven types of R. & D. activity for
both the current year and the past five years?
Percentage of Ideas Generated_within R & D. Department
73~ActivIty









(b) What is the procedure for evaluating these ideas within the




NOTE: It is perhaps worthwhile here to make some comments about what
we~are trying to find out at this stage of the questionnaire. We are trying to
find out the lines of communication within the R. & D. department and between
the R. & D. department and other departments of the firm as regards R. & D.
activity. We are not trying to tackle the problem of evaluation here - this is
treated later on - but rather to get an understanding of where ideas and requests
come from and by what process they emerge as projects to be evaluated further
later on. We must also emphasise that an idea may have a different level of
formality in the process than a request has. It is obviously useful for us to
know that ideas and requests are treated in different ways according to their
different levels of formality.
13. (a) At what stage are these internally generated ideas merged with the
externally generated ideas and requests? Are internally generated
ideas treated any differently from externally generated ideas and
requests? e.g. are greater priorities attached to internally generated
ideas?
(b) Is it possible to get data for the past year (and, if possible, the
last five years) on the proportion of ideas that eventually get accepted
whether those ideas be internal to the~~R. D. department or external
to it?
Perhaps a table would help you in your answer.
Proportion of Ideas that gventuaR^^t_Accepted
Source of ideas Source of ideas
"R. & D. Department Other Departments
1968 19.67 1966 1965 1964 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 J
14./
9.
14. Do you feel that after a preliminary evaluation of a request or any
idea, such as is made at this stage of the decision process, you could
make a judgement about the probability of its technical or commercial
success?
If YES: On what grounds would you justify your probability estimate?
If NO: (a) What further information do you need?
(b) What further things would you like to see done?
NOTE: We are now asking a question about the total budget because it
!s"a~relevant factor in the evaluation of, and allocation of resources, to
projects.
15. (a) Does the firm have a total R. & D. budget?
(b) Is this budget defined in terms of:
l.
(i) a specific cash sum?
(ii) a certain number of projects?
(iii) other (please specify)?
(c) As a matter of policy, do you restrict your investment programme
to those acceptable proposals which can be financed out of internally
generated funds?
16. Is the research and development director or manager given full res¬
ponsibility to administer his budget resources in whatever way he
thinks fit?
If NO: with whom does the final authority lie on the administration
and allocation of the budget?
/2-V-.
10.
17. (a) What information do you collect in the R. & D. department about
production licensing agreements and patent rights held elsewhere but
which might be useful to the firm's operative?
(b) What information do you collect about R. & D. going on
either (i) in firms in the same industry?
or (ii) in firms in other industries?
or (iii) any other places (please specify)?
(c) What sort of analyses are made of business and market conditions
by the firm?
Are these analyses fed to the R. & D. department?
(d) Are profits and sales figures fed to the R. & D. department?
(e) Do you think that information about external and internal con¬
ditions (as outlined above) needs to be collected by the R. & D.
department? What reasons would you give for assembling such
information?
18. We have tried to see how informal ideas and requests are made to
the R. & D. department and how they are formalised after a preliminary




(i) (a) Are they considered individually or does the managerial
organisation decide to look at them after a quantity has amassed?
(b) If done in batches, how many batches per year do you deal
with?
(ii) Who decides that the process of consideration is done in the way
described in (i)?
(iii) Why is the process done in this way?
(iv) How often do you submit R. & D. estimates up to the board?
19. Please elaborate on the method or methods by which your firm measures
the relative investment worth or economic desirability of proposals sub-
, mitted for inclusion in your R. & D. budget.
(a) Simple rate of return on each investment is estimated.
(b) Discounted cash flow (DCF) method is used.
(c) Net present value calculation made.
(d) MAPI formula employed.
(e) Payback period calculated.




20. Against what standard(s) do you compare the relative worths (as
provided by the measure(s) denoted above) of the various proposals
under consideration to determine which to accept and which to reject.
(a) An arbitrary "cut-off". Please note the specific value which
serves as your standard (e. g. you may consider as acceptable all
proposals with an indicated payback of less than three years or a
rate of return not less than 10%).
(b) An historical average return on the book value of the company
or division.
(c) A weighted cost of capital.
(d) Other.
21. * Measures Standards
(a) "(b) (c7~~(d7~Te) (f) (g) (a) TbTTcTTd)
(a) Convenience













*For which of the reasons shown overleaf does your firm prefer the
measure(s) and standard(s) indicated in your previous responses?
(b) If you wish to elaborate on any of the reasons please do so
now.
22. How have your measure(s) and standard(s) changed over the last
five years?
23. If you are contemplating a change in the immediate future in either
your measure(s) or investment worth or standard(s) of comparison,
what measure(s) or standard(s) are being considered, and why?
24. (a) As a matter of policy, are projects given a definite expectation
of life when they are first approved?
(b) How is this length of time or period of life determined?
(c) Also, at what resource level (or strength) do you decide to
back projects? (e. g. if you put limitless resources into some
projects they would have a higher probability of showing tangible
results eventually).
25. (a) How often are projects:
(i) evaluated
(ii) reviewed
(b) Do existing projects come up for renewal, each year or at the
end of their lifetime?
(c)/
14.
(c) How do you review and appraise the performance of projects
in operation?
(d) How often are budgets allocated to particular projects?
26. How do you incorporate the element of risk amd uncertainty into
your evaluations?
(a) By adjusting investment worth figures to reflect the different
levels of risk associated with individual proposals?
(b) By applying different "cut-off" rates to projects of different
degrees of uncertainty?
(c) No attempt is made to incorporate risk and uncertainty into
our evaluations.
(d) Other method(s) used.
27. (a) What budgetary control techniques are used to control the
spending of the R. & D. budget?
(b) Is a separate account kept for each project?
28. If the resources given to a particular project were exhausted, would
additional resources for that project be available from the central
If YES: are budgetary control techniques used to control
spending on that project?
pool?
PART in. THE FINANCE OF R. & D.
NOTE: Earlier in Part n we looked at the question of an overall budget
set a~side for R. & D. work in the organisation.
1. Is the total budget planned in advance?
If YES:
(a) How is the budgeted figure calculated?
e. g. Do you decide to spend so much on R. & D. or do you
just decide to support a certain number of projects?
(b) What factors are considered in your calculation?
(c) To what extent do you take account of:
(i) production leasing agreements with other firms
(ii) research carried out by other firms in the firm's
industry
, (iii) research carried out by other industries (please name)
(iv) general business conditions or forecasts
(v) profits or sales results
(vi) government actions, e. g. credit squeeze
Then, can you give us some examples of how you take account of




(a) Are figures available of planned or budgeted spending on
R. & D. for each year for the paiOIve"years?
(b) In all cases what was the actual spending? Please enter
figures below.
PLANNED BUDGET ACTUAL BUDGET
1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 j
•
If there is no definite planned figure available for R. & D., what
' was the actual spendirig"on"R,7 & D. (Again for the last five years.)
ACTUAL BUDGET '
1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
(a) Is it possible for the figures for total current' expenditure on




































(b) Can this breakdown also be obtained for each of the previous
five years?
5. What is the smallest unit costed separately? (e. g. does each •
individual project have its own account?)




What was the cost breakdown in the R. & D. department, for each
of the last five years and the current year, between labour costs
and material costs.
NOTE: This is not the same question exactly as (4) because we
are seeking the aggregate breakdown here, i. e. we are not trying
to distinguish types of R. & D. activity.
Cost Breakdown for R.__& D. Department





In question 4 we have as one of our cost components:-
OVERHEAD COSTS
(a) What does this overhead cost component consist of?
(b) How far is an attempt made to assign overhead costs, where
these are used by all activities of the firm, to the R. & D. department?
(a) What does external expenditure on R. & D. consist of?
Could you detail your expenditure in each of the following categories
for the current year (please add further categories that appear to be
necessary For your firm).
(i)/
(i) Payments for R. & D. work by subsidising to parent firms
(ii) Payments for R. & D. work to either government or private
research associations or both (please distinguish between regular
subscriptions and specific work)G
(iii) Payments for R. & D. work to private consultants
(iv) Payments for R. & D. work to universities
(v) Payments for royalties
(vi) Payments for licensing agreements
(vii) Payments for patent infringements under patent fields
(viii) Any other (please specify)
How many pieces of work "are given to outside bodies? Can these
figures be broken down?
Could you also give this information for each of the previous five
years?
(b) Could these payments also be broken down by type of R. & D.
activity as illustrated in the following table, for the current year
and each of the previous five years?
6.
Payment Breakdown for Current_Year
Question 9(a)












(c) Can you also give some indication of the number of production
leasing agreements entered into by the firm?
1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
Number of Production
Licensing Agreements




10. (a) What does external income from R. & D. work consist of?
Could you detail the Income in each of the following categories for
the current year (please add any further categories you think
necessary).
(i) From R. & D. work sold by the organisation to
outside bodies.
(ii) From licensing agreements.
(iii) From payments to the R. & D. department by other
subsidiaries of the firm.
(iv) From royalties.
(v) From patent infringement under patent fields.
(vi) Any other (please specify).
Could you also give this information for each of the previous five
years?
(b) Could these sources of income be identified by type of R. & D.
activity, as illustrated in the following table, for the current year
and each of the previous five years?
/36
8.
Income Breakdown for Current Year
Questi"on~l0(a) ~











(c) Can you also give some indication of the number of production
leasing agreements entered into by other firms with your firm?
1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
Numbers of
agreements
(d) Can you also give a list of patents taken out by the firm in:
; 3^.




»ART IV. MANPOWER_DATA FOR DEPT.
i. 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 196
L Total number of qualified
scientists and engineers
( include full-time equivalent of
those working part-time in
R. & D. and in rest of dept.)
2. Total number of technically-
qualified supporting staff
employed in R. & D. teams,
. and other staff in full-time
equivalent in firm
3. Please give the following information (on attached sheet) on each individual




















Do you have a library for use by Y ,,T
R. & D. scientists? es' 0
Do you employ a full-time information v /v
officer? - xes/iNO
Do you have contacts with outside
sources of information such as
libraries, etc. in parent firm
or others, research associations,
universities and government
research stations? If so, name
these. _
How many of your R. & D. staff
have been to the following (with
your knowledge and financial help,




How much was spent by you on 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
above, if known? £
How many of your R. & D. staff
are known to be working for
higher degree or engaged in
studies connected with present
occupation during firm's time?
How many of your R. & D. staff 0
have visited other firms, such as
parent firm, subsidiaries, private
research firms or others on
R. & D. business in past year?
3. "f-°
4. Do you have an established number
(a) of posts for Q. S. E. Yes/No
(b) if yes to (a):
(i) What is the size of your
current establishment?
(ii) How is this establishment
determined?
'acancies (Note: The following questions refer to the most recent complete year
for which the firm has data.)
1968 1967 1966 1965 1964
2. (a) Number of Q. S. E. recruited in
(b) Number of Q. S. E. who resigned
in
3. Number of unfilled vacancies in
current year under the following
; '• categories:
(a) because of resignation




How far ahead do you estimate
your requirements for Q. S. E. ?
4.
5. What proportion of vacancies for






in the past year
lLh(
(a) If a post cannot be filled, would a
scientist with a lower level of
training than first insisted upon
be acceptable?
(b) If answer to (a) is yes,
(i) How often does this happen
(ii) For what sort of posts would
this be acceptable?
(c) If answer to (a) is no, then how
long vail the firm wait before
re-offering the post at increased
salary or re-advertising?
Yes/No
17. Before advertising, will attempts be y ,,T
made to fill a post from within? '
L8. (a) For how long are Q. S. E. usually
appointed?






1. Do you keep salary scales for v /M
Q.S.E. xes/JNo
If so, please expand
0. What weight do you give to age
and period of employment in
fixing salaries. Please expand.
/
Xr\XV,JLv Number Qualifications Age Presentannualsal ry Periodofmployment withfirm Occupationandpost beforejoiningfirm Presentposition Changesiposition inperiodofemployment ♦Natureofworkt present ♦IfworkinginR.&D underwhichtyp Subjectworkingin atpresent Notes:/Intermsfd grees,post-graduateiplomatc.,ansubjectt di d(sea6,789f definitions). ♦Ifsubjectiworkingnmorethanonc pacity,pleasindic tai ,a dtthe s. |IfQ.S.E.isengagedmorthanonRa dDctivity,pleaseindi tin ,notothe
it+if-
ART V. GENERAL RESULTS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Project Performance
1. We would like to do a cohort analysis of a selected number of projects
through the past five years in order to evaluate the performance of
projects retrospectively, both from the point of view of technical
success and commercial success. Please refer to the separate
tables attached.
-J. Patents and Licensing Agreements
• 2. Does the existence of patent
rights held by other firms, in
any way deter you from certain
fields? If so, please give
examples.
3. To what extent are licensing
agreements for R. & D. bought
from parent company?
4. Give the main influences that
lay behind all licensing agree¬
ments bought by you.
Use of Outside Research Bodies
5. How many problems have you











(v) Private Research Firms *
6. Give the main reasons that
make firm use Research
Associations.
Have you been satisfied with







Can the firm estimate the
success-rate of such
research?
8. Number of visits made by your R.












9. Number of visits to you in past







10. What'practical use have you made
of results of Research Associa¬
tions, other than specific
problems referred to them?
11. How had these results come to
your knowledge?
12. Does distance between Research
Associations, and other outside
bodies, and you handicap your
use of them?
13. What other factors deterred you
from using Research Associa¬
tions, and other outside bodies,
more?
14. Would the firm have used the
services of Private Research
firms to a greater extent if more




15. Name other forms of co¬
operation in R. & D. between
you and your parent company,
e. g. exchange of scientists.







'YPE OF R. & D. ACTIVITY Initiated
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1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th yea
nvestmert necessary
ment. **
ital stock required or
i stock
3 Price of product
ce of product
=s output of product
output after innovation
.




1, please give details
* e. g. cost reducing, quality improvement; new and improved product.
** If also included in R. & D. expenditure, please note this.
/ Where the answers to this question are estimates rather than actual
figures, please mark thus -
// Technical success/failure involves the project being judged technically
feasible/not feasible. ,
/// Commercial success involves, e.g. producing a marketable product.
In the case where research continues after an innovation has become
a success commercially, we would like you to follow this through
where for example research continues to find potential applications




AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION PROCESSES IN R fc D
4. 0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the nature of research and
development activity at the level of the firm. We consider the prob¬
lems faced in research and development work and the decisions made
by the decision maker in the firm. We seek to determine the nature
of the methods used in the processes of decision in R & D but leave
an analysis of the effectiveness of historical R&D work in the firm
with its associated implications for decision making to Part III of this
thesis. Our purpose is to understand the formal and informal decision
processes in R & D in the firm and to incorporate evidence from the
questionnaire study to further this purpose. However, there are
sections and questions in our questionnaire which we shall not con¬
sider because they do not help our understanding of decision processes.
In order to make our subsequent analysis meaningful we should
present a few introductory remarks about the firms A and 3 who
cooperated in our case study research. Both firms manufacture
electronic instrumentation and have premises in the central helt of
Scotland.
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Firm A is the British subsidiary of an international electronics
firm. Its policy is determined wholly within Britain and it is auto¬
nomous in financial and other managerial matters. Its finance for
growth is generated out of sales volume though in extremely exceptional
circumstances finance can be raised from the parent company. Present
annual money sales volume is in the range of £3-10 million and for
R&D expenditures are in the range of £0. 25 - 1.5 million. R&D
as a proportion of sales volume has been increasing over the last
ten years and there is no evidence to suggest that R&D expenditure
is some constant proportion of money sales volume.
Firm B is a private British electronics firm and is somewhat
smaller in terms of sales volume and R&D expenditures. Sales
volume is in the range of £ 1 - 3 million and R&D expenditures are
in the range of £0. 025 - 0. 15 million. Sales volume has increased
over the last ten years though R&D expenditures have risen less
than in proportion to the rise in sales volume. High risk projects
involving largish sums of money are not usually undertaken without
external backing.
In firm A the ratio of overhead costs to materials costs for the
R&D department is approximately 1:1. Unfortunately for firm B
accounting data could not be broken down accurately to give a similar
ratio for the R&D department in B. This is mainly because of diffi¬
culty in defining the R&D department in B. If, however, we regard
the firm as the R&D department in B the ratio of overhead costs to
/52-
materials costs is approximately 1:1 also.
4.1. The Notion of a Decision Process
Theories of decision making are based upon the study of the ways
in which people make (and ought to make) decisions. Many theories
exist and these vary from the statistical theories of decision to the
organisational theories of decision. Yet whilst theories are useful
their worth improves if, and only if, we constantly improve our
understanding of the nature of the problems in the decision process
under study.
We have as our area of interest the R&D process at the level
of the individual firm. The research and development process concerns
itself with the search for possible research opportunities, the evalua¬
tion of these opportunities in a formal or informal manner, the
comparison between alternative research opportunities and the
selection of the set of opportunities to be undertaken as the research
work by the firm. This process continues through time and in addition
to constant evaluation of new projects the progress of existing research
work is reviewed and compared with new research opportunities for the
firm.
The research and development process thus has a number of
stages. What, however, is the nature of the decision to undertake
R&D? Is it purely an investment decision undertaken with the
motive of future profit or are technical criteria important in the
decision? What are the particular characteristics of the innovative
IS3
process? These are some of the more important points in our
subsequent study.
We have to be careful, nevertheless, of several pitfalls in
our analysis of decision processes in R & D. First, we must
be aware of the difference between describing legitimate structures
within which research and development decision making may be
carried out and the nature of the decision process itself. In any
firm there is some procedure for decision making in R 8; D i.e.
a decision making structure but merely describing this procedure
is not sufficient for a deep analysis of the decision process in R & D.
We are merely describing structures for decision peculiar to the
individual firm rather than the nature and characteristics of the
decision process itself. The process of making a decision is com¬
plex and is related to the nature of the particular decision structure.
It is basically a process of thinking and evaluation by a decision
maker and is performed in relation to thelogical apparatus personal
to the decision maker. The decision maker acts according to his
information and knov/ledge of the environment, i. e. the R&D pro¬
cess, and the particular decision problem and is conditions by the
goals or objectives which he desires to attain. The manner in which
the process of decision is carried out is a function of the decision
maker's subjective weighting of the relative importance of information,
hunch and personal and corporate goals.
Second, in considering structures which are helpful for decision
making, we must draw the distinction between the formal decision
/%-
(making structure or method and the informal operation of that
method. A method for evaluating the worth of some R&D pro¬
ject may be formally put forward by the firm's management but
the way in which it is used in practice may differ radically from
management's initial conception.
Third, given that we can identify the decision maker in the
firm, how can the processes by which he makes decisions be
evaluated? It is quite clearly not sufficient to adopt the approach
of asking him what decision he is making on a regular or periodic
basis because of the different goals and personality structures
of the decision 'maker. When we are trying to conceptualise an
instinctive process such as the process of making a decision we
must observe the decision maker's personal behaviour and his
role in relation to other individuals in the firm. The effectiveness
of the decision maker in relation to the sub-organisation which he
controls has implications for the eventual quality of the R&D
work performed by those under his control.
Fourth, this leads us naturally to an analysis of the influence
which the particular organisation structure has on the decisions
taken by the decision maker. The decision maker's objectives
may diverge widely from corporate objectives if reward structures
which recognize the worth of the decision maker are not present
in the firm. He will be encouraged to set his targets in accordance
with the firm's if his reward improves by doing so. Further, the exis-
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tence of a well-defined information and data processing system
within the organisation has an influence on decision because it
will tend to alleviate the need for the decision maker to act as
an information processor on information generated routinely
within the firm and should thus increase his efficiency.
Therefore, we have a model of a decision maker acting in
an uncertain environment, namely, research and development. Ihe
actual decision d, is a function of the research and development
problem, the available information on that problem, the environ¬
ment of the firm, and the objectives and goals of the firm and deci¬
sion maker (which are in general dissimilar particularly if the
decision maker and firm are not the same entity. )
Mathematically, d f (R & D , Information, The Firm, Objectives &
Problem Goals of
Decision Maker)
We have shown that the environment of the firm is important
and in particular, that the presence of structures or procedures for
decision making within firms is a means of developing a process of
communication between individuals involved in a particular decision
problem and a structured "vocabulary", quantitative or qualitative,
with which they can communicate on a common basis. We must turn
now to a brief consideration of information neitessary for decision
making.
Ib(?
4. 2. Information for Decision Making
The decision maker must have information on the factors affecting
his decision. In our analysis of the processes of decision we must,
therefore, consider the information needs of the decision maker.
In relation to research and development there seem to be three sets
of factors which are worthy of detailed consideration. They are
economic, technical and organisational factors. The decision maker
needs information on the costs and benefits in economic terms of
undertaking particular research projects. This information must be
mixed with an evaluation of the technical feasibility of a project in
relation to the firm's mix of physical resources and technical skill.
Such an evaluation may be presented as an information flow from a
project engineer to the decision maker responsible for research and
development. Economic and technical information must be merged
with information available from the organisation as a whole on budgets
for research and development, plans for company growth and objectives
and targets which research work must satisfy. A priori it is reason¬
able to suppose that the decision maker with better information will
on average make better decisions and that, therefore, a firm with a
well designed information system will be more efficient in its decision
making. However, we should note the distinction between a good
decision and a good outcome in this context. A good decision is a
logical decision based on the uncertainties that are present in a given
situation but it does not necessarily lead to a good outcome.
In the analysis that follows we consider the decision process
itself in terms of its rationality and leave the measurement of the
efficiency of past R&D results, which doesn't bear on the processes
of decision, until Part III of the Thesis.
4. 3. An Evaluation of the Decision Processes in Firms A
and B in the Electronics Industry.
We know that the decision maker in research and development
acts in an uncertain environment and we require to analyse the
reasons why particular strategies are adopted. The firms A and
B have been chosen because they have widely divergent structures
within which decision problems can be analysed. These structures
are merely legitimate methods of viewing a decision problem. Since
the words formal and informal have been used in another sense
previously we shall distinguish between rigid and loose structures
which help the evaluation of decision problems in research and
development. A rigid structure is one in which facts and assump¬
tions about a particular R&D problem are formalised and related
together in some particular analytical form. This analytic form
is often an explicit independent variable considered by the decision
maker as a part of his information base in coming to a final decision.
A loose structure is one in which at best only very rough numerical
and factual analyses are carried out. The decision maker in such an
environment looks at a given problem as a whole and comes to a
decision on the basis of hunch, judgement and experience.
/5"g
In our analysis of decision processes in A and B we will
constantly keep in rnind the functional form relating the decision to
information and knowledge, the nature of the organisation and the
goals of the decision maker and firm as the model for the analysis.
Thus, it is legitimate to discuss the influence of the independent
variables related to the decision before finally analysing how the
decision maker (or group of decision makers) proceeded to the
eventual decision in a particular case.
Firm A's main objective for undertaking research and
development work is stated by corporate management as being
the need to provide the base on which the long term growth of the
company can be developed. In operational terms this means that
research and development work has to achieve a level of profit¬
ability in order to maintain the future growth of the firm out of
internally generated funds. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the research and development work in the firm is applied in nature
and oriented towards the development of new and existing products.
Research and development is organised on a departmental basis
with a manager appointed to direct its operations. The links between
the managing director and the heads of the various sub-departments
such as R & D are close and weekly management meetings at which
the R&D manager and sub-managers are present are regularly
held. There has always been a special relationship between the
R&D manager and the managing director because of the irategic
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importance of R & D work to the firm. Their philosophy is
basically that without good R&D they might as well go out of
business. This philosophy is an offensive one, R & D is there to
develop new areas of technical competence in advance of the
competitor.
The research and development manager controls a skilled
research staff whose size is about 5-10% of the total employ¬
ment of the firm in all functional areas and he has a number
of senior project engineers directly under him who are made
responsible for the day to day operations of the various pro¬
jects which make up the research department's portfolio of
projects. The process by which project ideas are generated
within the firm is random and the search process for new pro¬
ject ideas is delegated to every project engineer and sales
engineer. In fact most project ideas are generated from the
research and development staff with a number of improvements
in design, i. e. applied design projects, suggested by production
engineers. Sales engineers often stumble upon untapped market
demands and are responsible for putting firms, who want a
special instrument designed and made, in touch with the R&D
manager. A few ideas come also from other sub-departments
in the firm but the major source is the R&D laboratory itself.
Perhaps this is because the firm has a type of rigid structure in
which ideas can be communicated and formulas can be calculated
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to aid decisions. The existence of channels of communication
through which ideas for projects can be passed and a "vocabulary"
in which facts about them are analysed and formalised allows the
research engineer to be aware of the desire of the firm for project
ideas but most important that these ideas should be presented in
such a way that they will be useful to the R&D manager.
The firm divides a new project idea once generated into four





The investigation phase is the most interesting because it is
at this phase that decisions about possible adoption of projects
are made. It comprises three more or less separate stages which
will be described as follows
A) Preliminary Product Survey
In this stage a broad definition of the technical features of the
project is required. In the light of this definition a list of possible
technical approaches for the product is drawn up and critical tech¬
nical areas are identified and evaluated. A preliminary evaluation
of the market into which the eventual product will sell and its likely
costs are also made. This preliminary survey is generally carried
out by the engineer who put forward the initial idea.
B) Detailed Design Study
This presupposes a satisfactory outcome for the preliminary
study. The outcome of the initial study is reviewed at a meeting
of the R&D manager with the senior project engineers and a de¬
tailed study of possible project designs is carried out by teams
of research and design engineers to evaluate the one which is
most feasible in terms of overcoming major technical problems
at a given qost level.
C) Project Proposal
Stage (B) is an essential prerequisite for (C). In (C) a
complete technical specification is prepared for the project and
where possible preliminary circuit diagrams are provided. To¬
gether with the specification is an accompanying formal market
estimate, i. e. an evaluation of economic factors and a time
schedule for the development project.
This detailed project proposal is most often carried out by
a senior project engineer who coordinates the opinions of the
project initiator and the research and design teams empbyed on
the project.
Given the structure presented by the firm for the evaluation
of projects how are projects reviewed in practice and what factors
tend to be given most emphasis in the review procedure? It is
important to remember in considering the process of project
evaluation that firm A has never yet had a budget constraint on
research and development spending, to some extent this is because
the firm is not aware of the nature of the relations between R&D,
inventive output and economic results but mainly because of the
shortage of new product ideas. The firm's growth is limited by the
growth of new ideas and, therefore, the firm has adopted the policy
of undertaking R&D activity in a limited number of technical areas
and planning a concentrated R&D effort in each of these areas in order
to highlight new ideas. This policy is further necessary because the
shortage of really good engineers means that R&D also has to be
an educative process in which the benefits of concentrating are
reaped by engineers "learning by doing" and generating new product
ideas with increasing momentum through time.
We find that the process of preliminary evaluation of new product
ideas is very sketchy and informal and the project initiator's idea is
usually taken on trust. It is assumed that the initiator is sufficiently
objective that his judgement and experience are a guarantee against
the need for a formal preliminary evaluation.
Once this initial review has been carried out by the project
initiator, the project idea is passed on to the research manager
for action. He generally convenes a meeting of his senior project
engineers to evaluate the areas in which greater information about
the feasibility of the project is needed. Once the areas are defined
a working party of research and design engineers is set up to evaluate
the project in detail and this team is encouraged to maintain close
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liaison with the marketing, sales production and financial
areas of the firm. The process of reviewing projects occurs
regularly in the R&D department and projects are formally
reviewed as and when they are generated. One of the main ele¬
ments of the formal review is the judgement of the potential
worth of a proposed development in terms of financial criteria
such as the likely return on the R&D investment. The cal¬
culation of such criteria is not regarded as being an end in
itself as far as the decision to adopt a particular project is
concerned. Occasionally overriding technical or other reasons
influence decisions and alter the weighting given to financial
evaluations. Yet, financial criteria are given a large measure
of credibility by the research and development manager in his
project selection decision.
In this formal financial review the working party considers
three basic economic factors in relation to a particular project.
First, the total money volume to be expected from the product
during its life cycle. Second, the likely value of the return on
the R&D investment which involves some estimation of the likely
costs of the R&D investment. Third, thelikely level of operating
prof it.
Money volume to be expected from an eventual product is
important to a firm because of its production facilities. The firm
regards product lines which generate a volume per annum less than
some specified amount as not being capable of efficient manufacture
by the firm. The criterion of rejection is sometimes flexible if a
small volume project can be expected to utilise production facilities
common to other lines. The statement that the firm requires product
lines which generate sufficient money volume to some extent pre¬
empts the firm's research and development strategy given the
firm's objective of maintaining technical leadership in its field.
It is likely that a small number of high cost projects will be the
backbone of the firm's R&D effort with high earning, small cost
projects being incorporated in order to meet corporate profitability
objectives.
Money volume is calculated by separately estimating the
eventual price of the product and the sales to be expected over
the product life cycle. The first factor that is estimated is always
sales and this is done by exploiting the product life cycle concept.
The product life cycle * is a concept in marketing theory which
relates sales as a function of time and usually four stages in the
sales history are visualised. First, product introduction; second,
market growth; third, market maturity, fourth, sales decline.
An idealised shape for the life cycle curve, as in the following diagram,
is usually presented,
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1. Theodore Lfcvitt, "Exploit The Product Life Cycle" Harvard
Business Review, 43, November-December 1965.
Given this shape for the sales phase of the project the engineer
and people from the marketing department try to estimate the peak
or mature sales volume and the time period over which sales will
continue. In this way, they can estimate approximately the parameters
of the curve and the sales volume in each phase of the launch. With
this knowledge of sales volume the engineer is asked to consider for
various price levels in a feasibly profitable range the likely mature
sales volume that will occur under each price. This often requires
that the engineer has to consult to obtain information on the com¬
petition for the product and then subjectively assess the mature
volume at prices within the range. The price that gives maximum
money volume is obtained by drawing the curve of mature money
income i. e. price x sales volume at that price against price and
selecting the maximum point of the income curve.
Return on investment is calculated as the ratio between the
estimated additional profit contributed by the product during its
first five years of useful life and the total engineering develop¬
ment costs. It is assumed that the calculation of additional profit
contributed by a new product contains an element to allow for any
loss in profits incurred on an existing product which is competitive
with or complementary to the new product. However, no allowance
is made for the timing of cash inflows or outflows or for inaccuracy
in the estimation of these cost and revenue cash flows. Discounting
criteria are adopted very rarely and in this firm the major instance
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has been as a justification for installing a computer facility,
a common research overhead for the whole R&D department.
Though the payback period, loosely the period over which revenues
will balance costs, is not specifically calculated the R&D manager
admits that he does a quick calculation to determine the approximate
length of the payback period.
Once the return on investment i. e. the benefit/cost ratio has
been obtained its value is compared with a corporate or target
value for the return factor. The firm requires that the value of the
ratio should be as high as possible but in most cases it should
certainly have a value greater than four.
Operating profit per unit of a new product is defined by the
firm as being the difference between selling price per unit and
manufacturing plus selling costs per unit. The definition takes
no account of the development costs of a new project. The firm
generally requires an operating profit in the range 20-30%.The
estimation of the likely level of operating profit is dependent upon
a preliminary analysis by the engineer of labour and materials
costs, overhead costs and sales and marketing costs in addition
to the estimates of price and volume made in the previous return
factor analysis.
Armed with the three estimates of money volume, likely return
and operating profit that may accrue from introduction of a new
project the research manager contemplates the options open to him.
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He has immediate authority in the project selection decision
and he acts on the basis of the financial and technical evaluation
of a project made by the working party. The R&D manager in this firm
is conditioned by exposure to an academic research environment in
that he favours projects which maintain the company's technical
leadership. To this extent he encourages planning of research
in a number of technical areas but he is also ruthlessly profit and
growth oriented in his outlook. His decision to undertake a project
is a rational one always because he does not allow technical merit
to overcome sound financial reasons. However, when he takes
risks upon a technical idea whose economic future is uncertain
he believes in acting upon his hunch about the eventual market and
the value of the project to the firm. In this respect his risk taking
behaviour can be taken to be sound managerial behaviour in the light
of the information available and the goals of the firm.
Whilst the manager does not review projects on a batch basis
at yearly intervals, he nevertheless waits until a number of project
options have emerged. At that stage the research manager adopts
a policy of ranking projects in the order of the attractiveness of their
return factor ratios subject to the constraints that they appear to him
to be technically sound and meet the criteria of satisfactory levels of
money volume and operating profit. The research manager then looks
at the ranking and subjectively decides upon the projects he will
recommend for adoption to corporate management. He then sends his
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recommendations on accepted projects to the managing director who
either confirms the research manager's decision or reduces the bud¬
gets allowable for some or all of the recommended projects. The
managing director never rejects a project recommended by the
research manager and only makes amendments about the time
estimated to complete the work and certain minor financial details.
In practice, up until very recently, every project that has satisfied the
return factor criterion has been adopted by the firm because it has never
exhausted its budget resources for R&D work owing to the shortage
of good engineers.
However, at present largely as a result of a far-reaching re¬
cruitment policy on the part of the firm its technical capability has been
expanded considerably and the firm now faces a difficult resource
allocation decision. The injection of new engineers of quality has
stimulated the process of idea generation and the number of poten¬
tial projects is now very large. Funds available for this work,
though much larger, are now no longer capable of meeting all
demands. As a result of this the formalised selection procedure
outlined earlier has now become a major tool in the selection decision
and is used rigidly in order to produce a list of worthy projects. Once
this list is available, the research manager summons a meeting of
the senior project engineers and supplements the mechanical selec¬
tion criterion with the opinions of his staff. If it is felt that the selec¬
tion procedure has been too generous to a technically undesirable pro-
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ject thejlist is amended but this occurs very rarely.
We must note here that our discussion of the selection process
has been treated as if the decision to select projects only occurred
at one point in time. In fact, projects are considered randomly
through time and are compared actively with projects already in
the firm's research portfolio. The firm uses several techniques
including critical path analysis in controlling and reviewing the
progress of projects. Typically, on any project the project engineer
holds a series of regular checkpoint meetings at which the progress
of a project is reviewed and every six months he is required to sub¬
mit an updated formal technical and financial review to the R&D
manager for discussion. The updated return factor is compared
with corporate targets and estimated return factors of new projects.
If the project's future looks unpromising the research manager quickly
decides to cancel work on that project. There are a number of past
cases of projects which have been frozen because of an unpromising
future. The research manager regards all past costs as sunk, what is
important to him is the expected level of future costs and benefits
which he rightly considers to be the relevant costs and benefits for
decision making purposes.
Project review is thus an integral part of the R&D process and,
in this firm, in addition to updating project data and return factor
forecasts as we have outlined, they also plot graphs to show how
the progress of a job (in time) compares with the previously planned
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estimates of that progress. The method consists of plotting two
sets of data which are superimposed. The first set of data plotted
on the chart is a historical record of the accumulated cost of the
project against time. The cost is measured in man-months by
deflating actual expenditure figures by a factor which indivates
the effective cost of a research employee per month. This factor
will clearly vary with changes in wage rates and research produc¬
tivity. Figure 1 shows the typical shape of the curve of total effort
versus time. In the case depicted the number of engineers employed
on a project varies through time because effort on a project slowly
builds up over the initial period until somewhere in the middle of
the project the maximum amount of effort is applied. This reduces
gradually as the project nears completion.
CALENDAR MONTH
A: INITIAL PROTOTYPE D: PILOT RUN
B: FINAL LAB PROTOTYPE E: PRODUCTION RUN









TOTAL EFFORT VERSUS TIME FOR A PROJECT IN WHICH THE NUMBER
OF ENGINEERS EMPLOYED VARIES
FIGURE 1 (b)
Note:l) Scales on the axes are not given because they are not
necessary in discussing the nature of the procedure in
general terms.
2) The characteristic S shape of the upper curve - 1 (a)
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During the course of a project, we know that various stages in
a project's development are reached. We can identify the completion
of an intitial prototype, a final laboratory prototype and a final pro¬
duction prototype and then the beginning of the pilot run, production
run and sales phases of the project's life cycle. We can plot these
stages on our S shaped cost curve in figure 1 (a) which will show for
us the costs and dates by which the given stages will be reached
viewing the project a priori. We can also plot the project stages













Note: - the definitions of A, B, C, D and E are the same as in Figure 1
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After some interval of time let us assume that some information
on actual cost expenditures (man months) becomes available. We can
plot this point on a curve (0*) as in figure 3 and treat it as a new ori¬
gin from which two sets of axes emanate and on which new estimates















In Figure 3 we have contructed a situation in which we have
A 1
not yet reached stage A of the project. Our new estimates A , ,
E* reflect our present assessment of dates and costs for the com¬
pletion of the various stages. The new estimates are joined by
short lines to the original estimates A, , E. The fact that these
estimates are not parallel to the axis indicates that our performance
has slipped with respect to our estimates. The chart is updated in
this way periodically and its shape shows the extent to which we
are meeting prior time and cost objectives. As a control tool it is
used primarily by the research manager in updating his knowledge
about projects and aiding him in any further project resource allo¬
cation decisions. Critic 1 path analysis is used by engineers in the
project teams so that they meet time objectives in their engineering
work.
Having thus outlined the rigid decision making procedures of
Firm A we must make some comments about formalised procedures
of this type. Many engineers in the firm admit quite freely that
their estimates of cost and sales volume for projects are often
biased in order to make the resulting return factor estimates appear
favourable to the firm. They point out that the procedures themselves
are very inaccurate and do not incorporate technical factors which
are often not understood by finance or marketing executives. There¬
fore, engineers deliberately amend estimates in order to make
return factors acceptable to the firm. They do not do this for personal
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reasons, e.g. scientific attractiveness. Their sole motivation is
to make the firm move towards the adoption of more flexible numerical
criteria for differentiating between projects. For this reason they were
very keen to cooperate with the research work outlined in Part IV.
We turn now to a consideration of Firm B. The strategy of the firm
in the research and development field has not been clarified by means
of a statement of objectives for R&D. It can fairly be said, however,
that the firm can be described as a research follower rather than a
leader. The firm tries to spot gaps in the field of electronic instru¬
mentation and having found them attempts to develop an instrument
subject to the availability of the required technical skills in the
laboratory. The firm has a number of technical areas in which it has
accumulated expertise over time and is in fact divided organisation¬
ally into groups working in each of these areas. However, despite its
concentration on a number of technical areas the firm has not managed
to maintain periods of technical leadership in any of them for a sig¬
nificant proportion of the time.
There is clearly a contrast between Firm B and Firm A. Firm A
has an organisation structure with a considerable degree of decentra¬
lisation and the establishment of managers with responsibility for the
various financial areas of the firm's operations. Authority is delegated
from managing director to departmental manager and the span of con¬
trol is wide. Firm B has a pyramidal type of organisation structure in
which any decision of consequence is referred back to the managing
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director. Recently, this firm has achieved a certain measure of
decentralisation as a result of the establishment of a technical
manager, marketing manager and financial manager who oversee
their particular areas. Yet the managing director tends to pay lip
service to decentralisation and still possesses ultimate authority.
The firm is clearly in the process of moving towards an organisation
structure most suitable for its stage of development. There are, for
example, strong feelings about lack of communication between
engineer and manager in the firm and no established channels through
which communication can easily be effected.
Research and development in this firm is thus carried out without
a real sense of the ultimate objective and in this sort of environment
frustrations build up between engineer and manager. Ideas for re¬
search projects tend to be generated mainly by customers. Other
sources for research ideas are the production engineers who suggest
redesigns of existing instruments and the research departments
themselves who generate a smallish number of research ideas. The
orientation of the research and development work is applied research
and development directed towards new or existing products. Any
fundamental research work is not approved by the firm unless outside
sources of finance, e.g. IRC, NEDC, AEA etc. can be persuaded to
provide the major proportion of the capital investment at risk. It is
not surprising that the mix of research and development work carried
out by the firm is so diverse and loosely planned in view of the type of
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organisational communication and authority delegation that exists
at present. The research and development strategy is to operate
in the market to fill gaps in instrumentation technology and to pro¬
vide low cost high quality instrumentation. Any major technical
development in the firm is either gained by buying technological ex¬
pertise in the form of men or research results from other firms or
from outside sponsorship of high risk projects.
When ideas for R&D projects are generated within the firm there
is no involvement in committee procedures for reviewing their feasi¬
bility. It is assumed that the idea source is sound enough for any
preliminary review to be dispensed with. The firm sets aside a
maximum amount of money that can be used to support research and
development work in any giver year (although it is never sure about
how much to allocate) and projects are reviewed for adoption in the
light of this budget constraint. Projects occur randomly within the
annual period and no attampt is made to wait for the really good pro¬
ject or to review projects on a batch basis. A project is formalised
very roughly in a meeting between the technical manager and the
marketing manager and a private venture proposal form is completed.
This form requires a brief description of the likely specification of
the final product, a rough quantitative estimate of the product's
likely development cost, a qualitative assessment of the likely market
and a time estimate for completion of the work. Once this form has
been completed no attempt is made to compare it with any other forms
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available for other potential or existing products, it is merely
transmitted to the managing director for a decision on acceptance
or rejection. The managing director has established a priority for
undertaking projects that are a result of a customer's idea because
they have greater possibilities of immediate financial returns.
He is not at all concerned about existing projects because whatever
happens they are always completed and introduced in the market.
Also, the managing director tends to be keener on supporting pro¬
jects, whatever their merit, at the beginning of a financial year
when expectations are higher than at the end when priorities are
often shifted to maximising productive output in order to produce
a favourable financial statement. Money has been a constraint on the
expansion of research and development work because more projects
have always been available for development than resources to support
them. Yet, despite all this, the firm has managed to grow quite
considerably over the last five years with its strategy of being a
technical follower in its own research and development work and
this may reflect the managing director's decision making ability.
Future growth, on the other hand, may be inhibited if the present
policy of a low cost, high spread diversified research portfolio fails
to produce a future stream of new product research proposals of suffi¬
cient calibre. From the role of participant observer it is clear that
efficiency will be maintained in the future if attempts are made to
reduce the frustrations and tensions built up within the firm because
of the poor communication between engineer and manager. It is
still possible that a loosely organised decision structure will be
preferable for the firm but some changes are necessary in order
to ensure that the participants in the system know their roles and
functions.
4.4. Summary
The description of the decision systems for Firm A and F irm
B has been undertaken to provide a basis for our understanding of the
R&D process. It is clear that decision systems that are either too
loose or too rigid generate problems which are equally difficult to
solve. A compromise between the two in which the rationality of the
rigid and loose elements is apparent to all personnel in the firm may
be a good compromise.
Our knowledge about the R&D process has been enriched because
we note that whatever the firm there are common elements
The determination of the budget for research and development
The search process for possible R&D projects
The preliminary elimination of infeasible projects
The appraisal of a project's value
The decision about acceptance of a project
The changes in R & D projects through time and the general
uncertainty characterising the R&D process i. e. technical
uncertainty about a project's feasibility and commercial un¬
certainty about its viability and performance in the market
place.
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Therefore, economic allocation decisions have constantly to be
made in this sort of technically uncertain environment. The manner
in which these decisions were executed in firms A and B differed
mainly in terms of the information required and used by the decision
maker in each case. There is, of course, a difference in the organi¬
sation structure and in the turnover of each firm, with firm A being
the more financially viable. In firm A the decision maker's goals
were more of less in line with those of the firm and he approached
the problems of allocating resources to projects in a logical and rational
manner. In this allocation process he was guided by the generation of
detailed information, both financial and technical, on each project
at the initial stages and at points throughout the project's life. The
decision maker in B, the managing director, had the goals of the
company and his own goals in one to one correspondence and his
decision making was very informal with strong reliance on personal
judgement. It is fair to say that both decision makers have been very
successful because their projected objectives for growth in economic
terms have been met. Despite the ability of the decision maker in B
the view is taken here that the provision of information of an economic
and technical nature about an R & D project helps decision making
because the manager has more time and a better framework with
which to' make his decision. On the other hand, information cannot
replace decision and neither can any formal methods. The function of
a decision structure and a model is to provide information and an
analysis of possible alternatives as accurately and logically as possible.
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Its function, is not to replicate the processes of decision because
these are individual to the decision maker and a function of his
own perception and goals. Yet, the provision of a thorough
economic and technical analysis of problems will tend to improve
decision making by identifying valuable projects and thus allow
the decision maker to adapt to a changing and uncertain technical
environment.
Let us return to a consideration of the decision maker's ob¬
jectives. There is no'evidence from these two decision makers
that they act as if to satisfice. They seem from observation and
deed to act so as to maximise long term profitability ax^d growth
for their firms. However, the statement in the previous sentence
requires some qualification. Whilst, we consider that it is im¬
possible to justify our assertion that the decisions makers in A
and B behave as maximisers by any objective test, we nevertheless
believe that the weight of evidence is consistent with our assertion.
Both firms are successful and have grown quickly over the past
five years. The rate of growth of profitability and sales has been
significantly large in both cases. Both decision makers showed profit
consciousness; the decision maker in A cancelled projects which
looked unprofitable whilst the decision maker in B altered the allo¬
cation of financial resources for R & D in the second half of the
financial year in order to improve the firm's end of year financial
statement.
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In Part IV of the thesis, when we try to evaluate the decision
maker's objectives, formally, some additional evidence will point
to the reasonableness of a maximisation objective.
Finally, we should remember the discussion in Chapter
where we quoted some theoretical evidence to support the view
that the single objective maximisation hypothesis is preferable
to the satisficing hypothesis.
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Summary for Part II
The role of the case study of the decision process is to improve
our knowledge of the factors that are relevant to a decision maker
in his decision making and to assess the extent to which the routine
data and information provided by the firm help him in his decision
making. We have seen that decision making is a function of the
personal logic of the decision maker and the information available
to him. The approach be re is to assess the information and environ¬
ment needs of the decision maker so that we can reduce the decision
making function to a logical evaluation of alternative outcomes
analysed within the firm's own information system. By reducing
the decision maker's tasks and his need to be an information analyser
we hope that he will make good decisions i. e. decisions based on the
logical and reasonable evaluation of all possible alternatives.
It is clear that the research method of participant observation and
interview adopted in Part II does not give us much information on the
results of historical R&D decisions. This means that we do not know
whether logical decision making in. the past, which we have evaluated
here, has led to good or bad outcomes. There is clearly no reason why
good decision making should necessarily lead to good final outcomes
because the processes of prior evaluation of a particular project by
a decision maker and of its actual operations in practice will clearly
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differ. In part III we complement the analysis of this part by retro-
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spectively analysing a number of historical project decisions.
If from this we find that in some cases "good" or logical decision
making has led to poor eventual outcomes for projects we may
consider that we can isolate the features of the decision process
information systems which contributed to the poor results. In other
words information (or rigid) processes to aid decision making may
create an environment in which efficient and logical decision
making is hindered.
Duckworth* quotes Sir Solly Zuckerman who has pointed out
that attempts to plan and predict research progress can stifle its
creativity. This is clearly an important point because, as we have
stated in contrasting the different information and control systems
existing for R & D in firms A and B, we do not know whether rigid
or formal procedures for decision making in the firm will be bene¬
ficial in terms of producing better outcomes and efficiency. We do
suspect, however, from our analysis that the extremes of rigid and
loose decision mechanisms each have their deficiencies in terms
of the environment of the individual firm. A compromise arrangement
of a system in which information ic processed regularly and efficiently
and in which communication between engineer and manager is smooth
and simplified is likely to be most efficient without stifling the
creativity of the individual engineer.
In our analysis of the decision process we have learnt that it is
characterised by the following phases:
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a) Search for possible research opportunities
b) The formal or informal evaluation of research opportunities
c) The determination of the level of the R&D budget
d) The comparison of alternative research opportunities and
the selection of the ones with greatest potential
e) The constant re-evaluation of existing and newly developed
R&D projects for control and comparison purposes
We can characterise the formal structure of the R&D prccess
and a general type of decision mechanism by considering the following
block diagrams.
The diagrams should serve as a quick representation of the
processes of search for, evaluation, comparison and selection
of research projects. This framework is crucial as a building
block for the later model building analysis.
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STAGE 1
Evaluation Stage of R&D Process Depicting a General
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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OP THE INFLUENCE OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ON THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF THE FIRM
5. 0 Introduction
We have seen in Chapter 4- that the decision maker in R & D
in Firm A has a large amount of information on which to base his
decisions. We suggested that the provision of accurate and realistic
data was necessary for good decision making in R & D in general.
Yet we pointed out in our analysis of both firms A and B and in our
initial literature review in Part I that a great deal of vagueness
surrounds two problems. First, the problem of how much to spend
on research and development and second, the general nature of the
relationship between research and development effort and financial
performance of the firm. In this chapter we try to understand with
the aid of the limited amount of data available from A and B the
essention nature of the relationships between research results and
economic results. We regard this relationship as being the most
important and if it3 nature can be determined we can then suggest
how much should be spent on R &- D. We approach our analysis by
briefly considering previous research in the literature and follow
this by presenting the results of our treatment of the problem.
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5.1. Literature evidence
We shall divide this review section into two parts. We shall
first consider the references on the determination of the level of
research expenditure and then consider references on the relation
between research expenditure, inventive output and commercial
results.
5.1.1. The determination of the R Si D budget for the firm
W. E. Duckworth* in a recent paper looks at the question of
how much money should be spent on R & D at the firm level. He
considers two main approaches which can be useful. First, to
determine the levels of research expenditure by looking for relation¬
ships between company or industry performance and total research
and development expenditure in the firm. Second, to make the
determination by adding up the amounts of expenditure necessary
for each of the component parts of the R&D mix e.g. basic re¬
search and applied research towards new products or processes.
Examples of the first method are the analytical and compara-
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tive approaches. Hart puts forward an analytical technique in which
the maximum amount of expenditure that the firm can justify for its
R&D operations is determined. He considers first the factors that
affect the obsolescence rate of existing products, and therefore, of
R&D spending. In order of their importance they are as follows:
1. W. E. Duckworth, "The Determination of Total Research
Effort ', Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, (1967)
2. A. Hart, "Planning for Increased Research Productivity",
Productivity in Research, 1963 (London:- Instn. Chermical
Engineers)
i
1) The extent of competition
2) The nature of the product
3) The nature of the production process
4) The availability of resources in research and production
5) The productivity of the R&D department
6) The size of the firm
He then develops a method for forecasting the maximum
amount of research expenditure by first assuming that if R & D
expenditure were stopped today the profitability of the firm would
fall to zero over a number of years depending on the obsolescence
rate of its products. He then requires that several people in the
firm give estimates of the period of future life of the company,
i. e. positive profits given no R&D, and the rate at which profits
will decline to zero. Finally, he tries to compare the effects on
profits of the situations with no - R & D with those in which R&D
is continued in the future at an economic rate (gross profit being
assumed to remain at its present level for all years from now on
into the future). His analysis can also be generalised to compare
the effects on profits of no - R & D situations against situations in
which R&D grows at x% per annum where x is some positive value.
Basically, the method of calculation is the same in both cases and
entails determining the discounted profit at the firm's cost of
capital for the R&D and no - R & D situations. If we call these
discounted profit values Pj and P£, the maximum expenditure
tf/
justified on R & D is defined to be (Pj - P^).
It must be noted, therefore, that Hart's method allows us to
set an upper bound on the amount we should spend on research as
a whole and, if necessary, the analysis can be carried out on each
single project to determine the upper bounds on budgets for indi¬
vidual projects. It is, however, heavily dependent on the produc¬
tion of sensible estimates of the rate of decline of gross profit over
the remaining life of the firm in the no- R&D case. Hart argues
that it doesn't matter if these estimates are subsequently proved
wrong because they represent a realistic view of the present state
of knowledge of the future and since the situation changes through
time such forecasts can also be revised. This is all fair enough if
we accept that any employee in the firm can give a realistic esti¬
mate of profit decline over the next 5-10 years in a situation in
which one of the essential features of his firm, its R&D work,
no longer continues. Such a forecast much clearly neglect any
attempts that the company may make to alter its status and role
after R&D work is given up.
Thus, Hart's maximum expenditure (MEJ) figure is to be
regarded as a guideline with which to evaluate the exact amount of
R&D spending. It is clear that it could be used to give guidelines
M
or REJ for each of the categories of research in the firm and help
provide an answer to the budgeting problem by summing a series
of smaller categories to get the total. This assumes that a meaningful
distinction can be made by the engineers in the firm between basic
and applied research of various kinds. It is by no means clear from
firms A and B in our study that they can meaningfully distinguish
between the research categories outlined in the first page of the
questionnaire.
Having looked at one analytical approach which can be used to
solve the budgeting problem as a whole or as the sum of distinct
parts, we consider the meaning of Duckworth's comparative approach.
This method requires that we search for data that give us guidelines
on the relative amounts spent on R & D in our industry and typical
rates of growth of cfirms in that industry. Useful data sources for
this type of information are the FBI Survey and the recent govern¬
ment enquiry on R & D which are noted earlier in this Part. However,
fixer-c. i sc-s.
the major difficulty with comparative exexvioes of this type is that
they assume that one of the firms being compared has solved the
problem of how much to spend on R & D.
Duckworth's final suggested approach is to calculate the
research and development budget as the sum of the separate budgets
required for the different categories of research - fundamental,
applied - offensive, i. e. new product oriented and applied - defensive
i. e. existing product oriented. This is apparently the method used
in most British companies though we are not told how budgets are
calculated except in the case of offensive research where it is
suggested that the controlling factor in the cost decision is the
/<?3
availability of capital to exploit the research.
It can only be said that none of the approaches given by Duckworth
solves the basic problems of how we determine budgets for R&D and
the spread of those budgets across the various possible categories of
research work. Hart's analysis though rough gives us an upper ceiling
which is so large given the present levels of R & D budgets as to be al¬
most useless to the individual firm. Developments can only be made
in the budgeting problem by returning to the factors which should
determine R&D spending at the level of the firm and trying also to
understand how research and development affects economic results.
It seems that our lack of understanding of the process of innovation
inhibits us in our analysis.
5. 1.2. The Relation between R&D Results and Economic Results
3
Mansfield in a very important study provides us with a sophi¬
sticated quantitative analysis which brings R&D budgeting quite
correctly into the general area of the relation between R&D and
economic performance of the firm. His main concern in the study is
to investigate the determinants of the level of a firm's expenditures
on R & D. He finds that the level of a firm's research expenditures
can be explained reasonably well by a model in which it is assumed
that the expected rates of return from promising projects follow the
Pareto distribution. Given this assumption the determinants of the
firm's desired level of R & D expenditures are the distribution of
3. E. Mansfield , "Industrial R&D: Determinants and Relation
to Size of Firm and Inventive Output", Chapter 2 in Econometric
Studies of Industrial Research and Technological Innovation
(W. W. Norton, 1968).
expected rates of return from R&D projects and the firm's size.
He further finds that the firm's speed of response toward this
desired level depends on the extent to which the desired level
differs from last year's spending and the percent of its profits
spent last year on R & D.
He also uses this model to forecast R&D expenditures for
a given year by substituting the relevant values of the independent
variables into his equation for the level of R & D expenditures.
We cannct hope in our analysis to match the subtlety of
Mansfield's work. However, with the financial and other relevant
information which was obtained from the answers to the formal
questionnaire, we try to develop some relationships between R&D
expenditures and economic results. We turn to this analysis now.
5. 2. The Analysis of the R&D Expenditures a&d their Effect on
Economic Indicators of the Firm
5.2.1. Introduction
The model which provides the basic framework for the economic
analysis is the classic invention - innovation view of the R&D process.
Simply, this is that R&D inputs generate a flow of research or
inventive output which is transmitted into commercially saleable
products by the economic processes of innovation and risk taking.
Our model could be depicted in the form of a block diagram as follows:
MODEL OF THE R&D PROCESS IN THE FIRM
\
rf &
It should be noted that there are other factors determining
corporate objectives for R&D, and the firm's R&D expenditures
and capability. Some of these such as the nature of the product, the
dynamic nature of technical change were spelt out clearly in Hart's
study. Further, we do not get involved in arguments which exist
in the economic literature about whether or not inventions are gene -
rated within the economic system. For the individual firm the aim
underlying R&D work is to create new or improved products and
thus help to increase the sales and profitability of the firm. It can
be seen, therefore, that this simple model corresponds to the reali¬
ties of the R&D process in the individual firm. The factors not
considered by the model such as the nature of technical change can
be handled with either methods of analysis and thus aid the further
understanding of the economic relationships in R & D. We include
here only those variables which are both realistic and important in
explaining the effect R&D has on the overall economic position of
the firm.
5. 2. 2. Methodology and Hypotheses
5. 2. 3. Data
The data used in this study was obtained in the information
gathering phase of the work in firms A and B. It consists, in the
case of firm A, of information on pre-tax profits, net sales, the
total wage bill, capital expenditure, research and development
expenditure, marketing expenditure and the number of research
ni-
and development staff for each of the last seven years. This means
that we have only seven observations on each variable in firm A and
six observations on each variable in firm B. The limited size of the
data base inevitably means that complex and/or sophisticated analy¬
ses of the relationships between R&D and economic results cannot
be undertaken.
5.2.4. Equations Relating R & D to economic results
For these reasons the method of analysis adopted here is
linear multiple regression analysis. Initial linear and rank corre¬
lation analyses confirmed that there were strong degrees of asso¬
ciation between R&D expenditures and net sales in money terms
(which -is a reasonable meanure of turnover) the eventual output of
the R&D. However, these analyses cannot give us the direction of
causation between the two variables and we take the position here
that changes in R & D expenditures lead to changes in sales rather
than vice-versa. It is quite clear that a case can be made that good
economic results will lead to corporate management authorising a
larger future budget for research and development. In this $ense
the feedback mechanism that is in operation in the process means
that R & D s f(sales) rather than sales - f(R & D). Whilst this influence
of increased sales on management's desire to do more R&D does
occur, the formulation sales f(R&D) can be justified by considering
what would happen if research and development expenditures were
curtailed and completely stopped. The effect over the long term would
be a sales decline because the products without R&D would not
remain competitive in the market.
m
Therefore our first hypothesis is that R&D expenditures
influence the economic results of the firm. In making this state¬
ment we accept that other variables affect economic results but we
do not take account of them in our initial hypothesis. We try to
give this hypothesis operation meaning by considering various
alternative functional forms for the equation relating R & D to
sales. Specifically we consider first relationships of the form.
S^. = a + b R. v (l)tl (t - o< )i ^
where
S . = net sales in year t for firm i
ti 7
R. \. = R & D expenditures in year (t - oC) for firm i
(t -©cji
for </, - 0(1)3, j t - 1(1) 7 for A, t = 1(1) 6 for B J, i 1(1)2.
These formulations relate sales in period t to each of the R&D
expenditures in t, t-1, t-2 and t-3 separately. The rationale for the
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formulations comes in part from the work of Palda and Stigler .
Palda's study starts from Stigler's premise that the effects c.f adver¬
tising are cumulative and that an advertising message sereral periods
ago still has some effect in the present period. Thus Palda views
sales in period t as being a function of advertising expenditures in
periods t, t-1, t-2, etc. i.e. S, f(A , A , A ). Similarly,
t t t" 1 t" Z
here it is considered reasonable to regard the effects of research
and development expenditures on sales as being cumulative because
4. K. Palda, The Measurement of Cumulative Advertising Effects,
Prentice-Hall (1963)
5. G. Stigler, PriPe Tl , Macmillan (1967)
of the phenomenon of technical spin off within the firm. This simply
means that the value of a significant piece of research work carried
out in some previous time period has an effect on sales for a far
longer period of time than initially envisaged. In any case, the
"f*o
relationship of researcpi expenditures a^0 sales has an inherent lag
structure because of the time delay between research expenditures
*
and eventual outputs .
We further amend the relationships of the form (T) by con¬
sidering sales to be a function of research and development expendi¬
tures, marketing expenditures (M) and technical capability (C) i.e.
S = f(R, M, C) and estimate regressions for all possible combinations
of the independent variables included lagged independent variables
subject to the constraints of the estimation procedure. In general,
/
therefore, we consider relationships of the form
su ■ f<V*< )i- Mt«- C«A —- ®
where - marketing expense in period t for firm i
C^. - technical capability in period t for firm i
Our measure of technical capability is given in money terms
and is the salary of the research and development staff. This measure
is used because in a market context the value of an engineer is
measured by his wage rate. Since skilled engineer shortages exist
in the area in which A and B operate, it is further contended that the
wage rate will measure the good engineer, and , therefore, skill
*
Note: It can be argued that, since the level of R & D expenditures
is often determined as some constant proportion of sales, R & D is a
function of sales. In the case of firms A and B no evidence was found
to suggest that R&D has a constant proportional relationship to sales.
2oO
because both A and B are willing to pay a good salary to the right
type of engineer. Therefore, the amount of money spent on tech¬
nically skilled labour is a measure of the pool of labour skills
available to the firm especially since the age structure in the
R&D staff in both A and B is young with relatively few highly paid
older engineers around to bias the measure of the amount of labour
costs for R & D as a measure of the pool of technical skill and
capability. This measure, of course, neglects the influence of
equipment availability and technical facilities in the firm and
thus our measure of technical capability is conservative. We assume,
however, that each firm will make available sufficient amounts of
technical equipment in order that the engineer will be efficient and
productive. We make allowance for the effect of capital and equip¬
ment expenditures on sales in the later analysis.
We could have measured technical capability each year in
terms of the average number of professional researchers employed
by the firm in a given year. This information was obtained from both
A and B but in this case the measure of the number of researchers
times the wage rate was favoured because the money wage is a
weighting mechanism to measure the worth and thus the skill of
the individual engineer. Further, merely measuring technical
capability in terms of the number of researchers makes this
measure conservative because no allowance is made for technical
facilities which affect capability as we have said previously this is
Zo I
equally true of labour costs as a measure of technical
capability.
Thus far we have outlined the form of the equations relating
R & D to sales. We carried out a further transformation on both
sets of equations (\) and (z) and this was to transform the original
variables into logarithmic form. This type of transformation has
the effect of making the relationships more linear and the models
(l)and are not then additive models in the variables but multi¬
plicative i. e.
1. becomes log S . = log A + b log R, . ..tl t -!?<.) 1
orSt. = A P.® ^ } . £)
2. Becomes log S^. = f (log R^ ^ log M^., log C^.)
D
TT
or S = KR. . . M C . (J)tx (t - d. ) 1 ti ti v—
Equations (^through (Z) thus summarise the equations we
have estimated by regression analysis in order to establish the relation
between R&D expenditures and economic results. We must make one
further general comment about using sales as a measure of the economic
results of the firm. Strictly speaking the correct measure wotsLd be a
value added variable incorporating the sales data but since the sales
variable, net sales, was a measure of actual revenue received in that
period it was considered to be a reasonable measure for the economic
results variables. However, in order to allay any subsequent criticism
Zo%.
equations 1-4 were re-estimated with the variable P - net
profits before taxes in a given year replacing S ..
5. 2. 5. Input-output analysis
A final very tentative analysis was carried out to relate the
variations in particular types of R & D inputs, i. e. labour and
equipment to sales. The form of the equations was as follows:
©s = A C BK.V
tl tl tl
where S is as previously defined
C is the labour costs for the R&D staff per year
as previously
K^. is the equipment and capital st for the R&DcostJutdepartment per year where e® is a trend term
to measure technological change. A, B, D are
constants
It was only possible to estimate equation for firm A
because it proved impossible to obtain a meaningful breakdown for
capital and equipment expenditure on R & D in Firm B because of
the absence in that firm of an R & D department and hence a natural
sub-unit for management accounting purposes.
In the place of the disaggregate analysis of the effects of R & D
inputs on output i. e. sales, we decided to carry out a very simple
naive model analysis of the relation between output i. e. sales and
resource inputs of labour and capital for the firm as a whole. Such
an analysis will give us a feel for the differential total effects of the
2.o f?
of the resource inputs for the firm as a whole. The equations
estimated were of the following form:-
sti = A Q
wiicitg f
ti is the total wage bill for the firm as a whole
per year
L^. is the total capital expenditure excluding de¬
preciation for the firm per year
and S and e are as previously defined.
We turn now to a discussion of the methods of estimation
used in the analysis.
5.2.6. Methods of Estimation
It should be noted that we require an estimation method to
determine the nature of the relationship between a dependent variable,
sales, and a series of independent variables. We naturally Slink of
regression analysis but it is important to remember the limitations
of such an analysis. It assumes, as all analytical methods do, that
the underlying relationship has been correctly specified. In this case
our specification is in terms of linear or log-linear models. This is
considered to be the best compromise with the limited amount of data
available. If the data base were much larger then the nature of the
relationships would be more evident a priori and we could use possibly
2c>£f
non-linear models to specify the relationships. Given, however, that
the equations - (6) are assumed to be correctly specified we
estimated their parameters by means of ordinary least squares.
The method of least squares, together with all its important
assumptions, will now be outlined. Let us assume that each equation
can be written in the following form:
y s XB + U
(1x1) (1 xk) (kxl) + (lxl)
Where B is the column vector of regression coefficients
X is the row vector of independent variables (x^ ■
y is the dependent variable
U is the random or error term
The assumptions of least square analysis are as follows:
first, the elements of X are fixed constants, second, the u's have zero
mean, and are uncorrelated with constant variance i. e. E (U) =*- 0,
1 2
E (UU ) _6 I_ . The principle of least squares (LS) is to minimise
(y - Xb) * (y - Xb) to give b — (X*X) *X*y as the least squares
estimates of the ^>. Under all these assumptions the Gauss-Markov
theorum tells us that b is the best, linear unbiased estimator of p.
But, in practice the LS assumptions are frequently invalidated.
First, X may be a matrix of random variables. However, a
conditional analysis E (U | x), V(U| x) will validate LS in this case.
Second, some of the X may belagged dependent variables but Durbin
2^-
shows in JRSS(E), i960 that LS holds asymptotically in this case.
1 2
Third, E(UU ) 6 I which implies that the error terms are
serially correlated. In this case the best practical solution is to
assume some relationship between the U's e.g. the auto regressive
relationship. Fourth, some of the X may in face be interrelated
which will tend to increase the size and standard errors of the
regression coefficients.
the problems of intercorrelation between the X's because we include
more than one lagged research expenditure variable in some
equations and serial correlation in the residuals. Also the number
of degrees of freedom available to obtain reasonable parameter
estimates for the is insufficient in this analysis to merit any
final conclusions about the generality of the relationships expressed
in equations (j/)through(6>)
We turn now to a presentation and discussion of the estimated
equations.
5. 3. Presentation of the Estimates
We first present the estimates on each of the equation forms (lj
through^for both firms A and B.
5. 3. 1. I Equation formsfl), (%, /3)and(4^ - Einear and Fog-Linear
Equations of R & D to Economic Results
Firm A (Note * denotes that a parameter is significant at the
5% level)
In our analysis it is likely a priori that we will from
- 14 -
FIRM A
RELATION BETWEEN SALES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES




























































11-914 R + 26.269 R
t-1 ' "t-2
(31.1933) (26.418)
















































1') log St = 1325400 + 19.140 log R D.F = 5
(922740) (4.6342)







2') log S = 10.5 + 0.42636
(0.7159) (0.06211)
t= 6.81*
loS Rt-1 D'F = 4
























5') log St 18.897
(1.2281)































8') logSfc = 8.292 + 0.63431 log M
(3.7369) (0.34789)'
t= 1.82
9) = 1396800 + 47.951 C
(1023000) (12.421)
t= 3.86*








































1191900 + 61.380 R + 27.836 M
t t
■ 131.34 C D.F = 3
(890200) (35.68) (20.116) (97.953)





= 7.3795 + 1.4543 log R + 0.024710 log M - 0.8779 log C
(1.0965) (0.6127.) (0.12981) (0.6402)










t= 0.53 t= 0.67
R2 = 0.887R2 = 0.7869
F = 5.5374
P = 0.098405
= 10.825 + 0.5011 log Rfc_1 - 0.1094 log M D.F = 3
(1.3586) (0.2600) (0.3659)





3084000 + 22.157 R
1 - 14.119 C D.F = 3
(1630200) (18.645) (49.948)





= 13.19 + 0.69917 log R ± - 0.52374 log Ct D.F = 3'
(1.95) (0.1949) (0.3588)







14) S = 6839500 + 70.095^ - 92.731 M.
t k-%, t
(2077000) (36.51) (67.21)


























































16') logS. = 16.363 + 0.49008 log R 0t t-2
(0.71864) fO.0453.3)



















II Relationships net profits and research and development expenditures
17) = 104940 + 3.5742 R
(310650) (1.4692)
t= 2.43

































































22) logPt = 8.515 + 0.4547 log R 2
(1.665) (0.1491)
t= 3.05*




























II Equation forms 0&0&0&0- LINEAR AND LOG LINEAR EQUATIONS OF




I RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN R&D EXPENDITURES AND SALES
1) S 1196100 - 11.077 Rt t
(87284) (1.6552)
t= 6.67*






St = 1249600 - 9.8299 Rt 1
(60466) (1.0682)
t= 9.20*























































































iog Rt d.f = 1




10) logSfc = 2.2061 + 1.0464 log C<
(1.1209) (0.10548)
t= 9.92*
13) S_ = 621460 - 4.6739 R 7.3854 C
t-l ~t
(625600) (5.2211) (7.3214)






















13') logS = 10.295
(6.666)





























































































23) = 184960 1.4897 Rt-3
(123830) (1.8723)
t=0.8
























Equation forms (5) &QInput output relation ships
Firm A - I Relationships between sales and R&D inputs
1) log S, = 21.166
(2.149)















2) logS = 18.09 - 2.931og C 4- 3.09 log d.f = 4
(3.56) (1.19) (1.00)
t= 2,47 t= 3.09*
R = 0.9859
R = 97.20% explained
F = 69.36
P = 0.0008
II REIATION BETWEEN SALES AND TOTAL FIRM RESOURCE INPUTS
1) logS = 4.986 4- 0.737 log F + 0.022 log + 0.258 t
(15.483) (1.34) (0.566) (0.641)
t= 0.55 t= 0.04 t= 0.40
d.f = 1
R„= 0.9701
R = 94.127, explained
F = 5.33
P = 0.306
2) logS = -0.711 + 1.145 log Ft + 0.164 log Lfc d.f = 2
(4.765) (0.668) (0.337)
t= 1.72 t= 0.49
R2= 0.9652
R = 93.17% explained
F = 13.63
P = 0.068
1) logS = 11.06 + 0.099 log Ffc + 0.064 log Lfc + 0.186 t
(9.54) (0.892) (0.133) (0.202)
/ t= 0.11 t= 0.48 t= 0.92
d.f = 1
R = 0.9715
R = 94.377o explained
F = 5.59
P = 6.299
2) logS = 2.804 + 0.892 log Ffc - 0.018 log Lfc d.f = 2
(3.14) (0.227) (0.095)






5.4. Discussion of the Estimates
(Note: - the units in the equation are money values)
Our purpose is to determine whether reasonable relationships seem
to exist between economic results and R&D expenditures even though
the "small sample" problem reduces the value of the analysis. It seems
for firm A that the most useful relationships are the following:
I Equations of forms (£)and(3)(i. e. S^. — ^ or ^^(t U.) P
(i) Equation3) shows that S -^f(R ) is the best fitting single
variable relationship. This confirms the view that for this firm there
is approximately a two year lag between present R&D expenditures and
future economic results of the firm. However, we should note that the
number of degrees of freedom was very small and that in equations 1)
and 2) there was a good fit between sales and present R&D expenditures
and also between sales and R&D expenditures lagged one year.
(ii) If we view the leg iinearfbrms of the equations discussed
in (i) we find that the equations with lags of 0, 1 and 2 years have
significant regression coefficients and good fits. This would suggest
that the equation form linking sales to research and development ex¬
penditures with lags of cero, one and two years simultaneously might
be the most suitable.
(iii) Whilst relationships such as 7) or 5)* which are of the
form suggested seem promising, none of the individual regression
j22O
coefficients is significant under a t test though the fit measured
2 1
by R is good. 5) seems to be the most promising because the F
test which is a joint test for all the estimated regression coefficients
together (or if it is simpler, think of it as a test of the multiple
correlation coefficient) is highly significant in this case. However,
2
we must remember that the fit (or the value of R ) tends to be im¬
proved because of the intercorrelation between R , R , and R .
L I" 1 L"" w
It seems reasonable to conclude that with larger samples of
data for firm A we would tend to get confirmation of the strong
relationships between R&D and sales suggested by the present study.
If this is the case then we have the framework of a method for pre¬
dicting the level of R & D expenditures provided we are able to
make a reasonable forecast for the growth in turnover or sales.
Such a forecast could be made by a number of methods which we shall
take up in the concluding part of this chapter which assesses the
relevance of the results.
II Equations of forms (?) and (4p
Equations 8) and 9) relating net sales to marketing expense
and technical capability respectively give significant values for the
simple regression coefficients but the unexplained residual variance
in net sales is fairly large suggesting that the independent influence
of and on net sales is insufficient for explaining variations in
3J2-i
net sales. Clearly M and C have some effect on net sales but it
t t
is equally apparent from a study of the other estimated relation¬
ships that their joint inclusion with R&D variables gives a much
better explanation of the variation in net sales. This confirms a
priori reasoning but because of the limited number of degrees of
freedom available we cannot estimate many variable relationships
efficiently or accurately.
Ill Equations relating R&D expenditures to net profits
Again equations 17*) , 20), 21) and 22) show that there is
either a reasonable additive or multiplicative relationship between
net profits and R&D expenditures. Further the joint effect of lags
of 0, 1 and 2 years on net profits expressed in equation 18*) is seen
to be very strong. This strengthens the hypotheses that R&D
expenditures have cumulative and not necessary immediate effects
on the economic results of the firm but again this finding must be
tentative because of the small samples of data available and possible
intercorrelations between the lagged research and development
variables.
For Firm B a similar picture tends to emerge but the influence
of lagged R&D expenditures differs slightly reflecting the firm's strategy
of undertaking a large number of small cost R&D projects which tend
to have more immediate impact on economic results than if the project
were more technically complex. However, we shall consider the
estimated equations for B in the same manner as for A so that sub-
Zn.1-
sequent comparison can be facilitated.
Firm B
I Equations of Forms Qjand ('3)
Equations l)t 1*), 2), and 2*) show that variations in net
sales in B are explained most satisfactorily by present R&D
expenditures and those one year ago. This finding reflects and
confirms a priori knowledge of the relatively large number of
small cost and thus quickly resolved research projects in the
firm. Research output thus has a greater immediate impact
on sales in B. We can again, therefore, make use of these
findings in determining R&D expenditures provided that we can
make realistic forecasts of global sales.
II Equations of Forms (2$ and (4y
The most interesting equations here are numbers 9) and 10)
which show strong, good fitting relationships between sales and
the technical capability of the firm. This finding confirms our
initial hypotheses that technical capability influences economic
results.
III Equations Relating R&D Expenditures to Net Profits
The fit of the relationships here is generally poor, 17*
showing some evidence for a viable log-linear relation between
profit and R&D expenditures. The result is not altogether sur¬
prising given the research strategy of the managing director in
Firm B and the rather piecemeal treatment of R & D in the firm.
R&D does not seem a priori to fulfill profit objectives in the firm
and is undertaken without regard to financing firm growth out of
R&D. Thus one would not tend to expect a dynamic effect of
R & D on net sales in B.
We should briefly consider the results of the input output
analyses. These show that for both firms A and B the relation¬
ship between net sales and the total factors of production mix
in the firm was a weak one. Only in the case of Firm A for the
R&D department alone, see equations 1) and 2), was the relation
between net sales and the factors of production mix useful.
Equations 1) and 2) show that the elasticities of sales with
respect to R & D labour and capital are numerically greater
than one and are negative and positive respectively. The signs
of the elasticity coefficients imply that reductions in R & D
labour costs and increases in technical capital costs will tend to
increase the level of net sales in the firm. This in turn suggests
decreasing returns to R & D labour and increasing returns to
R&D equipment. The negative sign of the growth or trend term
is reasonable in view of the rapid nature of technical change in the
industry and consequently rapid time obsolescence of products.
5. 5. Summary of Results across both Firms A and B
Despite the limited scope of the analysis it is reasonable to
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conclude that:
a) R&D expenditures influence economic results in
both firms A and B. The difference in the lag structures
for the R&D expenditures in each case can be explained
by the nature of the R&D activity in each firm. A has a
small number of high cost relatively technically advanced
projects and with such projects the research pay off takes
longer than in B's case where a large number of smaller
projects of a more immediate value to the firm are under¬
taken.
b) Technical capability also influences R&D results,
the relationship being slightly stronger for B,
c) The relation between R&D expenditures and profit¬
ability is most apparent and useful in Firm A. This finding
confirms the evidence on A's profit and growth orientation
highlighted in the initial questionnaire study. Firm B's
R&D expenditures have a much weaker bearing on profit¬
ability and this again confirms the results of the questionnaire
study on the lack of formal awareness of objectives for R&D
in firm B.
d) The 'input-output' analyses show little and the only
strong findings refer to firm A.
In general the results must be viewed very cautiously and must
await amplification from the author's continuing studies in this field.
However, it is reasonable to draw some tentative implications for
the R&D budgeting process. With the small sample evidence it
is reasonable to expect that the fit of a linear relationship will be
good but we have no real evidence on the nature of the relationship.
5. 6. Implications of the Results
It is clear that some form of relationship exists between
research and development expenditures and sales and that with a
larger sample of data we could establish the exact nature of the
relationship and thus fit the derived functional form accurately
by means of efficient methods of statistical estimation such as
least squares, minimising absolute deviations or maximum like¬
lihood.
Given that it should be practically possible to find a relation¬
ship NET SALES f (R & D EXPENDITURES) we can try to predict
the level at which R&D expenditure should be set. This is achieved
by using corporate targets for the growth of net sales for the firm
as a whole to give us a value for the dependent variable net sales
in the present period from which the values of the independent
variables for the same period could be calculated by using the
estimated relation between net sales and R&D expenditures (with
or without a lag structure).
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In essence we are saying that we should try a number of
alternative targets for the growth in sales for the firm next year
and for each calculate the implied level of R & D expenditures.
This analysis would enable the upper and lower bound for the R&D
budget to be established. Formally, the approach is first to find
(1+r), where is net sales in t th period, is
estimated net sales for the (t+1) th period and r is the growth
rate in sales. Second, given S .use the estimated functional formt+1
between net sales and R&D expenditures with stable parameters
for the present period to estimate the implied level of R & D
expenditures in period (t+1).
It should be noted that the first part of the approach requires
the estimation of possible growth rates, r, in sales. We could in
practice estimate r in terms of a series of probabilistic forecasts and
thus weight the estimated values for R&D expenditures by the
weightings of the probabilities of occurrence of various values of r.
Alternatively, the forecast for S could be obtained directly byt+1
6
either fitting a mathematical trend curve to the past data on sales
and extrapolating the curve onto future periods or considering the
7
use of exponential smoothing or weighted moving average techniques .
This approach of finding R&D expenditures by evaluating their
effect on economic results to set appropriate levels for R & D is
throught to be much more useful at the level of the individual firm
than any of the approaches outlined by Hart or Duckworth. This
6. See ICI MONOGRAPH "Mathematical Trend Curves" Oliver and Boyd
7. See ICI MONOGRAPH "Short Term Forecasting" Oliver and Boyd
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approach owes a great deal to Mansfield's work but differs in that
the level of R & D is determined from estimates of global targets
for sales etc. within the firm. Mansfield considers in his model an
R&D budget determined as a function of the firm's size and the
expected rates of return from R&D projects. Thus Mansfield
builds up from the individual project to the budget. Thus the method
outlined here neglects individual projects and assumes that the firm
wishes to grow year by year ty a targeted amount (vide Firm A)
and that from this growth figure the amount that should be spent on
R&D can be determined.
5.7. Summary and Conclusions
The analysis reflects the difficulties that are inherent in
econometric work at the micro-level. For various reasons of sample
size and associated estimation problems little reliance can be placed
on the specification and the resultant estimation of the various rela¬
tionships. Yet it is clear that the simple invention - innovation
model for the R&D process is useful and that relationships
derived in this way can be used to establish limits within which
R&D expenditures can be set.
In the longer term with a greater sample size from each of the
firms and with the addition of other firms in the same technology to
the sample, the estimated relationships at the micro-level can be
placed on a sounder statistical foundation.
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PART III
RETROSPECTIVE R&D PROJECT ANALYSIS
Introduction
Professor B. R. Williams* in his commentary on the FBI
survey emphasises the apparent lack of awareness and interest
in firms in research economics and the high wastage rates in
R & D in some industries. Admittedly, this survey is now some
years out of date but the findings raise questions about the effi¬
ciency and effectiveness of research and development undertaken
at the firm level. In particular, how efficient is R & D in the firm?
Does effectiveness depend upon the type of organisation and the type
of product?
Therefore, the problem we tackle here is the evaluation
of R & D at the firm level. To do this we carry out a retrospective
cost/benefit analysis of past R&D project programmes and allo¬
cations in two firms , A and B, in the electronics industry.
This part of the thesis begins with a literature review of
relevant cost/benefit studies and continues with an analysis of the
effectiveness of past R&D work. This is followed by a short
econometric analysis of some of the data to find out whether past
information in R & D performance can be helpful in improving the
future effectiveness of R & D in the firm.
1. B. R. Williams, "Commentary on Behalf of the NIESR",
FBI Survey on R & D in Manufacturing Industry, 1961. p. 27.
Chapter ^
Literature Survey on the Cost Benefit Analysis
of Research and Development Work
6. 0. Introduction
Peck in a recent paper* comments that it is said that British
managers reach research and development project decisions that
make inadequate allowance for marketability, cost and production
considerations. Execution of projects is said to lack the sense of
urgency necessary for timely completion. This comment ties in
with his thesis that Britain is over-committed in research and
development and thus does not make proper economic use of expen¬
ditures.
This chapter reviews the literature on the cost-benefit
analysis of research and development work and summarises the




Baker and Pound in their review of formal selection models
found few references which gave data and discussed the role of
uncertainty in research and development project selection.
3
The RAND Corporation economists Marshall and Meckling
however, carried out one of the pioneer analyses of estimate accuracy
1. M.J. Peck, ''Science and Technology", in Britain's Economic Pros¬
pects (ed) R. E. Caves, Allen and Unwin, 1968. p. 448.
2. N. R. Baker and W. H. Pound, "R & D Project Selection: Where We
Stand", I. E. E. E. Transactions on Engineering Management Vol. Em-11,
No. 4 (December 1964).
3. A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, "Predictability of Costs, Time
and Success of Development" in R. R. Nelson (ed) "The Rate and Direction
of Inventive Activity" Princeton (1962).
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and the role of uncertainty in research and development projects.
Their analysis was carried out on government sponsored research
and development in the fields of aerospace and military production.
The value of Marshall and Meckling's work is that they outline
clearly the framework within which we should evaluate effectiveness
of research and development programmes. They concentrate on the
confidence or accuracy which can be attached to predictions made by
research and development managers about the success of particular
development projects. Success of a project is defined in terms of the
difference between the value of the final output and the total costs of
production. In order to measure success we have to estimate four
factors which affect it, viz. Costs (development and production),
Performance, Time of Availability, and Utility. Cost and Time of
Availability are self explanatory, whilst Performance relates to the
specification and working ability of the end product and Utility is a
measurement of the value of the end product to the military authorities
in terms of weapons systems available elsewhere. A major problem
is, of course, that predictions of the various factors are rarely avail¬
able in a systematic form, lack quantification and thus cannot be
verified easily. In addition, the factors themselves are inter-related,
e. g. to obtain a given level of performance, sufficient time and cost
resources must be set aside. If the level is not attained with the
specified cost/time allocation a decision must be made to allocate
extra time or cost or both. Also, specifications of projects rarely
zzi
stay the same either because of technical problems or knowledge
of the success of a similar project in some other country.
In the evaluation of the predictive accuracy of initial cost esti¬
mates there are a number of difficulties. The costs finally incurred
on a given project relate to the costs of actual production and the
performance configurations eventually adopted. Initial estimates
of cost reflect the initial designs and specification for the project
which, because of the dynamic nature of technical knowledge, do not
generally remain the same during the life of the project. For this
reason alone it would not be surprising for initial and final estimates
of cost to differ quite considerably. However, measurement of the
extent of the difference between estimated and actual cost depends
upon our definition of cost. Marshall and Meckling convincingly
a;rgue that if we treat cost estimates, however they are generated,
as if they were estimates of achieving the expected levels of per¬
formance by a given date, we can measure the uncertainty in the
cost factor in our decision by observing changes in the cost estimates.
They further suggest that the error in cost estimates can reasonably
be divided into two parts: first, due to intrinsic cost estimation error
with a given specification and second, due to specification change as
development proceeds. If this division is correct it implies that
major improvements in initial forecasting should occur through early
prediction of the final design and specification.
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Marshall and Meckling thus analyse the prediction error by
dividing the latest possible production cost estimat e by the earliest
possible estimate. The factors obtained are presented in Tables I and
II in unadjusted form and with adjustments for changes in price levels
and final output (because most early estimates are made on the basis
of producing an estimated expected output which in general differs from
the actual output). It is clear from both sets of factors that initial
cost estimates have over-optimistic biases, in fact, on average the most
recent estimates exceeded the earliest available estimates by between
and three times.
Table 1
TOTAL FACTOR INCREASES IN AVERAGE CUMULATIVE COST
OF PRODUCTION - UNADJUSTED
Fighters Factor Bombers Factor Cargoes &
Tankers
Factor Missiles Factor
1 5.6 1 8. 7 1 1. 7 1 57. 6
2 3. 6 2 3. 5 2 1.6 2 20. 7
3 3. 1 3 1. 5 3 1. 0 3 11. 1
4 2. 1 4 1. 0 4 co•oH
5 1.9 -L- 5. 1.5
6 1. 5 6 1. 3
7 1.4
8 1. 2
9 1. 2 |l
Mean 2.4 4.5 1.3 17. l(«f. ofJ
Mean - All classes 6. 5 (4. +)
+ excluding missile case No. 1
Source Marshall and Meckling (op cit.) p. 11 (RAND Corporation,
P. 1821-1959)
Table II
TOTAL FACTOR INCREASES IN AVERAGE CUMULATIVE COST











1 3.9 4.0 1 6.2 4.0 1 1.4 1.6 1 14.7 6.4
2 2.6 2.5 2 COc\]00rsj 2 1.5 1.5 2 9.4 6.0
3 2.0 2.0 3 1.1 1.2 3 1.0 0.9 3 4.4 2.7
4 1.5 1.5 4 1. 0 0. 8 4 7. 2 7. 1
5 1. 7 2. 1 5 1.5 1.2
6 1.2 1.2 6 1.1 0. f
7 • o o • 00
8 1.0 1.0
9 i—» • >-* o •
■
Means 1.8 1.7 3.4 2.7 1.2 1.2 6.4 4. 1
Means - All Classes _A_ _B_
3.2 2.4
Source Marshall and Meckling (op cit) p. 14 (RAND Corporation, P. 1821, 1959)
2S4-
When looking at tables I and II it is interesting to discover
whether estimates of cost are more accurate when projects have
only a small degree of technical difficulty. Marshall and Meckling
asked a number of technical experts to classify the twenty two
development programs they analysed according to the technical
advance sought in each - small, medium or large - andfhey then
-v
rearranged the entries in Table II by this small, medium and large
classification to give table III shown immediately below.
Table III
COST FACTORS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCE
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
Tactor A Factor B Factor A Factor B Factor A Factor B
1. 5 1. 5 2. 8 2. 8 1. 1 1. 2
1. 7 2. 0 2.6 2. 5 1. 0 1. 0
1. 0 0. 8 2. 0 2. 0 1. 0 0. 8
1.4 1.6 1.2 1.2 6. 2 4. 0
1. 0 0.9 1. 1 0. 6 1. 1 0. 8
1. 5 1. 5 1. 5 1. 1 14. 7 6. 4
3.9 4. 0
4.4 2. 7
7. 2 7. 0
9.4 6. 0
ns 1. 3 1.4 1. 8 1. 7 5. 0 3.4
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Clearly, there is a strong correlation between the accuracy of cost
forecasts and the degree of technological advance of a project i. e. the
greater the advance, the more inaccurate the forecast.
Availability estimation errors measured by the time difference
between early estimates of completion dates and actual completion
dates generally show the same type of over-optimistic bias. The
mean "slippage" betweenactual and estimated times is 2 years which
is significantly large, but to assess the extent of the significance, i.e.
to allow for different project lives, it is necessary to construct
ratios of the actual time to completion to early predictions of com¬
pletion time. On average projects take 50% more time than the earliest
prediction would indicate.
Early performance estimates are much more often fulfilled than
early cost and availability estimates in Marshall and Meckling's
sample of projects. The reason is to be found in the nature of
government sponsored development work. Centrally funded work
has to fulfil performance objectives even if the trade off is time
slippage in completion or increased cost of production and develop¬
ment. Even so, in most of the twenty-two cases performance
goals were not fully achieved.
A further important question that Marshall and Meckling try to
resolve is the behaviour of the estimates through time. At what
time do estimates become reasonably accurate and thus usable for
economic evaluation purposes? The general conclusion is that the
Z34
accuracy of estimates is a function of the stage of development.
This also means that estimates for development projects represen¬
ting only limited technical advancement tend to be better than estimates
for more ambitious projects.
4
Peck and Scherer as part of an analysis of the weapons
acquisition process calculate estimate errors for aerospace develop¬
ments. Their findings (f a threefold (average 3.2 times) over-optimistic
bias in cost estimates and a time slippage bias of 36% more than the
early time estimates are in close agreement with RAND studies.
Both studies, however, were of government sponsored programmes
and these tend to haye different objectives from commercially oriented
development work. Therefore, whilst we can tentatively say that
military programmes show consistent over-optimistic biases in the
estimation of economic, time, and to a lesser extent, performance
factors, we cannot generalise these results to industrial research
and development work.
However, before leacing military R&D studies we must mention
5
the very recent paper by Summers which extends the cost-effectiveness
analysis approach by studying 68 historical Rand Corporation military
R&D case studies including the evidence from Marshall and Meckling's
study. The ba3ic aim of Summer's work is to try to give an answer to
the questions, how unreliable are cost estimates and in what directions
are they unreliable ? His analysis closely follows Marshall and Meck-
4. M. J. Peck and F. M Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process,
Division of Research, Harvard, 1962
5. R. Summers, "Cost Estimates as Predictors of Actual Costs: A
Statistical Study of Military Developments", in T. Marschak, T. K.
Glennan and R. Summers, Strategy for R & D-, Srpinger-Yerlag,
1968, p. 140.
m
ling's in that he calculates raw and adjusted (for price changes and
changes in expected output levels) ratios of actual cost to initial
estimated cost. He finds that the initial estimates are far from
accurate and that the bias in estimation of costs is largely on the
side of the underestimation of costs. Specifically, four fifths of
the initial estimates of cost are less than their actual values and
one quarter of the estimates of cost are less than half of the total
actual costs. In this respect, of course, the findings agree with
the magnitude of bias found in the other military R&D studies.
The difference here is that Summers tries to find the detailed
micro reasons for the inaccuracy that exists in cost estimation for
research projects.
He identifies several variables which seem to influence
estimation performance. They are, first, the point in time during
the development when the estimate is made; second, the level of
technical difficulty offered by a project; third, the length of the
development period i. e. the longer the development period the
more likely it is that the initial design specification and configuration
will be changed, fourth, the experience which estimators have pre¬
viously had in assessing estimates for R&D projects. He then
tries to assess the extent to which each of these variables can
explain the observed variability in the ratio of the actual cost to the
initial adjusted estimate. He finds that the character of the develop¬
ment program and the timing of the estimates are important in
explaining the observed variability. This means simply that cost
Estimates are good for projects offering a small technical advance
and vice-versa and that if early estimates of cost are poor then later
ones will be better. Also he finds that inaccuracy is greater the longer
the development period and that estimation performance is improved
when comparing chronologically later projects with earlier ones.
However, Summers considers that the most critical factor in deter¬
mining the accuracy of a cost estimat e seems to be the degree of un¬
certainty, at the time the estimate is made, about the exact design con¬
figuration of the product at the end of the development program.
Having analysed the factors which seem to be the major explanatory
reasons for inaccuracy, he attempts to show that we can adjust initial
estimates by a factor to correct the estimate for tbe biases of inaccu¬
rate forecasting. Summers uses multiple regression methods to relate
the ratio of actual cost to the initial cost estimate to the degree of
technical difficulty and the point in time during the development period
when the estimate is made. With this relationship he obtains a debiasing
formula which he rejects as a means of adjusting initial cost estimates.
Table IV given below presents the results of Summer's basic
analysis of ratios of final cost to initial cost values. We shall take
up his more detailed analysis in the next chapter.
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Table IV
SUMMERS COST-FACTOR FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
(1) (2) (3)
Class Intervals Frequency of Unadjusted Frequency of Adjusted
Cost Factors Cost Factors (Raw F) Cost Factors (F)
0. 60 - 0. 99 13 14
1. 00 - 1. 39 17 23
1.40 - 1. 79 12 10
1. 80 - 2. 19 7 5
2. 20 - 2. 99 3 6
3. 00 - 3. 79 5 4
3. 80 - 4. 99 3 2
5. 00 - 9. 99 4 4
0. 00 -19. 99 2 -
;:o. oo -39. oo 2 -
68 68
Mean 3. 26 1. 79
Standard Deviation 5. 39 1. 34
Root-Mean-Square Error 5. 85 1. 56
Source R. Summers p. 152 in Strategy for R & D ed. by T. Marschak et al.
The reported evidence on the relation between estimated and
actual outcomes of development work in an industrial context is
much more sparse. Undoubtedly, the major reason for lack of research




Professor Mansfield in two recent studies has initiated
the detailed study of the relation between estimated and actual
outcomes in industrial research and development. Of about 45
projects he studied in an equipment laboratory only 50% resulted
in commercial success though the accuracy of cost estimates was
generally very good and only a small way out for projects that re¬
sulted in technical failure. We present the information on these
45 projects in Table V below:
Table V
MANSFIELD: RATIO OF ACTUAL EXPENDITURES TO
FINAL BUDGET APPROVED BY LABORATORY MANAGE¬
MENT, 45 R & D PROJECTS, 1963
Ratio Number of Proposed
Projects
0. 00 - 0. 39 2
0.40 - 0. 79 21
0. 80 - 1. 19 16
1. 20 - 1. 59 3
1.60 and over 3
45
Source E Mansfield and E.G. Brandenberg: Journal of Business, October 1966
6. E. Mansfield, Econometric Studies of Industrial P,esearch and Technological
Innovation, W. W. Norton, New York, 1968.
7. E. Mansfield and R. Brandenberg, "The Allocation, Characteristics, and
Outcome of the firm's R&D Portfolio: A Case Study", Journal of Business
October, 1966.
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Further, about one half of the laboratory's projects did not
achieve their technical objectives on time and this implies a fairly
large area of technical uncertainty in research and development.
However, Mansfield points out that the delay in two-Lhirds of the
time slippage porjects could be explained either by changes in
project objectives or by transfer of personnel to other projects.
Therefore, in only one-sixth of all the projects was there a rela¬
tively large element of technical uncertainty, suggesting that time
slippage errors overstate the problem of uncertainty in research
and development.
Mansfield's major conclusions about industrial research and
development differ from those of the military research and develop¬
ment studies. Cost estimates tend to be more accurate, expected
profit seems to be the major objective in industrial research and
development work and technical uncertainty seems to be smaller in
industrial research and development because of its applied nature,
even though time slippages occurred in half of the projects studied.
Performance objectives seem to be met in the majority of cases in
both military and industrial research and development. If Mansfield's
analysis is correct it suggests that strategies for research and
development woti should differ between industrial and military
research and development and that policies designed to reduce un¬
certainty in research and development will be more useful in those




Meadows has also collected data on the accuracy of project
estimates in industrial research and development and is engaged on
further studies to determine the relationship between estimated and
actual outcomes in commercial development projects. Meadows
discusses the effect of inaccuracies in the estimation of such fac¬
tors as probability of technical success (PTS), probability of com¬
mercial success (PCS), net profit (NF) if the project is successful,
the development costs (DC), which are frequently used as inputs to
indices purporting to measure project worth. An example of this
type of measure is the expected profit ratio suggested by Meadows,
viz.
EXPECTED PROFIT RATIO - (PTS) X (PCS) X (NP)
DC
It can easily be seen that estimation errors in any of the factors in
the numerator and denominator of this ratio may distort the measure
of project worth and throw considerable doubt on a decision to go on
a project based solely on expected profit index.
Meadow's data sources comprise three chemical laboratories,
one electronics laboratory and the information from the equipment
laboratory collected by Mansfield. We present the evidence Meadows
has collected about cost factor ratios on Table VI overleaf:
8. D. Meadows, "Estimate Accuracy and Project Selection Models
in Industrial Research", p. 105-121, Industrial Management
Review, Vol. 8. Mo. 3, Spring; 1968.
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Table VI
MEADOWS: RATIOS OF TOTAL ACTUAL COST TO TOTAL
ESTIMATED COSTS FOR 59 PROJECTS FROM TWO CHEMICAL
________
Project Outcome Number of Projects Ratios
Chemical Lab. A
Miscellaneous and 7 2. 55
Technical
Failure
Commercial Failure 11 1.28
Commercial Success 12 0.94
26
Chemical Lab. B
Miscellaneous and 4 3. 84
Technical
Failure
Commercial Failure 12 4.25
Commercial Success 17 1.27
33
Source: Amended from Table II in D. Meadows, Industrial Management
Review, Spring, 1968.
His general conclusions again show evidence of the existence
of biases in estimation. The ratios of actual costs to estimated costs
show over-optimistic biases of between It to 4 times for projects
that were either technical or commercial failures but for projects
that were commercial successes, actual and estimated costs tend
to be very similar. It should be noted that for the chemical labora¬
tories the major source of cost overruns were projects sponsored by
the laboratory research staff themselves and smallest for projects
sponsored by customers. This result is not surprising given the
difference in technical difficulty that usually exists between labora¬
tory and customer sponsored projects. It appears alsu that the abi¬
lity of managers to predict the probability of technical and commercial
success is limited, although they are far more able to get reasonable
predictions of technical than commercial success. However, since
estimates of probabilities are fraught with difficulties in interpre¬
tation and cannot strictly be verified, not much reliance should be
given to these findings. Meadows does not present any evidence on the
extent to which laboratory management can successfully predict the
level of net profit or benefit likely to be achieved from a project,
doubtless this will be reported in later analyses.
Allen has carried out a small study of the accuracy of forecasts
9
in novel projects in a number of chemical laboratories . He collected
seven project case histories and attempted to measure the errors in
forecasts by comparing them with the actual results. He also tried
9. D. H. Allen and P. J. November, "A Practical Study of the
Accuracy of Forecasts in Novel Projects", Tripartite Chemical
Engineering Conference, Montreal, September 1968.
to find out which of the various factors contributing to the financial
outcome of a project significantly affect the eestimation of expected
financial outcome because of errors in ihe initial forecasts.
His findings show that in four cases out of seven, cost fore¬
casts tend to optimistic, in two cases pessimistic and in one case
very slightly optimistic. These results tend to confirm the optimistic
biases uncovered in Meadows' work but are not conclusive. It may
well be that particular organisation structures generate different
biases in forecasts and that the studies so far may have reported
predominantly those organisations which a tendency towards over-
optimism in forecas.ing. Only a statistically representative cample
of firms will allow us to confirm tentative hypotheses about cost
over- estimation. It is virtually impossible, given the under¬
standable desire of firms to guard their corporate security, to
obtain co-operation for a broadly based statistical sample. We must,
therefore, be content to continue the case study work but extract the
maximum possible amount of relevant information from each in order
to make further progress.
Allen's analysis also gives us some evidence on fore casts of
completion time and eventual benefit (profit, sales volume and price)
from projects. However, because the firms in his sample obviously
differed in their forecasting practices, time and sales volume estimates
are not available for every case. In those cases where evidence is
available forecasts of benefit are in all cases optimistic but time
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estimates tend to be much more accurate. Examination of the
behaviour of forecasts of costs and benefits through time shows
that it is only at a late stage in a project's development life that
uncertainty in most of the forecasts is substantially resolved.
Predictably, Allen finds that errors in the forecasts of benefit
variables i.e. price and sales volume can affect the project's
predicted financial outcome considerably but that errors in the
various cost components, research and development, raw
materials, etc. , are also important. These results suggest that
ratio type cost/benefit indices may produce incorrect measures
of the attractiveness of potential projects and thus seriously in¬
validate any project selection decisions based on them.
6. 2 Summary
The studies undertaken on military research and development
viz. Marshall and Meck.ling and Peck and Scherer, show that initial
estimates of cost are very optimistic and that time slippages in
project completion occur very frequently. Although satisfactory
performance is achieved it is often obtained at the expense of time
slippage and increased cost.
The evidence from the industrial studies viz. Mansfield,
Meadows and Allen is not consistent. Mansfield's equipment laboratory
turns out to be well organised and error in forecasts of costs is very
small. Further, even though time objectives are often unfulfilled most
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of the slippage is explained by changes in the individual project's
nature and staffing . Meadows finds large errors in forecasts in
his chemical laboratories and these tend to be of the same order
for cost as the military research and development studies. Further,
errors in forecasts of commercial and technical success are sig¬
nificantly large though much greater in the area of predicting com¬
mercial success. Allen's evidence for seven chemical projects tends
to be similar to the laboratories in the Meadows study, viz. in general,
optimistic biases in cost estimation and in the prediction of likely
benefits arising from commercial adoption of the project's results.
It is reasonable to conclude on the basis of the existing evidence
that in government sponsored research and development there tend to
be over-optimistic estimates of likely costs and times to project
completion. In commercial research and development errors in
forecasts would seem to be a function of the type of industry, the
product produced by the firm and the organisation structure of the in¬
dividual firm. Firm conclusions are limited by the paucity of evidence.
However, as more case studies are undertaken our understanding of
research and development across different industries and firms will
improve. It is in this spirit that the retrospective analysis in the next
chapter of some of the research and development work of two firms
in the electronics industry is presented.
PART III
Chapte r 7~
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF PAST R&D PROJECTS
IN TWO FIRMS IN THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
7.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter we looked at the range of published
studies on the retrospective cost effectiveness analysis of both
government and privately financed research and development.
This chapter is concerned with the usefulness of retrospective
cost/benefit analysis in enriching our understanding of the eco¬
nomic characteristics of the development process. The analysis
differs from our view in Part II of the formal and informal processes
of decision in R & D because it seeks to evaluate the actual perfor¬
mance of the R&D systems in Firms A and B. In particular, Part II
allows us to develop some hypotheses about the characteristics of the
development process but it is only in this part of the work that they
can be given operational meaning. Our objectives in the analysis pre¬
sented here are to improve our knowledge of the economics of the
development process by highlighting and discussing the problems
encountered in development work. Thus, we try to build on our
basic knowledge of the environmental and organisational structures
of Firms A and B and their formally stated decision processes in
R&D work to improve our understanding of the nature of the develop¬
ment process and the alternative strategies that are possible for the
research director. The distinctive feature of the analysis is that we
are trying to give a depth analysis of R & D in two firms by means
of a continual case study of its environment and actual decision prob¬
lems. Our underlying aim is, thus, to help move towards a better and
perhaps normative theory of development. We begin this chapter with
a discussion of the methodology of the cost benefit study and the sample
of projects obtained for subsequent analysis. The central core of the
chapter is concerned with the accuracy of forecasts made in relation
to R & D projects and the nature of uncertainty in the development
process. The evidence obtained is then compared with the published
material evaluated in Chapter i°.
7. 1 Methodology
The approach adopted in both A and B was to establish a repre¬
sentative sample of past projects undertaken by the firms and then to
try to piece together from formal records, accounting data and dis¬
cussions with project engineering personnel how these projects
started and evolved through time. Given this reconstruction we can
then carry out analyses of forecast error, of the resolution of uncer¬
tainty through the life of the project and of the reasons for changes in
the technical and commercial objectives of a given project.
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7.2 Data
In the following section we present a brief description of each
of the projects evaluated in firms A and B. This description is neces¬
sarily limited by the desire to avoid identifying the firm or the exact
nature of the project. The description is given primarily to provide
an awareness of extraneous factors to be borne in mind in considering
results of the later analysis.
Project 1A
One of a projected family of instruments for electronic measure¬
ment. The objective of pursuing the concept of the family of instruments
was a result of a company plan to produce a range of test instruments
in an area not previously exploited by the company. Market potential
was considered by the company to be considerable and the expertise
within the research and development laboratory available to carry out
the work.
Project 2A
A complementary instrument to 1A produced to extend the
product line.
Project 3A
The final member of the first phase of the series 1A, 2A set of
instruments. This was produced to provide a complete measurement
system for the customer and to provide training for existing engineers
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in the technical area before the launching of the second phase
of this system of instruments. Again, market potential for the
system was estimated to be considerable.
Project 4A
A measurement instrument sponsored and planned by the
laboratory management to follow on and replace an existing
instrument. The modifications were designed to improve the
capability and performance of the device. The market potential was
thought to be large.
Project 5A
A re-design of an existing instrument for a specific customer.
The request for the research to be done emanated from the sales
division who considered that the market offered was profitable to
the company.
Project 6A
An instrument specifically planned by the laboratory management
to place the firm in a new area of electronic measurement. Again, the
market was considered to be very large and the measurement area one
with great long term potential. As a result the project was felt to be a
small extent a learning exercise as well as a profitable venture for the
company and its technical staff.
Project 7A
To design an electronic measurement to meet known existing
demand. Again a family of instruments was planned and in this case
it is considered reasonable to view them as one rather than three
distinct projects. The idea for the project was generated within the
laboratory.
Project 8A
An instrument designed and planned to be used as a comple¬
mentary instrument to an existing successful product marketed by
the firm. The market for the instrument was thus considered to be
steady but not considerable.
Project 9A
An instrument designed as a result of technical "fall-out" from
the project 1A series. Considered to have a useful market potential
and overall benefit for the firm.
Project 10A
An instrument designed specifically to a special contract from
a customer. Sales department considered the development would be
extremely profitable for the firm and the laboratory regarded the
development work as being a fairly simple task.
We now present four projects which were shelved by the firm.
Owing to the fact that records for shelved or failed projects are very
difficult to trace the documentation or description in these cases is
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not up to the standard of the previous sample of 10.
Project 11A
An electrical measurement instrument to fill a gap in the firm's
product line. Market potential uncertain and ultimate benefit to the
firm considered to be not very great.
Project 12A
An extension of the project 6A range of instruments. Considered
to have both good market potential and profitability prospects.
Project 13A
An instrument designed to a contract specification from an
outside customer. Both market potential and benefit were calculated
to be large and the involvement in a new measurement technique
technically appealing.
Project 14A
A fall-out from the 1A series of instruments. Undertaken largely
because of the spin-off even though market potential and benefit were
estimated to be barely satisfactory.
The above sample of projects is considered to be a representative
sample of the work undertaken by the firm over the five-year period
1963-1968 including the early mohths of 1969. From the description
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of the projects and the overall description of the firm given in the
second part of the thesis, it is clear that the firm has a formal
evaluation and review system for research and development projects.
Briefly, if the research and development manager decides that a
project idea is worthy of further consideration he requires that a
preliminary evaluation of specification, design and project economics
is carried out. If this proves prositive the project engineer assigned
to the investigation phase of the project must estimate certain eco¬
nomic factors, cost, eventual quantity sold, price and profit rate
and calculate a preliminary net benefit/cost ratio for the project.
Then, if the value of this ratio is greater than some minimum
corporate target a decision is generally made to recommend inclusion
of the project in the research and development work of the firm subject
to the availability of resources. The nature of this project selection
process should be borne in mind in reviewing the tabular analysis of
retrospective data.
Project IB
This project has been created from a large number of individual
projects which on individual analysis might not appear profitable but
when viewed as a system were attractive to the management of the firm.
The system embraces a bread and butter range of measuring instru¬
ments of high quality with the advantage of cheapness and reliability
at the expense of extreme technical sophistication. The family of instru-
ments has been continually developed and new additions, modifications
etc. are introduced to sale at the same time as development is proceeding.
Project 2B
This project has largely been sponsored by outside contract. It
is an instrument in a new area for the firm and is intended to compete
with a couple of existing products which do not have the performance
and specification of the new instrument. The instrument was an attempt
to build a bridgehead for the firm in the area with a view to further long
term expansion. The attraction of the project was enhanced for the
firm because a large proportion of risk capital was provided from
sources external to the firm.
There are a number of other projects that could be presented but
the level and quality of past records is not sufficient to maintain the
same standard of analysis as with previous projects. The problem with
Firm B is that records of expenditure on R & D projects have only
recently been started and market and cost evaluations of projects are in
most cases no more than "ballpark" estimates. Analysis based on such
data would obviously have spurious validity.
7. 3 Analysis of Data
In this section we shall try to assess:
1) The accuracy of forecasts of variables related to the projects,
2^
2) The change in these forecasts through time and the resolution
of uncertainty;
3) The usefulness of the return factor index of Firm A in giving
a valid measure of worth of project and predicting the eventual
financial outcome of a project.
7. 3. 1 Forecast Accuracy
Typically, the decision to include a project within a firm's
R&D portfolio is dependent upon a preliminary process of evaluating
the worth of the project to the firm. The methods by which firms
evaluate projects vary from the fairly informal, rough appraisal
of a firm like B to the more formal economic appraisal of factors
such as likely cost and revenue cash flows and the calculation of a
rate of return factor. An example of the latter type of approach is
the procedure adopted by Firm A.
If a firm calculates a return factor it requires estimate®
of economic factors as inputs to this calculation. It can be seen
fairly easily that a return factor of the form Net Revenue/Cost
can give misleading values if the forecast inputs are not accurate.
If a decision to undertake a project is based solely on the figure
of merit given by a return factor without allowing for inaccuracies
in the forecasts of inputs the firm may commit heavy expenditures
to a worthless project and reduce the value of its total research
work. We shall not discuss here whether firms should use return
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factors to aid them in their project selection decisions. We shall
take the view that whatever method they use to appraise a project,
better decisions will come on average from better forecasts of mar¬
ket and cost factors.
In Table 1 below we present ratios for FIRM A of the earliest
available estimat es of the factors, i.e. those on which decisions were
based, to the actual value that eventually occurred. Firm A evaluates
how much the development will cost (and how long it will take), how
many units of the end product are likely to be sold over an estimated
life for the product and what the market price for the product will bew
It should be noticed that colums 7, 8 and 9 in the table assess the
degree of technical advance (SMALL, MEDIUM OR LARGE) of the
end product, the final status of the project in terms of technical and
commercial success and the source of the idea to develop the product
(L Laboratory, C Customer). For almost all the projects it is too
early yet to assess whether the engineers assessed the likely market
life for the end product correctly.
Some comments must be made at this point about a number of
the items presented in Table 1. First, column 3 is obtained by
adjusting the ratios in Column 2 for the influence of changes in price
levels. The adjustment is thus the familiar one for the effects of
inflation and it was carried out in the following manner. From pre¬
vious accounting records of cost breakdowns for the R&D depart¬
ment the ratio of overhead costs, including occupancy costs, wages and
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salaries, to materials costs was approximately one to one. With
this one to one relationship established official statistical publications
were then consulted to find out the rate of increase of earnings and
materials costs over the period of study. Tables in the Monthly Digest of Sta¬
tistics for the average earnings of all employees in the engineering and
electrical goods industry and for the wholesale price of materials used
in the engineering and electrical goods industry were used to measure
the rates of change of earnings and materials costs over the period of
study. It was further assumed that overhead costs could reasonably be
considered to be strongly correlated with earnings costs and, there¬
fore, could be adjusted by the measure for the rate of change of earnings.
Then, for each project an index was constructed giving equal weight to
overhead and materials costs to allow for changes in price levels over
the development period of that project.
It is important to remember at this point that the measurement
of ratios of final to initial values of cost and other factors is compli¬
cated not only by the effects of inflation but also by changes in project
objectives and the estimated magnitude of the production run that be¬
come apparent during the development period. Where it has been
considered necessary to adjust for such changes as this the adjust¬
ment has been carried out. However, the adjustment is subjective in
two respects. First, the situations in which other factors have in¬
fluenced costs or other factors are judged subjectively by the investi¬
gator and second, the magnitude of the adjustment necessary to allow
25?
for the bias introduced can only be subjectively assessed. This is
why Marshall and Meckling found it necessary in their work to pro¬
vide two sets of adjusted estimates one constructed by Eugene Brussell
and the other by Robert Summers. They commented that the tricky
nature of the adjustment process and the element of subjective
judgement necessarily mean that no two estimators will give the
same weighting to the elements in the adjustment process.
The seventh column in the table on the degree of technical
advance of the projects was obtained by asking the research and
development manager and the project engineer for each project to
evaluate the technical nature of the project and assess it on a three
point scale, small, medium and large. The eighth column in the
table was obtained from the company accountant who assessed
whether the final return factor for the project did or did not meet
the corporate targets. The final column on the source of the project
idea was obtained through interview and perusal of project records.
It is to be noted that Table 1 does not include the data on the four
technical failure projects of Firm A. These are treated separately
because of their unique characteristics.
Table1 FIRMA
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The relevance of the information in Table 1 is that it shows
the innacuracies that exist in early forecasts of various factors
and enables us to assess their extent and influence on the revenue/
cost ratios.
Specifically, the fifth column in the table indicates that the
firm is well able to forecast with reasonable accuracy how long
the research and development work will take. This result is
explained in large part by the firm's policy of trying to meet
deadlines wherever possible and its adoption of network analysis
techniques for project planning. Trade offs of extra resource in¬
puts are frequently tolerated and accepted by the firm in order to
fulfil time targets.
It is equally clear from the results in column 2 that in most
cases initial cost forecasts tend to be far smaller than actual final
cost values. A contributory factor is clearly the extent of extra
resources that are often injected into a project in order to ensure
completion by a given date. In addition, changes in price levels and
expected output levels can have a significant effect. Nevertheless,
the results indicate considerable weaknesses and overoptimism in
the forecasting of costs. This result is consistent with the nature
of overoptimistic biases found in most of the existing studies andis
of greater importance here because the firm has a well organised
information system and is efficiently run.
On the revenue side in most of the cases it is clear that early
1^
estimates of quantities sold tend to overstate the actual final
position by a considerable amount. This highlights the fact that
marketing a new R&D generated product (i.e. knowing its likely
market) is difficult and past data on sales are not likely to be
helpful unless the firm is selling in well-defined technical market.
Unfortunately, well-defined markets exist in very few cases. Des¬
pite the difficulties in quantity estimation the extent of the error
can be explained in part by biases which engineers in A admitted
were widespread when they were asked to evaluate the worth of a
project by some form of return factor index.
It is interesting to consider whether the extent of accuracy
in the estimation of the various factors related to a project's worth
varies with the degree of technical advance of those projects. Table II
provides a breakdown of estimation performance by the magnitude
of technical advance of a project.
Table II
FIRM A - MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF RATIOS
ANALYSED BY DEGREE OF MAGNIT UDE OF TECHNICAL ADVANCE











Cost 1. 78 1. 16 2. 97 0.46
Adjusted
Cost
1.62 1. 19 2. 62 0. 57
Quantity
Sold
0. 31 0. 21 1. 58 0. 36
Price 0. 95 0. 22 1. 75 o • o
Time 1. 25 0. 52 1. 11 1. 14
It is clear from this analysis that there are differences in
forecast error between projects of limited and great technical
difficulty. Because we have few cases of large technical advance it is more
relevant to aggregate the cases of medium and large technical advance
in the table. Actual costs tend to be twice as much as initial estimates
in the case of small technical advance and about three times in the case
of medium to large technical advance. Even if allowance were made for
inflation over the development period the relative difference between
the small and medium to large cases would be of approximately the
same magnitude. This result suggests that cost forecasts are more
accurate when the degree of technical uncertainty is small and vice-
versa.
It is difficult to come to firm conclusions about inaccuracies
in sales (or quantity sold) forecasts. When the technical advance of a
project is small, on average we find that final sales over the period
are only about one-third of the initial estimate. On the other hand
medium to large technically advanced projects tend to produce sales
greater than initial estimated values by a mean factor of about half.
Certainly technically advanced products will tend to define a market
of their own and not often be subject to severe competition. Projects
of a more limited degree of technical advance tend to be improvements to
existing ranges or "gap fillers" in the firm's product line and thus
are subject to competition from a number of other firms already in
the market. A simple explanation of the results produced in the table
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rpay merely reflect inability to estimate market size either in the
case of a new technically advanced instrument when other firms may
be doing research designed to produce a similarly technically advanced
instrument at roughly the same time or in the case of small detailed
improvements to an existing product when consumers may prefer a
more limited specification or one of the range of instruments available
from other firms. However, if we had more observations we might have
found that if firms can afford to do high risk, technologically advanced
R&D and succeed in their development work, their eventual market
might be much larger than if they concentrated on a low risk diversified
R&D portfolio. A conclusion of this nature would be a statement if
true of the extent of research economies of scale.
Price forecasts seem to be very accurate in the case of small
technical advance but underestimated initially in the case of medium
to large levels of technical advance. Because medium / large levels
have greater degrees of technical uncertainty we have seen already
that cost estimates tend to be severely underestimated relative to
projects with much smaller levels of technical advance. Since firm A
sets its prices by means of full costs plus a mark-up it is not sur¬
prising that final prices are greater than initial estimated prices in
cases of high technical advance. In addition, where technical advance
is larger the- market is less well defined and this further complicates
meaningful estimation of prices at an early stage in the development
life of a project.
As we have noted already there is no real difference between
projects of different levels of technical advance in their ability to
fulfil time objectives. Nothing can be inferred from this fact other
than it is a direct result of 2 factors, first the strict control system
for R&D adopted by the firm and, second, the firm's policy to
complete its R&D work on time even if extra money and resources
have to be incurred.
A further analysis of the figures in Table 1 by extent of
final commercial success provides an interesting picture. This is
shown in Table III.
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It can be seen that commercially successful projects exhibit
greater errors in forecast estimates than non-commercially successful
projects except for forecasts of eventual market. This can be explained
partly because three out of the five commercially successful projects
represent significant degrees of technical advance compared with only
one of the non-commercially successful projects. We have seen that
high technical advance projects tend to define markets of their own and
no matter how much the escalation of costs these are regained by the
firm via a full cost pricing policy. The evidence for this firm suggests
that to be commercially successful an useful R&D strategy would be
to engage in an R & D programme with its objective as the development
of technically advanced rather than bread and butter projects.
It has not been considered worthwhile to provide figures of the
initial and final estimates of the various economic and time factors for
the technically unsuccessful projects of Firm A's portfolio. The reason
is a simple one. These projects have been terminated for different
reasons: poor initial feasibility, shortage of skilled labour resources,
rapid cost escalation and so on. As such comparison of "final" estimates
against initial ones is not meaningful because "final" does not relate to
an unique point in time (such as the end of the development period with
technically successful projects) and thus comparison of results with
other more successful projects is rendered worthless.
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However, we present in Table IV beneath ratios of the latest
available estimates of cost for each of the four projects before ter¬
mination to the initial estimated total development cost and a short
explanation of the reasons for termination of the project.
Table IV
COST RATIOS
Project Ratios Reason Given
11 1. 04 Uncertain market; low return factor
12 1. 82 Rapid escalation of initial cost estimate
13 2. 1 Political difficulties with contract
14 1. 1 Instrument not viable in market
Too much reliance should not be placed on the reasons given
for project termination because observation has shown them to be
convenient rationalisations and not statements of reality. In fact,
project 11 has now just been reinstated in the laboratory largely
because personality differences about the relevance of the project
have been resolved. Further, project 12 is now again under active
consideration because sufficiently skilled engineering resources
have become available. It is the view of this observer that if project
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12 had been undertaken at the time of its first inception the
company would have had a huge commercial success in the
light of the market reaction to project 6's final end product.
Thus, for comparative purposes we cannot say much about
projects that were technical failures in this firm. It is surprising
in view of the former argument that Meadows in his study analyses
ratios for a number of projects that turned out to be failures
or were terminated. Obviously, since reasons for failure or
termination are never the same in each case and are not neces¬
sarily meaningful in technical terms it is misleading to give in¬
formation on forecast ratios in these cases.
The evidence available from Firm B on forecast accuracy
is for reasons that were made clear in Part II far less detailed
and comprehensive. It is useful to remember that records for
firm B cn R & D projects have until recently been kept on ly in
those cases where outside risk capital is a major source of finance.
If we take note also that appraisal of projects is very informal and
economic estimates related to R & D projects are no better than
"guesstimates" then it is clear that an analysis as detailed and
thorough as that for Firm A is not possible in this case. However,
we can only say here that Project 2 B does provide us with some
estimates of cost, price and sales per annum because the sponsoring
agency required information of this nature when it gave the risk
capital and subsequently when it reviewed the progress of the project.
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The estimates made for this project should be considered as
being an example of the best possible estimating behaviour - "bread
and butter" R&D projects are approved on the basis of highly-
informal and speedy subjective evaluations. The information
available from Project 2B is given in Table V below.
Table V
FIRM B: UNADJUSTED COST, PRICE AND SALES RATIOS









Note: The SALES ratio is based upon the first year's actual sales
for the instrument and the initial estimated value of sales for that year.
This project can fairly be regarded as being technically advanced
in nature so that the inaccuracy of cost estimation is understandable
and perhaps a little bit smaller than with Firm A and the ratios obtained
in other R&D studies. The price estimate inaccuracy is again of the
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same order as for a technically advanced project in Firm A and
consistent with the level of cost escalation given the practice of
full cost pricing in the firm. The short fall of actual sales,
however, differs from the case of firm A in which the opposite
occurred for technically advanced projects. The difference might
be explained by the marketing oriented approach in new product
planning present in Firm A. However, it is true to say that Firm B
has had the same short fall experience with a couple of sponsored
projects it undertook some years previously and which project
engineers raised when the poor sales performance of 2B was dis¬
cussed with them. Since we have concrete information on only 2B we
should perhaps emphasise that discussions with project engineers
in B about previous projects yielded the general impression of a
tremendous lack of awareness of the importance of economic factors
such as cost and sales of a project and where "guesstimates" of the values
of cost and sales had been made they tended to be wildly inaccurate
and almost random in comparison with the true value.
It is clear that with the degree of inaccuracy at present found
in project appraisals, measures of worth of projects based on these
estimates may give an incorrect assessment of the value of each pro¬
ject to the firm. Until forecasts can be improved adoption of selection
techniques for R&D projects based on estimating likely financial
rates of return must proceed with caution. In any case decision should
never be made solely on the basis of the value of the rate of return
factor and must be combined with technical and other relevant evaluations.
7. 3. 2 Uncertainty Resolution
Thomas Marshak* in discussing the nature of the development
process considers it to be a process of uncertainty reduction or
learning. This idea of the nature of the development process is
one which is supported by earlier evidence in this thesis. In fact,
the RAND Corporation through a number of its research personnel
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such as Marschak, Klein , Meckling and Nelson can be regarded
as being the originator of this view of the development process. We
need here to provide evidence about the nature of uncertainty in
industrial development and parallel it with the RAND view of the
military development process. Such a comparison is essential in
view of RAND's development of the parallel path strategy for mili¬
tary research and development management. Basically RAND
believes that uncertainty about any given project is so great initially
that the most sensible strategy is to carry out R & D on a number of
possible approaches to the project in parallel until design uncertainty
is resolved sufficiently for the best approach to become clear to the
research director.
Uncertainty is not so great in industrial R&D because of its
applied nature and, therefore, we suspect that a parallel path strategy
■n-
would not be useful for the management of most industrial R&D projects.
However, it is of great importance for the industrial manager to know
what faith he should place on forecasts and, in particular, to know at
which stage in the development process they become reasonably accurate.
"IT T. Marschak, "The Microeconomic Study of Development" Chapter 1 in
Strategy for R & D by T. Marschak et al. (Springer-Verlag, 1968)
2. B. H. Klein, "The Nature of Military R & D" P1818 (Rand Corporation)
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3. B. H. Klein and W. Meckling, "An Application of Operations Research
to Development Decision" Operations Research, VI (May-June 1958)
4. R. R. Nelson, "Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel
Research and Development Efforts" Review of Economics and Statistics,
1961.
The only evidence available in this study about uncertainty reso¬
lution is from Firm A. In certain cases with technically unsuccessful
projects the basis for their decision to suspend work on a project for an
indefinite period has been stated (see Table IV) to be because the latest
available estimates of cost, sales etc. present a clearer picture of the
true worth of the project to the firm. Since the firm was never able to
find out the true value of costs, sales etc. (because they never completed
the R&D work) the firm's decision implicitly assumed that latest
available forecasts present a more useful decision tool than initial
forecasts. We have to ask whether this has been true of forecasts on
technically successful projects.
A detailed analysis of the forecast evidence is presented below.
This analysis consists of graphs of the behaviour of the forecasts of
cost, quantity sold, price and the associated measure of worth, the
return factor at discrete points within the development period. It
should be noted that the number of points evaluated varies with the
length of the project, the technical obstacles that occur and the routine
need for forecasts. In fact, forecasts are typically made every four
to six months and also when a significant oroblem, economic or tech¬
nical occurs during the project's development. The variable plotted
on the graphs presented below is the forecast inaccuracy where the
degree of forecast inaccuracy is measured by the index :
I = Actual Value - Forecast Value
Forecast Value
expressed as a percentage. We shall present the graphs immediately
now and then discuss the findings that appear subsequently. In the tables
which accompany the graphs we present the values of I for each factor
on the 10 technically successful projects.
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Price Quantity Sold Return Factor
1 176.4 22.5 4.3 -12.5
2 80.0 22.5 -5U.5 * -57.3
3 81.4 22.5 0.0 -6.7
4 75.9 11.4 100.0 -55.7
5 36.2 9.1 100,0 -45.3
6 — 0,0 100.0 -31.4
NOTE-- the last period is the end of the development period, uncertainty
still remains about quantity sold and final return but not about price and
development cost.
Project 2A Values of I Cages')
Times Cost Price Quantity Return Factor
luring Development Sold
Period
1 17.3.9 51.1 100.0 64.3
2 173.9 51.1 -36.3 -47.7
3 72.4 51.1 40.0 81.6
4 67.7 51.1 -30.0 -6.8
5 23.9 21.4 -30.0 +3.0
6 o.o 0.0 -30.0 +25.4
- ps-







1 172.1 -13.3 71.4 0.0
2 172.1 -13.3 -45.4 -68.2
3 72.6 -13.3 20.0 10.5
4 72.6 -13.3 -40 0 -44.7
5 31.0 -13.3 -40.0 -27.6
6 0.0 0.0 -40.0 10.5







1 6.2 -20.0 -90.0 -86.4
2 19.4 -20.0 -90 0 -86.9
3 15.4 -20.0 -90.0 -86.9
4 10.3 -20.0 -70.0 -60.0














1 -64.2 -16.7 8.3 + 32.6
2 -48.8 -16. 7 8.3 +32.6
3 0.0 0.0 8.3 oor—11
Project 6A Values of I (Tages)
Times Cost Price Quantity Return Factor
During Development Sold
Period
1 265.9 242.9 -45.4 -4.0
2 81.7 66.7 -40.0 2.1
3 41.9 66.7 -40.0 29.7
4 41.9 20.0 -40.0 -2.0
5 19.9 0.0 -20.0 54.8
6 17.8 0.0 -20.0 57.4
7 17.8 0.0 -20.0 33.3
8 29.9 0.0 -20.0 33.3
9 0.0 0.0 -20.0 33.3
2.2?^
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1 15.8 56.7 -62.5 -47.6
2 15.0 56.7 -70.0 -54.2
3 10.3 56.7 -70.0 -50.0
4 -22.8 34.3 -70.0 -50.0












1 53.1 -44.4 -90.0 -95.0
2 53.1 -44.4 -90.0 -95.0
3 27.3 0.0 -91.7 -91.1
4 0.0 0.0 -93.8 -91.8
222
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Project 9A Values of I ''"/cages")
Times Cost Price Quantity Return Factor
During Development Sold
Period
1 153.7 -42.9 1 O 00 00 -91.0
2 0.0 0.0 -37.5 -18.2







1 276.7 -6.0 -66. 7 -87.9
2 276.7 -6.0 -66.7 -87.9
3 0.0 -6.0 -66. 7 -7.0
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The main conclusions that can be drawn from the preceeding
analysis of forecast behaviour are as follows. First, cost forecasts
or predictions certainly get closer to the true value over time.
However, in most cases cost forecasts converge on the true value
slowly and it requires about 50% of the development period* before
the bias in the forecast becomes small enough for us to say the un¬
certainty in our cost estimate has been satisfactorily resolved.
Second, estimates of price are sufficiently close to the final value
in most cases, with the important exception of project 6. With
project 6, a technically advanced product, it is clear that there is
a large measure of uncertainty in the initial price forecasts. How¬
ever, we can see that by period 4 the uncertainty in the price fore¬
cast is reduced to only 20% This can be explained by the great
improvement in the cost forecasts over the first four periods and
the firm's cost-plus pricing policy.
•5^-^it-
Third, in most ca.ses, estimates of sales tend to oscillate
widely about the true value. This finding reflects the great degree
of uncertainty that is faced by engineers and marketing managers
in estimating market conditions for a product generated as a by¬
product of the research and development output.
Fourth, if we analyse the behaviour of the return factor index,
into which estimates of the above three factors are placed, we find
predictably that uncertainty about the worth of the project is not
resolved quickly through time because of the degrees of uncertainty
* Actual times for projects are not given here for confidentiality
reasons. Although forecasts are not made at equal intervals of
time during the development period it is reasonable to consider
the middle forecast as being made approximately half way through
a given project.
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inherent in cost and sales forecasts.
We have looked in general terms at the behaviour of the individual
forecasts. Now, we must consider a number of general issues on which
this study provides guidelines. We should note immediately that the
evidence here leads us to infer that uncertainty about project outcome,
sales and cost remains until a significantly large proportion of the
development period has elapsed. This is an important inference
because it suggests that a parallel path strategy for a firm such as A
carrying out applied, product orientated R&D work is a costly pro¬
position. The mere fact that uncertainty is only slowly resolved implies
that learning by doing on projects will be costly and produce high pro¬
ject wastage rates.
Another equally important point is that the greatest degrees of
uncertainty are evidenced in cost and sales forecasts. How can we
improve these forecasts? The next chapter considers the extent to
which we can use previous estimating experience to revise present
or future experience but it is important to state here that we should
try to extract from past data, however rough they may be, lessons
from which future estimating practice can be developed and improved.
An additional source of improvement would be to educate the engineer
and manager more about the characteristics and nature of the R&D
process and, in particular, about the close interactions between
economic and technical factors on a project.
Cost and sales as we have seen are the areas of great forecast
I
uncertainty. However, we should ask how much the area of uncertainty
is clouded by the uncertain technical or design nature of the project.
In particular, is there a correlation between changes in the objectives
of projects and inaccurate forecasting behaviour. Unfortunately in this
study our sample of projects is so small that on only one project was
there any significant change in project objectives. The project on which
this occurred was project 6A and we have noted already the huge im¬
provement in the cost and price forecasts that occurred in the 4th
period of the development stage of 6A. Instrument 6A, which is a
specialised testing instrument, had a change in performance and
design specifications between the third and the fourth period. The
changes were caused by a number of factors including greater tech¬
nical awareness and the need for certain features to be added to the
original design in order to improve the instrument's performance in
a number of areas of application. Discussions with project engineers
suggest that if these changes in objectives, had been known initially
the initial estimate of cost would have increased by no more than
50% which would have had the effect of reducing the forecast inaccuracy
for cost as a whole by no more than 15%. The engineers felt that lack
of knowledge of the final design configuration was not sufficient on its
own to explain the extent of forecast inaccuracy. They mentioned
factors like technical uncertainty and the lack of appreciation of
how lnng it would take to complete development work as being equally
important.
We have not attempted here to break down the values of I
either by degree of technical advance or commercial success.
There are two reasons for this: first, the analysis would tend
to be repetitive given the breakdown presented earlier and second,
the analysis can be carried out simply enough from observation of
the graphs by the reader. The important point in this section is
that we provide evidence on forecast behaviour which is not
available elsewhere in great detail and this enables us to con¬
clude that uncertainty resolution on the R&D projects studied
here is generally a slow process. As a result a learning by doing
or a parallel path R&D strategy might prove to much less useful
in industrial R&D than military R&D contract work.
7. 3. 3. Validity of the Return Factor Index as a Measure of
Project Worth
Firm A uses a formal selection index, basically a ratio of
the form Net Revenue/Cost, to evaluate the worth of research project.
Ratios like firm A's index require estimates of cost of development,
and sales and revenue variables which we have already seen to be very
inaccurate in most cases. Such large inaccuracies in the estimates
of cost and sales factors can make the measure of worth of a project
relatively useless.
There is, of course, a further more important question to
discuss when considering the validity of a measure of worth such
as a return factor, namely: how sure are we that the Net Revenue/Cost
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ratio is an adequate measure for evaluating the worth of an investment
project such as a research and development project? Should projects
be evaluated solely in terms of financial criteria?
In the analysis we shall first consider the inaccuracy in the
initial return factor prediction in terms of its closeness to the final
return factor. We then consider what other financial criteria would
be more useful in analysing the worth of research projects and, in parti¬
cular, criteria based on the actuarial principle of discounting cash flows.
The discussion of alternative criteria is illustrated by cash flow dia¬
grams for the ten projects already considered in xirm A.
If we now consider Table VI we find our usual analysis of F
factors i. e. final values initial estimated values for the return factor
indices.
Table VI
F RATIOS OF FINAL RETURN FACTOR VALUES TO INITIAL
RETURN FACTOR ESTIMATES
Mean F Ratio for Technically
Advanced Projects = 1. 12
Mean F Ratio for Non-Techni-
cally Advanced Projects = 0. 33
Project F. Ratios











It would appear from the table that return factor predictions
are better for technically advanced than for less technically advanced
projects. This is more by accident than design since if we refer back
to the behaviour of sales and cost forecasts through time for the
technically advanced projects we find that in most cases changes
in cost forecasts are associated with compensating changes in sales
forecasts either instantaneously or a number of periods later. The
net effect of these changes on the project return factor index is to
leave the value of the return factor at the end of the project's life
approximately the same as it was initially. This can also be explained
in a different way by referring back to Table II. In that table we
found that the mean F ratios for cost, quantity sold and price for
more and less technically advanced projects were 2. 97, 1. 58 and
1. 75 and 1. 78, 0. 31 and 0. 95 respectively. If we now remember
that a return factor ratio is of the form Net Revenue/Cost, final
ratios as compared with initial ratios for technically advanced pro¬
jects will be about the same because the increase in the denominator,
cost, is met by corresponding increases in the numerator, revenue,
which is proportional to price times quantity sold. Similarly, for
less technically advanced projects cost escalates i.e. the denominator
increases in size relative to the numerator which decreases because
of the reduction in sales forecasts. The net effect is, therefore, to
reduce the value of the return factor.
We can see, therefore, that return factor predictions are
affected by the weaknesses inherent in the input forecasts* of sales
and cost. Because sales and cost forecast inaccuracies tend to
cancel out in the case of technically advanced projects but not in
the case of less advanced projects the difference in the research
team's ability to forecast return can be explained. It is clear,
therefore, that the validity and usefulness of the return factor
index is severely weakened by problems in the forecasts of sales
and costs. This suggests that improvements in the methods of
assessing and presenting forecasts must be made to the extent
that initial estimates are assessed as range rather than point
forecasts i.e. we take the uncertainty in the forecast into account
by specifying the range within which it is likely to occur rather
than the exact point of occurrence.
Any return index is thus dependent upon the accuracy and
method of presentation of forecast variables. Its validity is also
dependent upon the extent to which it represents the financial
operations of the firm. There has been a great deal of adoption
in recent years of techniques for financial appraisal which take
full account of the time value of money. Such discounting techniques
are based upon the inverse of the actuary's principle of compound
interest. The attraction of the techniques for the manager of the
firm is that they take full account of the distribution through time
of the cash flows accruing to investment and earnings. They clearly
differ from the type of return factor index of Firm A which is a
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a ratio of Revenues to Costs and where revenues are treated
as being of the same worth to the firm even if they occur pre ¬
dominantly towards the end of a projects life. A discounting cri¬
terion would weight revenues and costs, if necessary, by the
interest rate factor which reflects the time value of money.
In Table VII below we present ratios of the net present
value of projects 1-10 to their initial cost. The net present value
(NF'V) criterion has beer, obtained by discounting each project's
gross cost and revenue cash flows (see the cash flow graphs for
each project presented on subsequent pages) by the appropriate
cost of capital or discount rate for the firm and obtaining the net
present value by treating discounted revenues as positive quantities
and discounted costs as negative quantities. If the firm has only
finite amounts of money available for investment in R &D projects,
it is reasonable to consider NPV per unit of money employed i. e.
cost as a measure of worth of an individual research project.
Table VII
RATIOS OF NET PRESENT VALUE TO INITIAL COST FOR
TEN PROJECTS IN FIRM A
Ranking of Pro¬ Ranking of Pro¬ Ranking of Pro¬
Projects Ratio (NPV) jects in Terms jects in Terms jects in Terms
Cost of NPV/Cost of final R. F. of initial R.F.
1 1.48 6 6 9
2 2. 78 1 1 7 =
3 1. 25 7 4 7
4 2. 15 3 7 2
5 2.45 2 2 6
6 1. 60 5 3 5
n
l 0. 06 8 9 10
8 -0. 71 10 10 3
9 +0. 03 9 8 4
10 + 1. 75 4 5 1
Vtf-
Colums 3, 4 and 5 of this table show a ranking of each project
in terms of its worth to the firm under the NPV/Cost, final return
factor and initial return factor criteria respectively. No meaning
should be read into this ranking about selection between projects
because these projects occurred in the period 1963-69 at random
intervals. The ranking is merely undertaken to show that different
criteria assess the worth of projects differentially and result in
return factor or worth predictions that do not imply the same
decisions to adopt or select a project by the firm concerned.
It is clearly argued that predictions of final financial outcome
of a project will improve with better forecasting of economic factors
and adoption of financial discounting criteria of project worth.
Financial outcome is not the sole criterion of worth of a project
becausejthe need for the firm to develop its R&D expertise in
several technical areas. However, if the engineer / manager better
appreciates the interaction between technical and financial factors
then the efficiency of project selection decisions is likely to show a
significant improvement.
One way in which sales forecasting procedures may improve is through th«
observation of past actual sales data for R&D projects. In fact, if we
consider the graphs of sales against time for the 10 R & D projects of
firm A then only projects 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A 4 5A and 6A show evidence
of the product life cycle philosophy which is used in the commercial











they estimate sales of a product by picturing an idealised product
life cycle diagram showing growth, maturity and decline for the
project, by estimating the peak or mature sales volume and then
assigning sales to each phase of the project according to the pro¬
duct life cycle diagram. This is clearly an efficient procedure if
we have a constant or known period of time for the project's life
cycle diagram with unknown parameters to be estimated by the
forecaster. As .:e have said only five of the projects show evidence
of a product life cycle shape and it is significant that four of these
are the technically advanced projects. This suggests, on the basis
of somewhat limited evidence, that the concept is useful for, and
applicable to, R&D projects of medium to large complexity. We
can, however, make this statement slightly stronger by remembering
that project 10 is a contract project and cannot be expected to gene¬
rate sales according to a project life cycle curve. Thus, over 50%
of the projects can be viewed in terms of a product life cycle but
particularly those with a significant degree of technological innovation
in design. Therefore, rigid adherence to sales forecasts made in
terms of the product life cycle can only be justified with relatively
technically advanced R&D projects.
7. 4. Summary Statement on the Performance of the R&D
Department in Firm A over the Period Studied
In this very short section we consider the global performance
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of the R&D department in Firm A over the period studied in
order to put the cost/benefit analysis into perspective. Over
the period of study 31. 3% of the resources available for research
and development expenditure have been spent on projects that for
one reason or another have been shelved. If we allow for the fact
that 10-12% or approximately 1/3 of the "wasted"' R&D resources
have value to the firm through technical learning and "spin-off",
then we can say that approximately 80% of the R&D work has
contributed to commercially oriented products. This compares
with an average percentage for the 10 firms in the electrical
5
engineering industry in the FBI Enquiry of 63. 5% (see table 9,
P. 9)ip ). This would suggest that the efficiency and product
orientation of this firm in R & D work is better than average and,
if the percentage distribution in the FBI Survey is a criterion, at a high
level of efficiency relative to other firms in its industrial sector.
Certainly when viewed in relation to manufacturing industry as a
whole, on the basis of the 1959/60 FBI evidence, it has operated
extremely efficiently in the R&D area.
7. 5 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this analysis has been to look retrospectively
at the results of the research and development work in two firms,
A and B. We found initially that records were only adequate enough
in A for a detailed analysis to be carried out and that firm B's per-
5. Research and Development in Manufacturing Industry, 1959-60.
London: Federation of British Industries, 1961
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formance could from subjective observation, be considered to be
less efficient than A's.
The rationale for the analysis was to learn more about the
characteristics of the R&D process by piecing together the
past performance and operations of the research and development
department.
The main conclusion from the evidence presented here is
that forecast inaccuracy is of the same order of magnitude in the
two firms studied as in the chemical firms considered by Allen
and Meadows. Further, for projects with a high degree of tech¬
nical advancement the inaccuracy of estimation is of the same order
of magnitude as in the military R&D studies of Feck and Scherer and
Marshall and Meckling. The behaviour of forecasts through time is
found to be unpredictable and indicates clearly that the uncertainty
present in the R&D projects is not resolved quickly during the
development period. Estimators find it mos t difficult to forecast
costs and likely sales and it is found that relatively small inaccuracies
in the forecasts of both these variables can have much larger effects
on the measure of worth or likely rate of return from a project.
It is not difficult given the evidence evaluated here to under¬
stand why formal models for the selection of R & D work are
difficult to construct. Even Firm A which had a formal selection
index suffered from large inaccuracies in estimates of costs and
sales factors. This suggests that more attention must be given to
3*$
organisational considerations before formulating project selection
models for individual firms. In particular, the relation between
estimated and actual project outcomes must be documented retro¬
spectively by each organisation. Inaccuracies in estimation can
reflect organisational, social and technical factors present in the
individual firm which must be understood in greater depth. In
addition, relatively little is known of the nature of uncertainty
in R & D projects and more importantly when estimates become
sufficiently reliable for a reasonable discrimination between the
worth of various R&D projects to be effected.
We must repeat again that inaccuracies in estimates are im¬
portant because of the uses to which they are put. In the case of
research and development these estimates are used as a basis on
which firms decide to allocate financial and technical resources be¬
tween various projects. It is clearly the function of such estimates
to improve and stimulate better project decisions. Unfortunately,
the evidence shows that estimates are very often unreliable and
only become relatively more reliable much later in the develop¬
ment period. Consequently, resource allocation decisions involving
the calculation of return factors based on estimates which are so
inaccurate that they can only be regarded as worthless are unlikely
to be very useful.
We turn in the next chapter to the consideration of ways in
which we can harness the knowledge of inaccuracies in past data
to improve prospective cost and sales forecasts.
PART III
Chapter ^
METHODS FOR IMPROVING FORECASTS OF VARIABLES
RELATED TO R&D PROJECTS
8. 0 Introduction
Summers' questions whether our knowledge of cost estimating
errors can help us to improve future estimates and also ultimately
our resulting project selection decision. We concentrate here on
the extent to which adjustment of present estimates by means of
our knowledge of past estimating behaviour is justified. Summers'
position is that the cost estimating position of the recent past is
very relevant to assessing the worth of present day estimates.
Of course, the main problem with the analysis of past data on
estimating errors is the accuracy of the information on which the
analysis is based. Is a difference between an initial estimate and a
final value of cost a true measure of inaccuracy? The answer is
not necessarily since, for example, it depends on the basis on
which the initial estimate was calculated and any subsequent changes
project definition and objectives which affect the magnitude of the
final actual value. We know, of course, that Marshall and Meckling's
analysis states that provided we treat estimates, however they are
generated, as estimates of achieving the project's objectives satis-
1. R. Summers, "Cost Estimates as Predictors of Actual Costs"
in T. Marschak (ed. ) Strategy for R fc D, ( Springer-Verlag, Berlin
1968)
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factorily by a given date, we can view the difference between initial
and final estimates as a measure of the uncertainty actually con¬
fronted in making research and development decisions. However,
whilst it gives us a measure of the magnitude of uncertainty in
broad terms it is not specific enough for operational use in
amending present day estimates for known past inaccuracies. To
be able to do this we must follow Summers' advice and extract every
piece of evidence from the information available. A first step in any
analysis of this type must obviously be to enquire into the nature and
sources of estimate inaccuracy. Marshall and Meckling suggest
that the main source of improvement in estimates of cost, parti¬
cularly for military research programs, lies in being able to fore¬
cast the final design configuration for the project as early as possible.
If improvement is not possible in this way tfcon some other method
must be found to estimate the extent of bias and potential variability
concerning a project's predictions and to adjust existing estimates
by means of our estimates of bias and variability, bummers in his
study of cost predictions follows the suggestions of Marshall and
Meckling and tries to analyse the sources of uncertainty in past
data before attempting to construct a debiasing formula. Summers
specifically isolates three important variables which influence in¬
accuracy, namely, the technical complexity of the project, the
length of time necessary for accomplishment of the development
work and the time at which the estimate was made during the develop-
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ment period. We have discussed earlier the rationale for the
influence of these variables on cost estimates and as such we
accept their relevance here. Indeed, in the previous chapter similar
relationships were found with the much smaller sample of 10 pro¬
jects analysed as part of this study.
We shall consider in subsequent sections the work of Summers
and the adjustment approach adopted in this study. The reasons for
each type of analysis will be evaluated and the conclusions and
implications for forecast adjustment will be assessed.
8. 1. The Summers Study
We have discussed two features of Summers work already.
First, his findings on inaccuracy which agree in broad terms
with the existing evidence on military R&D. Second, the
variables which explain the major proportion of the uncertainty
inherent in cost estimation, namely, the point of time, t, during
the development program when the estimate is made; the degree
of technical advance, A, of a project; the total length, L, of the
development work and the calendar year, T, in which the estimate
is made (this tends to allow for the learning process in estimation
over time. )
The data available for Summers' analysis consists of 68
estimates of cost for military programs evaluated by the RAND
Corporation over a period from 1945-1958.
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Summers seeks to explain the value of F, the ratio of
actual cost to the adjusted estimate, in terms of the variables
t, L, A and T. He decides that the best method of approach is
regression analysis and by using regression methods he tries
out several functional forms for the relationship between F and
t, Li, A and T. The most satisfactory functional form is found
to be one relating log F, t, L,, A and T. Its estimated form is
shown in the equation below:
log F = 2.479 + 0. 097t - 0. 032t A -0. 311A+ 0. 015A2
e
(0.205) (0.019) (0.189)
+ 0. 008L - 0. 075 (T - 1940) + u
(0.002) (0.020)
Thi6 empirical statement of the relation between F and
2
the independent variables is shown by Summers to confirm the
empirical hypothesis about the sources of uncertainty inherent in
cost forecasts.
To be specific:
(i) for increasing values of t, the expected value
of F goes down
(ii) for increasing values of A, the expected value
of F goes up
(iii) for increasing values of JL, the expected value
of F goes up
2. See R. Summers (op cit) p. 164
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(iv) for increasing values of T, the expected value
of F goes down
(v) for increasing values of t, the standard deviation
of F goes down
(vi) for increasing values of A, the standard deviation
of F goes up
Summers' method is thus a fairly large sample regression analysis
of past data. There are four comments that can be made: first, about
the usefulness of past data in estimating future forecast inaccuracy.
The main problem is that the data is rough and consequently we have
to assume that the data was generated in a similar manner with the
same commitment of resources in each case and that it is a repre¬
sentative sample from the total population cf projects. In addition,
we have to assess whether a knowledge of past data is useful in R & D,
an area of huge technical uncertainty. If it is useful, how far back
into the past is the information valuable for prospective forecasting?
It is the view of this author that past data is likely to be of more use
in military contract projects, where the procedures and practices in
R St D work tend to be much more stereotyped, than in an industrial
context.
Second, is Summers correct in his use of regression analysis
to amend initial forecasts? Is the technical environment sufficiently
damped in its patterns of change for a rigid analytic method of the
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regression type to adapt to the changing nature of the R&D process?
Third, why did Summers choose a linear model to characterise
the nature of the process? He gives disappointingly little justification
for adoption of the linear model and the particular functional form in
view of his data base of 68 projects. With so many degrees of freedom
available, it is surprising that he did not try non-linear models since
non-linearities are present in the R&D process e.g. is it really true
that learning during development is a linear function of time (see
Summers p. 175)?
Fourth, Summers treats only uncertainty in cost estimation in
his analysis. From the point of view of the industrial firm and
particularly the R&D manager, analysis of sources of uncertainty
in market forecasts is useful.
In summary, Summers' study is a valuable one in that the
sources of inaccuracy are first assessed and then combined into
a formula approach. In the next section the less sophisticated approach
of the present study is considered.
8. 2 The Adjustment Study
8. 2. 0 Introduction
The detailed study carried out by Summers consisted of evidence
on the cost forecast behaviour of 68 projects. In this short study the
sample size is much smaller and refers to the ten projects of firm A
whose forecast behaviour has been analysed through time in Chapter
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Because the sample size is smaller the analysis necessarily
becomes cruder because we ha^e only a small number of degrees
of freedom with which to estimate relationships by statistical methods.
Further, the fact that the sample is so small means that it will be
very difficult for us to establish either the validity of the
relationships or to draw any general conclusions.
However, the rationale of the analysis is to consider various
approaches for up-dating initial estimates of cost, sales and price
in relation to applied research and development projects. Since
research and development decision making is a process in which
we make an initial decision to undertake a project and then review
the performance of that project through time at periodic decision
review points, there is a need for initial forecasts to be up-dated
and improved through time.
The differentiating feature of the analysis presented here is
that it refers to a number of industrial R&D projects and seeks
to improve the accuracy of forecasts on price and sales as well
as development cost. The analysis takes account of the evidence
on the behaviour of forecasts through time by including the fore¬
cast value initially, the forecast value at the end of the development
period and the actual final value. It considers past data on forecast
performance in such a way that it can be used to indicate the
general directions in which bias will occur in sales and cost
forecasts for R&D projects.
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8. 2. 1. Methodology
For the ten R&D projects of Firm A we have available
estimates of development cost, sales and price made at the
initial adoption phase of the project and the end of the develop¬
ment period, and also the actual (or estimated actual where sales
are still continuing) final values. We use these values to fit a
series of simple linear regressions to the data relating final
costs, sales, price and return factor values, first, to their
estimated values at the end of development and, second, to their
estimated initial values and those at the end of the development
period jointly. We consider linear functions for two reasons:
first, because of their computational simplicity and thus the
consequent ease with which they can be performed repetitively in the
future by the R&D staff and second, because the small sample of
observations available makes sophistication in the functional form
of the relationship pointless and the number of possible independent
variables that can be included in the analysis limited. We try the
analysis as a first step to see if simple rule of thumb formulae
can be applied to improve forecasts. We recognise that such simple
regression formulae neglect making allowance for known sources
of uncertainty in the development process some of which are indi¬
genous to particular organisations. We are asking if simple linear
relationships exist between initial values, intermediate values and
their final values.
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We present the results of the regression analyses (Ordinary
Least Squares: OLS) below. It should be noted that there are two
separate analyses. Regressions are carried out first for all 10
observations and then for the six observations most representative
of the future pattern of firm A's work.
In the price and cost regressions the individual observations
are in dollar values. We justify this because most of the projects
are of sufficiently similar size and scope that the likelihood of
problems of lieteroscedasticity and consequent bias in OLS is
correspondingly small.
8. 2. 2. Return Factor Estimates
Rj denotes the initial return factor estimate
R^ denotes the estimate made at the end of development
R^ denotes the actual final value
The regressions are carried out
1) for all 10 projects
2) for projects 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 considered by the firm
to be most useful in terms of representing the future pattern of
research work by the firm.
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1) 10 Observations
a) R2 = 4.51 + 0.01R1
(0.06)
t = (0.22)
b) R = 1.39 + 0.46R2
(0.37)
t = (1.23)














b) R3 = 2.27 + 0.30R2 R = 5.25%
(0.63)
t = (0.47)
c) R3 = 7.76 - 0.7R^ + 0.025R2 R2 = 75.47%
(0.24) (0.38)
t = (2.93) t= 0.07
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8. 2. 3. Quantity Estimates
Let be the final sales per period of time (month)
Let be the estimate of final sales made at the end of the
development period
Let Qj be the estimate of final sales per period of time
made initially
Again the regressions are carried out for
a) all 10 projects b) projects 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9
1) 10 observations
a)Q2= 15.45 - 0. 18QJ R2 = 7. 15% d. f. 8
(0. 23)
t= 0. 78
b)Q = -1.26 + 0. 649Q-, R2 = 45. 34% d. f. 8_
(0. 252)
t= 2.58
c)Q = -2.95 + 0. 099Q. + 0. 68Q R2 = 47.47% d.f.7
(0.186) (0.27)
t= (0. 53) t= (2. 51)
2) 6 observations
a)Q = 15. 32 - 0. 142Q R2 = 1.6% d. f. 4
(0. 556)
t= (0. 26)
b)Q = - 0.884 + 0. 667Q R2 = 65.58% d. f. 4
(0. 226) ^
t= (2.95)
c)Q = -5.5 + 0.424Q + 0. 715Q R2 = 90- 22% d. f. 3
(0. 164) (0. 146)
t= (2. 58) t =4. 88
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8.2.4. Price Estimates
let P, denote the final actual price
Let p£ denote the estimated price at the end of the development period
Let Pj denote the initial estimated price
Again the regressions are carried out for:
a) all 10 projects
b) projects 1, 2, 3# 6, 8 and 9
1) 10 observations
a) P2 = $109.2 + 1. 09Pj R2 =55.31% d.f.8
(0. 35)
t= (3. 15)
b) P3 = $9.69 + 0.993P2 R2 = 99.13% d.f.8
(0. 033)
t=(30. 12)
c) P3 =$49.6 - 0. 09Pj +1.04P2 R2 = 99. 30% d. f. 7
(0.069) (0.047)
t= 1.32 t= 22. 03
2) 6 observations
a) P2 =$329. 06 + L04 Pj R2 =49.12% d. f. 4
(0.533)
t=( 1. 96)
b) P3 = $-52. 85 + 1.014 P R2 = 99.72% d.f.4
(0. 027)
t=(37. 99)




8. 2. 5. Cost Estimat es
The analysis of this data war: carried out in a different way
in order to compare the cost results obtained from Firm A with
the chemical laboratory evidence given by Meadows in his study.
The projects were first divided into commercial successes and
failures and separate regression analyses were carried out for
each category. We find that there are five commercially success¬
ful and five unsuccessful projects. It was decided after thorough
discussion with project personnel to eliminate project 8 from
consideration and this reduced the unsuccessful category co 4
projects. There were convincing arguments to suggest that pro¬
ject 8 was atypical in cost estimation because of management inter¬
ference with the project - this drawback did not affect price and
sales estimates.
Let Cj be the final development cost
Let be the initial estimated development cost
1) Commercially Successful Projects
C2 = - 10791$ + 3. 36 C} R2 = 90.57% d.f 3
(0. 63)
t= (5. 37)
2) Commercially Unsuccessful Projects
C2 = - 16886$ + 2.822 C R2 = 86. 04% d.f. 3
(0. 803)
t (3.51)
These results were then compared with the same type of
regressions calculated here from the data provided by Meadows*
for chemical laboratories A and B. The regressions are presented
below:
Meadows Chemical Laboratory A
1) Commercially Successful Projects
C3 = 5232$ + 0. 138 Cj
(0. 186)
t (0.74)
R2 = 5. 2% d.f. 10
2) Commercially Unsuccessful Projects
C3 = 6489$ + 0.698 Cj
(0. 810)
t~ 0. 86
R2 = 7. 61% d.f. 9
3) Technically Unsuccessful Projects
C3 = 347. 1$ + 2. 51 Cj R2 = 47.93% d.f. 5
(1. 17)
t= (2. 15)
* Note: D. Meadows has given permission for me to use data
from a working paper
Meadows Chemical Laboratory B
1) Commercially Successful Projects
= $528.4 + 0. 595 C.
(0. 125)
t= (4. 75)
2) Commercially Unsuccessful Projects
C3 = -4255.1$ + 10.89 Cj
(1.64)
t= (6.66)
8.2.6. Comments on regression results
Some comments can immediately be made about the results of the
analysis. First, it is not surprising given the nature of the return
factor formula and the inaccuracies that exist in the benefit and cost
forecasts that simple relationships between estimates of return
factors made at different points in time during the project do not
exist. In fact the only relationship of any significance is 2) c) where
approximately 75% of the variance in the final return factor is ex¬
plained by the combination of the and values but only the
regression coefficient of R^ is significant at the 5% level under
a "t" test. This might suggest that with larger samples a relation¬
ship between R0 and R^ might be present but it is unlikely to be of
operational use because of the biases inherent in the return factor
measure itself.
Second, the results on quantity estimates confirm that no linear
relationship of any significance exists between estimates made
initially and those made at the end of the development period.
However, there is some evidence from equations lb, lc, and
2b, 2c that the final sales value is related to a combination of Q1
and Q, particularly in the case of the six observations. Yet in no
case, given our previous knowledge that quantity forecasts oscil¬
late about the true value through time, can we say that a rule of
thumb linear adjustment formula will necessarily improve future
sales forecasts.
Third, in the case of price forecasts we find very strong
linear relationships between final prices and those estimated
at the end of development. This is a reasonable finding since a
major uncertainty in the pricing analysis for a project in this
firm is the development cost. Linear relationships between
initial prices and P are not as strong but are just about sig-
nificant in both cases. Again the analysis confirms that the
major sources of uncertainty in pricing for this firm are re¬
solved by the end of the development period.
Fourth, in Firm A there appears to be a strong linear re¬
lationship between final costs and initial costs for both techni¬
cally and commercially successful projects. This appears also
to be the case for Chemical Lab B but mysteriously not for
Chemical Lab. A. Therefore, the analyses of industrial R&D
so far available do not agree with each other even on the strength
of the relationship between initial and final values. Further, if
we compare our Firm A with Meadows' Firms A and B, we find
that the regression coefficients for Meadows A and B are much
larger for technically and commercially unsuccessful projects
than for commercially successful projects whereas the reverse
is true for our firm A. This makes it clear that although linear
adjustment formulae for up-dating cost estimates may be valuable
for firms, the form and extent of the significance of the relation¬
ships will vary between firms.
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The analysis though very crude suggests that cost and price
forecasts can be adjusted by some sort of debiasing formula. If
more observations on projects had been available we could have
dealt with a larger number of independent variables and different
(and maybe non-linear) functional forms for the regression
equation. However, we can assert that the crude methods of
this section are of no use in adjusting forecasts of return factors
and sales which tend to ascillate around their final values through the
life cycle of the project.
8. 3. Conclusions
Most of the regressions show clearly that the practice of
up-dating initial estimates by working with past data is generally
inadvisable. The regressions also confirm that large errors are
present in forecasts made for R&D projects.
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Chapter
AN APPRAISAL OF THE USE OF THE CASE STUDY APPROACHES
IN BUILDING THEORIES AND MODELS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
The aim of the studies in parts two and three of this thesis
is to acquire knowledge about the nature and economic charac¬
teristics of the development process, and, in particular, to
provide evidence on the development process which is not
presently available in the literature. It is fair to say that the
studies have thrown light upon the nature of uncertainty in the
R&D process and have presented new evidence on the learning
process in development for a number of R & D projects in an
electronics firm. However, it is reasonable to gather our
sails for a moment and summarise the theoretical framework
on which we can build in Part IV. In short, what have we learnt
from Parts II and III and how will this affect our use of the eco¬
nomic evidence summarised in Part I?
In earlier chapters and here we stress the virtues of the
integrated approach to model building, that is, carrying out a
detailed preliminary analysis of economic and environmental factors
in the firm before commencing on the model building phase. This
approach implied that we first form a descriptive theory of the
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R&D process at the firm level. However, we are more
interested in using this observation of firm behaviour to
enrich a normative theory of decision making in R & D at
the firm level.
In Part II we first identify the stages in R & D process.
These consist of the initial search for and generation of pos¬
sible projects, the production from the potential projects of
a flow of new projects in the firm and the transmission of
these projects into commercially viable end products. Deci¬
sions have to be made throughout this process. The size of the
budget for R&D work, the acceptance or rejection of a poten¬
tial project and the review of existing projects for continuation
are some of the areas in which decisions are made by managers
of the R&D function within the firm. Any theory of decision
making must consider the areas in which decisions are made.
Equally important is the environment and conditions under which
decisions are made and this requires a detailed analysis of the
nature of development activity.
There is some truth in Klein's* view of the groping uncextain
nature of R & D activity in view of the evidence presented in the
uncertainty resolution section in the third part about the fact that
estimates of costs and other variables only get fairly accurate
after a significant proportion of the development time has elapsed.
There is clear evidence that there is some sort of learning process
1. B. V. Klein, "The Decision Making Problem in Development",
in R. R. Nelson (ed) The Rate and Direction of Invention Activity
Princeton, 1962
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during development in that estimates of cost improve through
time and become accurate once the final design and detailed
specification are approved. But the slow process of uncertainty-
re solution throws into open debate the policy of operating a
2
parallel path R&D strategy in industrial R&D. The rationale
for a parallel path strategy is clear in military R&D where the
work is at the frontiers of technical knowledge and thus very
little is known initially about design and specification of a mili¬
tary R&D project. Industrial R & D is as we have seen more
applied and concrete in nature and whilst a parallel path strategy
might be useful, it would probably be costly. This means that,
whilst the parallel approach will always improve knowledge and
thus estimates of a project's potential performance, the monetary
gain to the firm from the improved knowledge may be far less than
the cumulative costs of pursuing a number of approaches for each
of the potential projects being considered until a selection of the
best approaches and projects can be made.
3
The papers by Enos, Peck, Marshak and Nelson on case
studies of various inventions suggest that it is a reasonable
simplication to ignore the complications pointed out by Klein
and to treat the allocation of resources to R & D projects as being
capable of explanation in terms of a simple maximisation model.
The evidence from the present studies confirms that it is reasonable
to view the motivation for undertaking R&D work as being the
Z« The Parallel Path Strategy was first presented by R. R. Nelson:
"The Economics of Parallel R&D efforts" RAND Corporation,
1959.
3. See R. R. Nelson (ed) Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity,
Princeton, 1962
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maximisation of some profitability or value function. Our
study of the processes of decision is important in this con¬
text in so far as it tells us that it is reasonable to make the
assumption that managers in R & D act as if they seek to
maximise profitability.
One of the major decision problems in industrial R&D
is the allocation of resources to particular projects i. e. the
project selection problem. Any model to explain allocation
decisions must be based on a minimum amount of information.
In the decision process work we saw that the information sys¬
tems in firms A and B differed in their level of formality and
information content, B presenting relatively little information
for either decision making or control purposes. Yet we con¬
sider that it is perfectly reasonable to expect firms to generate
a certain amount of data for decision making purposes which
can be used as the information framework for an allocation
model. At the same time we recognise in our analysis that
there are undoubtedly cost elements involved in the provision
of management information and control systems for decision
making.
In our study of decision making in firms A and B we saw
that A had a procedure for routinising information gathering for
R&D projects and calculating measures of project worth. In B
the procedures were informal and personal to the R&D decision
maker. We take the position here that if information is being
generated about R&D projects, then there should be a process
or procedure to minimise the need for the decision maker to
process and summarise information. Such an idealised process
is summarised in the block diagrams in the summary to Part II .
We have seen that necessary inputs to such a process are a
priori estimates of project worth for preliminary screening
of potential projects. It must be noted that these estimates of
project worth must make allowance for all the relevant dimen¬
sions of project costs including search costs for potential pro¬
jects and must be plausible measures for decision making pur¬
poses (for example, allowance should be made for the discounting
of future benefits to their present value equivalents). Further,
much more explicit treatment has to be given to the uncertainty
inherent in the R&D process in developing measures of project
worth. The findings in Part III of the thesis show clearly the huge
inaccuracies that exist in forecasts of economic variables related
to R & D projects. There is, thus, a need to incorporate concepts
from probability theory to develop subjective probability fore¬
casts for those economic variables.
It is equally clear that any formal model will be useless unless
problems of obtaining estimates for variables related to R & D
projects are solved. The apparatus of the modern concept of
personal probability provides a basis for incorporating uncertainty
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into initial estimates and Bayesian concepts of conditional
probability give us the means by which we can up-date estimates
through time to take account of the extent of learning over the
stages of the development period.
If better measures of project worth can be developed and
tested and if we also accept the simplistic objective of profit
maximisation for R&D work, then the allocation problem can
be formulated as a maximisation problem subject to constraints
determined by the nature of the operations of the individual firm.
This formulation can be solved in terms of the range of currently
available constrained optimisation techniques.
The final problem in R & D work is the need for continual
re-evaluation of existing projects at review points in order to
compare them with newly generated projects. Typically, the
decision maker might have to recommend the curtailment of an
ongoing project in favour of a new project in a situation of scarce
budgetresources under a profit maximisation objective. It is
clear in this situation that we have a series of sequential allo¬
cation decisions which can be modelled under certain assump¬
tions by techniques such as dynamic programming.
We have so ^ar seen that the R&D process is a multi-stage
process in which uncertainty is present up until a late stage in
the development phase. It is evident that the "invention-innovation"
framework is an useful basic model for the R&D process and it is
reasonable to consider the aim of the invention stage for a given
project to be the achievement of a given quality, Q, or level of
technical success subject to cost, C, and time, t, constraints.
The function Q = f(C, t) relates quality or level of technical
success at the end of development to cost and time where there
can be trade-offs between cost and time to achieve an end result
of given quality. Clearly the objective of the development process
is to achieve as high a quality level as is possible commensurate
with the given cost/time configuration. This situation can be
depicted graphically as follows:
4. T. A. Marschak, "Models, Rules of Thumb and Development
Decisions", in B. V. Dean (ed), O. R. in R & D, (Wiley, 1963)
5. T. A. Marschak, Chapter 5, in Strategy for R&D, ed.
T. Marschak et al (Springer-Verlag, 1968)




Q= f(C,t) is depicted in three space and our clear
objective in the process is to find the maximum point in
Q space for a given project. Choice between projects is
determinedby forming a ranking in descending order of
Q and picking those projects with the highest Q values
subject to constraints on time and money. For any quality
function Q (however we measure Q) we can determine the
maximum point quite simply if we assume that cost is a
function of time. This assumption can be justified quite
reasonably if we review the evidence on the resolution of
uncertainty in cost forecasts over time where we see that C changes
with time in a slightly non-linear way and concerges on the
final value after about half the development period.
Consider Q = f(C, t) C = f(t) i. e. Q = f(t)
dQ = _2_f dC_ + 2_L
dt 3 C dt ^ t
This assumption that C = f(t) in effect makes Q a function
of a single variable time. Then dQ * 0 gives the maximum
dt
quality point i. e. where "^f dC + f = 0.
c dt ^ t
Whilst the above Q = f(C, t) analysis is useful conceptually
it raises severe problems about the measurement of quality. In
most econometric work price is taken to be the indicator of
quality but in this situation how is price defined. In firm A
P = f(C) i.e. the priee of the end product is related to develop¬
ment cost which would suggest that maximisation of quality or
level of technical success with respect to time is nearly equivalent
to the maximisation of development cost with respect to time.
Certainly, it is true that performance or technical objectives
on military projects are achieved in reasonable time with the
inevitable trade-off, cost escalation. Whilst this could be ex¬
plained in terms of cost maximisation it is more likely to be a
function of military contract estimating procedure with its
emphasis on cost plus contracts. In the cost plus situation the
contractor will maximise his profits by maximising his cost.
Clearly, the maximisation of Q (C, t) with respect to
constraints on cost and time could be formulated as a problem
in constrained optimisation by calculus. The model has some
value in viewing the development stage and can provide a basis
for a Bayesian treatment of the R&D process.
6
Arrow puts forward the view that Bayesian methods can
provide a framework within which the knowledge producing
activities of research can be analysed. He views the research
and development process as being ultimately concerned with the
6. K. J. Arrow, "Classificatory notes on the Production and
Transmission of Technical Knowledge", AER Papers and Proceedings,
May 1969.
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problems of uncertainty reduction which have been the topics
of interest in research in statistical decision theory. The
R&D decision maker has a number of possible activities or
projects and he is required to make a choice between pursuing
some or all of these activities when the physical outcome of the
activity and the information required are relevant dimensions
of his decision function. In industrial R&D Mansfield has shown
that the bulk of R & D expenditures are actual steps in the
production process - design, engineering and other costs - and
Arrow used this statement to develop his Bayesian view of the
process. Each stage in the process involves uncertainties about
cost estimates and eventually about final demand patterns for the
output. But as each stage transpires something is learnt about
the process to enable the decision maker's subjective prior pro¬
bability distribution over the outcomes of a particular R&D
activity to be revised into posterior probabilities by means of
Bayes theorem. Arrow, however, is not specifically interested
in developing the Bayesian microeconomic view of the development
process but in aggragating from an individual theory to a collective
theory of the production of technical knowledge.
The aim in this study is clearly microeconomic and we
propose that statistical decision theory is an operationally useful
theoretical framework for the R&D process. We have seen from
Part III that it is very difficult to justify the use of retrospective
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evidence on the parameters of the R&D process e.g. average
cost estimation errors to improve our estimation of the future
performance of the process. Evidence on past uncertainties
cannot be used to mechanically revise future estimate on new
projects but it can be helpful in improving the R&D manager's
initial prior probability distribution over the outcome space by
making him more aware of the source and extent of past inaccu¬
racies. The main reason for our lack of confidence in past R&D
work is the technically uncertain and dynamically changing nature
of R & D activity. In essence, the only useful evidence by which
predictions about the final outcome space can be amended is
evidence from the development project itself through time. This
corresponds with a view of the R&D process as a stochastic
uncertain process which generates its own information flows. In
such an environment the concept of personal or subjective proba¬
bility is valuable because the probabilities over the uncertain
states of nature e.g. cost, characterise the decision maker's
beliefs about the project before research work begins. At that
stage the personal probability distribution over the states of
nature, e.g. cost, time, etc. and the associated prediction in
the outcome space is the sole information base on which the
decision maker can evaluate whether or not to proceed with a given
project. Any projects which pass this initial project selection stage
are passed on to the development phase where the decision maker
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may or may not decide to review their progress at a number of
review points during the development period. If he does not then
the projects will continue over the development period purely on
the basis of the decision maker's prior evaluation of the odds.
However, if there are a number of review points over time, at
each review point the decision maker will have a number of
alternative strategies open to him. He will have information
available from the progress of the R&D work up until the review
point and he will have the option of either curtailing R&D work
because he has sufficient knowledge of the prevailing state of
nature or continuing R & D at a given cost to find out more
information about the states of nature. With either option he has
the opportunity of buying information at a given cost to improve
his knowledge of the research process. However, whatever
decisions he makes he must act in accordance with the posterior
probabilities on the states of nature obtained by the use of the Bayes
formula for conditional probabilities.
Thus Bayesian methods have an intuitive appeal in charac¬
terising the multi-stage decision nature of the R&D process
and further provide a means for formalising degrees of belief
about projects both a priori and a posteriori. It is considered
that the microeconomics of the R&D process in an industrial
context are better explained by the Bayesian model than the parallel
path strategy developed by RAND, which despite its elegance is
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more applicable to very technically advanced projects of the kind
sponsored under military contracts. There is not really such a
problem of choosing between various possible approaches to
tackle a given project in industrial R&D. On most projects
the preliminary evaluation determines the specification, design
configuration and method of approach and it is only when an
industrial R&D project becomes complex that design configu¬
rations change appreciably over time. Of course, in this situation
the combination of the parallel path approach and the Bayesian approach
is extremely useful as can be seen from Marschak's valuable con¬
tributions to the literature.
If we return for a moment to the Q = f(C, t) formulation of the
development or "invention" phase of the R&D process, this relates
the achievement of the best possible quality to cost and time dimen¬
sions (quite clearly others could be added). But we must also con¬
sider the innovation phase of the process, the transformation of a
technical success at a given cost into a commercially viable e nd
product. This is difficult if a poor end quality level is achieved.
If, however, a firm achieves high quality it generally has no
problem in selling the product. In the first situation of poor quality
it is always true that you can se 11 anything provided you try hard
enough but the achievement of extra sales has to be "traded off"
against any increase in marketing and sales costs. It is useful to
remember two parts of the evidence from Part III in this context.
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First, in Firm A we found that technically successful projects
tend also to be commercially successful in terms of the firm's
objectives if we disregard projects, e.g. contracts, which are
not typical of the firm's R&D activity. Second, the major part of
uncertainty in price and cost is resolved by the end of the development
period at which stage the sales mix required to produce orders can
be amended to ensure commercial success. Of course, the major
problem is still to estimate sales at this stage accurately but with
the technical knowledge of the end product that is available, the
decision maker can amend his beliefs of sales patterns and revise
his predictions of the final outcome. The process of commercial
exploitation of a project is thus dependent on the ability and skill of
the firm's marketing employees and any decision maker's prior
probabilities on demand patterns will reflect his awareness of the
firm's ability or inability to commercialise a project.
In summary, the Bayesian approach with its formal treatment
of the uncertainties inherent in , and the multi stage nati re, of the
R&D process is the most fruitful framework for a micro-theory
of development. In the next section we try to build on the structure
suggested in this chapter to build an useful normative approach to
decision making in industrial R&D.
It is true that the studies in Parts II and III refer to only two
firms in the electronics sector of industrial R&D. However, by
comparing questionnaire answers for A and B with the Clark study
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mentioned earlier we find that A and B are reasonably representative
of the typical electronics firm. Thus, our normative approach will
have relevance for electronics firms but should apply with modifica¬
tions to any R&D environment.
We turn now to Part IV in which we develop the Bayesian method
of viewing the R&D process.
